IC-NRLF 


•EX1 


tmntfoer0it£  of  Chicago 

FOUNDED   BY   JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 


CANADA  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  1815-1830 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO   THE  FACULTY 
OF  THE 

GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  ARTS  AND  LITERATURE 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 
DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  HISTORY 


BY 

DAVID  R.  MOORED 


CHICAGO 
1910 


{iffntfctrgftg  of  Chicago 

FOUNDED  BY  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 


CANADA  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  1815-1830 


A  DISSERTATION 

x 

SUBMITTED  TO   THE  FACULTY 
OF  THE 

GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  ARTS  AND  LITERATURE 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 
DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  HISTORY 


BY 
DAVID  R.  MOORE 


CHICAGO 
1910 


Press  of 

JENNINGS  &  GRAHAM 
57  Washington  St. 

Chicago 


To  My  Wife 

KTHEL  HALLAM  MOORE 
this  little  monograph  is  affectionately  dedicated. 


239328 


PREFACE. 


Students  of  Canadian  history  must  ever  be  thankful  for  the  ex 
tensive  accumulation,  careful  preservation,  and  systematic  arrange 
ment,  so  far  as  the  cataloguing  has  progressed,  of  the  historical 
manuscripts  in  the  archive  department  at  Ottawa,  Canada.  In  the 
Ontario  archives  much  collecting  and  arranging  remains  unfinished. 
I  am  very  much  indebted  to  the  directors  and  librarians  in  these 
archives,  especially  to  those  in  Ottawa  where  most  of  my  work  was 
done,  for  their  courteous  treatment  and  assistance.  I  am  also  very 
grateful  to  Professor  A.  C.  McLaughlin  and  his  associates  in  the 
history  department  of  the  University  of  Chicago  for  their  patient 
reading  of  this  monograph  and  for  their  helpful  suggestions. 

University  of  Chicago,  DAVID  R.  MOORE. 

December,  1910. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I.     THE  GENERAL  CONDITION  OF  AFFAIRS  IN  1815. 

British,  Canadian,  and  American  grievances  existing  after  the  Treaty 
of  Ghent. 

CHAPTER  II.    THE  MICHIGAN  FRONTIER  IN  1815. 

Tardy  surrender  of  forts ;  British  traders  and  British  presents  re 
ported  to  be  the  reason  why  the  Indians  resist  the  American  occupa 
tion  of  Green  Bay  and  other  posts ;  councils  at  Detroit ;  murder  of 
Akochis  and  other  trouble  near  Detroit ;  desertion  of  soldiers. 

CHAPTER  III.     NAVAL  ARMAMENTS  ON  THE  GREAT  LAKES. 

The  continued  searching  of  vessels  leads  to  international  correspond 
ence  and  reduction  of  the  navies. 

CHAPTER  IV.    THE  INDIAN  MENACE. 

The  Indians  in  their  councils  of  1816  threaten  war. 
CHAPTER  V.    THE  CANADIANS  RETAIN  THE  INDIANS'  GOOD  WILL. 

The  Indians  prefer  the  British  traders  and  cooperate  with  them ; 
failure  of  the  American  factory  system. 

CHAPTER  VI.     INDIAN  PRESENTS. 

The  British  continue  to  send  presents  to  American  Indians ;  reasons 
for  this ;  number  of  Indians  affected ;  abuses  resulting  from  the  giving 
of  presents;  protests. 

CHAPTER  VII.    APPREHENSION  OF  AMERICAN  AGGRESSION. 

The  British  fear  that  the  Canadas  are  still  in  danger  of  an  Amer 
ican  invasion. 

CHAPTER  VIII.    DREAD  OF  AMERICAN  INSTITUTIONS  AND  INFLUENCES. 

Many  British  fear  that  American  republican  influences  may  cause 
the  Canadians  to  forsake  their  allegiance  to  England. 

CHAPTER  XI.     BOUNDARY  LINES  AND  FREE  NAVIGATION. 

Disputed  boundary  from  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  Lake  Superior. 
United  States  claim  the  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence. 

CHAPTER  X.    COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS. 

Navigation  laws  more  strenuously  enforced  after  1815;  temporary 
and  variable  commercial  regulations  for  the  Canadas  until  1822 ;  de 
mand  for  freer  trade ;  abandonment  of  the  old  colonial  system ;  smug 
gling. 

CHAPTER  XI.     TRANSPORTATION. 

How  Canadian  relations  with  the  United  States  affected  the  trans 
portation  system  and  other  internal  affairs  in  the  Canadas. 

7 


Canada  and  the  United  .States — 1815-1830 

I. 

THE   GENERAL   CONDITION   OF  AFFAIRS   IN    1815. 

The  experience  derived  from  the  days  of  the  American  Revolution 
must  have  taught  European  nations  wholesome  lessons  in  the  man 
agement  of  colonies.  Nevertheless,  for  over  half  a  century  after 
the  British  lost  the  United  States,  England  still  compelled  her  Amer 
ican  possessions  to  endure  a  slowly  dying  system  of  navigation 
laws  and  similar  irritating  and  obnoxious  restrictions.  It  was  ap 
parently  with  the  greatest  reluctance  that  the  average  European 
statesman  could  accept  the  theory  that  colonies  do  not  exist  solely 
for  the  benefit  of  the  mother  country,  that  they  are  not  places  for 
mere  exploitation,  and  that  local  autonomy  must  be  given  in  due 
season. 

The  Canadas  were  peculiarly  and  dangerously  situated  for  the 
continuance  of  any  antiquated  and  nonprogressive  system.  Com 
mon  laws,  language,  customs,  and  descent,  common  commercial 
and  industrial  interests,  similar  local  conditions  and  the  lack  of  any 
geographical  barrier  tended  to  bring  the  Canadians  into  very  close 
touch  with  the  people  in  the  United  States.  The  very  presence  of 
the  youthful,  vigorous,  enterprising,  liberty-loving  American  Re 
public  was  a  menace  to  anything  that  abridged  ''natural  rights." 
In  addition  to  this,  American  proclamations  issued  during  the  war 
of  1812  convinced  many  Englishmen  that  the  American  Republic 
was  to  be  feared  not  merely  from  the  example  that  it  set,  but  from 
the  fact  that  its  citizens  were  ambitiously  eager  to  carry  their  flag 
and  institutions  over  all  the  continent.  A  few  enlightened  British 
statesmen  accordingly  endeavored  to  retain  the  loyalty  of  their 
colonists  by  loosening  the  shackles  which  bound  colonial  trade  and 
commerce  and  by  strenuously  opposing  any  arbitrary  imperial 
domination  in  local  affairs.  But  until  the  rebellion  of  1837  the 
prevailing  British  policy  was  to  maintain  the  old  system,  and  as 
far  as  the  Canadas  were  concerned,  prevent  the  loyal  inhabitants 
there  from  being  exposed  to  the  contaminating  influence  of  the 
expanding  democracy  to  the  south  of  them. 

The  Treaty  of  Ghent  in  1814  was  gladly  welcomed  because  it 
brought  about  the  cessation  of  active  hostilities,  and  yet  it  did  not 
usher  in  a  period  of  perfect  peace,  harmony  and  confidence.  In 

9 


the  United  States  indignation  was  aroused  because  practices  con 
tinued  which  it  had  been  hoped  the  war  would  bring  to  an  end. 
Vessels  were  again  boarded  and  searched;  Indians  were  corrupted 
by  British  presents;  life  and  property  along  the  western  frontier 
were  endangered  by  savages  generally  believed  to  be  emboldened 
by  British  intriguers;  the  American  Northwestern  fur  trade  was 
almost  monopolized  by  foreigners;  and  increased  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  persuading  the  tribes  to  surrender  their  lands  and 
make  room  for  the  American  farmer  and  merchant. 

The  Treaty  of  Ghent  stipulated  that  the  United  States  should 
restore  to  the  Indians  with  whom  they  had  been  at  war  all  the 
possessions,  rights  and  privileges  which  the  Indians  had  enjoyed 
or  been  entitled  to  in  1811,  previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war.a 
These  "possessions,  rights  and  privileges"  were  variously  inter 
preted  by  the  United  States,  the  Indians,  and  the  British.  During 
the  negotiations  at  Ghent  the  British  plenipotentiaries,  asserting 
that  the  Indians  "must  in  some  sort  be  considered  as  an  independent 
people,"  endeavored  to  create  a  kind  of  Indian  state  in  the  Old 
Northwest  which  would  form  a  barrier  between  the  United  States 
and  Canada.b  When  they  failed  in  this  attempt  to  creat  a  buffer 
state  they  insisted  on  having  the  Indians  specially  mentioned  and 
protected  by  the  contracting  parties.  The  British  wanted  to  provide 
for  the  welfare  of  the  tribes  who  had  helped  them  in  the  war,  but 
they  also  had  in  mind  the  protection  of  the  Canadas  and  perhaps 
were  influenced  not  a  little  by  the  desire  to  have  a  share  in  the 
profits  of  the  fur  trade.  The  result  was  that  the  British  continued 
to  be  very  friendly  with  the  Indians  residing  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States,  and  Americans  complained  that  much  of  the 
Indian  discontent  was  due  to  the  sympathy  and  support  which 
Canadian  agents  extended  to  the  tribes. 

In  Canada  also  there  was  restlessness.  Almost  unaided  the 
loyalists  had  held  the  enemy  at  bay  for  three  years.  Now  they 
saw  their  prosperity  and  progress  hampered  by  ill-advised  and  un 
intelligent  regulations.  They  censured  the  London  Colonial  office 
for  exploiting  the  colonies,  for  placing  friends  in  fat  salaried  si 
necures,  for  maintaining  an  irresponsible,  superimposed,  provincial 
government,  for  fixing  trade  and  tariff  laws  to  favor  English 
merchants  or  manufacturers,  for  hindering  American  immigrants 


"Am.   State  Papers,   For.  Bel.,  Vol.   Ill,   p.   745  ff. 
blbid.,  p.  706. 

10 


from  entering  and  developing  the  natural  resources  of  Canada, 
for  sacrificing  Canadian  interests  in  commercial  conventions  and 
boundary  line  awards,  in  short  for  being  either  ignorant  of  or  in 
different  to  provincial  needs  and  desires.  Canadian  soldiers  de 
serted,  and  colonists  left  Canada  for  the  western  states.  The 
English  suspected  American  immigrants  and  feared  American  de 
mocracy.  There  was  danger  in  the  spread  of  republican  principles 
lest  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  the  British  colonies  should  shake  off 
their  allegiance  to  the  mother  country  in  order  to  enjoy  greater 
political  liberty  and  economic  prosperity.  British  administrative 
officers  were  cognizant  of  dissatisfaction  in  the  Canadas  and  be 
lieved  that  the  United  States  was  in  part  responsible  for  this.c 

The  close  of  the  three  years'  war  was  therefore  followed  by  a 
period  wherein  there  arose  many  a  matter  relative  to  the  Canadas 
which  was  international  in  scope  and  which  became  the  subject  of 
discussion  and  negotiation  between  the  .United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  It  is  with  these  international  events  that  the  following 
chapters  have  to  deal.  ! 


'Durham's  Report,  p.  41. 


11 


II. 

THE  MICHIGAN  FRONTIER  IN   1815. 

The  first  serious  engagements  of  the  war  had  been  at  or  near 
Detroit  and  Amherstburg.  Here,  too,  among  the  frontiersmen  so 
recently  withdrawn  from  the  battlefield,  and  among  a  savage  race 
who  hated  the  Long  Knives  for  encroaching  upon  their  lands,  the 
ugly  demon  of  discord  lingered  the  longest,  ever  threatening  to 
bring  about  a  renewal  of  the  strife.  The  Treaty  of  Ghent  provided 
for  the  speedy  and  mutual  surrender  of  all  posts. captured  during 
the  war.  But  the  first  fort  surrendered — Fort  Niagara — was  not 
vacated  by  the  British  till  May  22nd,  1815,  and  the  delivery  of 
Fort  Michillimackinac  was  delayed  until  late  in  the  summer.  This 
tardiness  on  the  part  of  the  British  was  one  of  the  first  matters 
causing  trouble.1 

In  the  case  of  Fort  Michillimackinac  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires 
had  requested  extra  time,  a  request  granted  by  President  Madison 
because  there  were  no  buildings  available  on  the  British  shores  of 
Northern  Lake  Huron  for  the  reception  of  the  British  garrison. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  no  haste  was  made  in  erecting  the 
buildings ;  it  had  been  the  habit  of  the  British  in  America  to  hold 
what  they  already  possessed;  but  Drummond,  the  commanding 
officer  in  Canada,  cannot  be  held  entirely  responsible  for  the  delay 
in  ordering  the  departure  of  McDouall  and  his  garrison  from  this 
island.  As  soon  as  he  heard  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  he  gave  the 
American  officers  to  understand  that  it  was  his  anxious  wish 
"scrupulously  to  fulfill  all  the  conditions  of  the  treaty"  as  far  as 
they  depended  upon  him,  and,  only  the  "absolute  necessity  of  pre 
paring  a  cover"  in  his  own  territory  for  the  reception  of  his 
Majesty's  troops  and  stores  in  that  quarter  would  cause  him  to 
leave  McDouall  at  Michillimackinac.2  His  sincerity  in  this  is 
demonstrated  by  a  letter  dated  a  little  later  in  which  he  informed 
Bathurst  that  the  American  government  had  issued  instructions 
not  to  give  up  the  post  at  Maiden  until  a  simultaneous  restitution 
should  be  made  of  the  post  at  Michillimackinac  and  therefore  he 
had  "instantly  addressed  a  letter  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  McDouall" 


iDrummond  to  Bathurst,  C.  A.   Q.  133,  p.   5. 

'Harvey  to  Murray,  April  6,   1815,  C.  A.  Q.  132,  p.  10. 

12 


ordering  the  "immediate  removal"  of  his  garrison  "apprehensive 
that  delay  in  the  evacuation  of  that  island  might  afford  grounds 
of  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  American  nation."3  At  the 
same  time  he  communicated  with  Baker,  the  British  minister  at 
Washington,  requesting  him  to  "impress  the  American  government 
with  the  assurance  of  his  determination  to  fulfill  the  conditions  of 
the  treaty  of  peace."4  For  the  tardiness  in  leaving  Michigan, 
Baker,  not  Drummond,  was  primarily  responsible.  He  knew  what 
Drummond  was  as  yet  unaware  of — the  War  Department  at  Wash 
ington  on  April  29,  1815,  had  directed  their  military  forces  to  be 
continued  upon  the  same  establishment  as  they  had  stood  at  the 
close  of  hostilities,5  and  for  this  reason  he  sent  instructions  to 
procrastinate  until  definite  reports  should  come  from  his  home 
government  regarding  the  delivery  of  the  fort  and  island.  Upon 
receipt  of  Baker's  letter,  Drummond  countermanded  all  previous 
orders.6  It  is  apparent  therefore  that  it  was  Baker's  intervention 
and  a  knowledge  of  the  action  taken  by  the  American  War 
Department  that  caused  the  delay.  But  British  traders  and  those 
who  wished  to  retain  an  influence  over  the  Indians  also  pleaded 
for  procrastination. 

The  Northwest  Company  urged  Drummond  not  to  deliver 
Michillimackinac  until  compelled  to  do  so  by  positive  instructions, 
and  at  any  rate,  not  to  allow  American  custom  houses  to  be  estab 
lished  on  the  island  while  the  British  garrison  remained  there. 
They  said  the  Indian  trade  was  "on  the  point  of  annihilation  unless 
the  stipulation  in  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  to  preserve  Indian  rights" 
was  meant  to  exclude  military  posts  and  custom  houses  of  either 
nation  from  the  territory  then  occupied  by  the  tribes7.  Drummond's 
reply  to  this  company  was  that  they  should  make  representations 
to  His  Majesty's  government  if  they  deemed  it  needful ;  but  mean 
while  he  himself  made  certain  concessions.  He  told  McDouall  to 
allow  no  custom  houses  on  the  island  so  long  as  the  British  remained 
there  and  to  consult  the  company  in  the  selection  of  a  new  post8. 
This  trading  company  had  pleaded  hard  to  get  the  British  to  keep 
the  Americans  away  from  their  trading  centres.  They  urged  that 
if  the  British  forces  were  withdrawn  from  the  island,  such  with- 


3Drummond  to  Bathurst,   May  20,   1815,   C.  A.  Q.   132,  p.  104. 

•Ibid. 

5Ibid. 

'Drummond  to  Bathurst,   April  25,   1815,  C.  A.  Q.  132,  p.   18. 

7N.  W.   Company  to  Drummond,  April  20,  C.  A.  Q.   132,  p.  25. 

8Harvey  to  Richardson  and  McGillivray,  April  24,  1815,  0.  A.  jQ.   132,  p.  32. 

13 


drawal  should  be  on  the  condition  that  no  force  from  the  United 
States  should  occupy  it,  nor  any  civil  authority  of  that  country  be 
established  there,  until  after  the  decision  of  the  boundary  com 
missioners  had  been  given9. 

It  was  in  the  interests  of  both  the  military  officers  and  the  trading 
companies  to  retain  the  good  will  of  the  Indians  and  it  was  well 
known  that  the  Indian  warrior  and  hunter  would  show  the  greater 
respect  to  the  party  that  would  display  the  greater  force.  The 
United  States  realized  this  as  vividly  as  did  the  Canadians.  Graham, 
an  American  agent,  hoped  that  the  evacuation  of  the  western  coasts 
by  the  British  forces  would  have  the  effect  of  inducing  the  Indians 
to  seek  an  early  and  satisfactory  termination  of  all  differences  with 
his  countrymen10.  Harrison  and  other  American  officers  were 
carefully  warned  to  explain  to  the  Indians  why  Michillimackinac 
was  not  given  up,  so  as  to  give  the  British  no  advantage  over  the 
United  States  in  relation  to  the  Indian,  and  so  as  to  beget  a  just 
confidence  in  the  power  as  well  as  the  resolution  of  the  American 
government  to  maintain  its  rights  against  every  opposition11. 

It  was  impossible,  however,  for  the  British  to  procrastinate  very 
long  without  overtaxing  the  patience  of  the  Americans.  Moreover, 
Drummond  seems  to  have  desired  to  live  up  to  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  as  far  as  it  lay  within  his  power.  On  July  18,  1815,  Michilli 
mackinac  was  handed  over  to  the  American  officers  and  one  source 
of  trouble  was  removed. 

The  most  fruitful  and  long  enduring  source  of  annoyance,  never 
theless,  still  remained.  The  British  were  loath  to  sever  their  con 
nections  with  the  tribes  residing  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the 
United  States,  and,  in  spite  of  American  remonstrance  and  resist 
ance,  British  agents  still  gave  presents  to  the  red  men.  Was  it  a 
sense  of  moral  duty  or  of  gratitude  for  those  who  had  assisted  them 
in  the  late  war  that  prompted  the  British  to  dole  out  annual  presents 
and  extend  favors  to  the  children  of  the  forest  ?  Was  it  the  shrewd 
ness  of  the  British  trader  who  aimed  at  extending  his  business? 
Or  was  this  policy  a  precautionary  measure  on  the  part  of  the 
British  imperialist  and  military  officer,  who  wished  to  retain  an  ally 
for  a  future  service?  The  British,  as  we  shall  see  later,  claimed 
that  gratitude  for  services  rendered  was  the  reason  for  any  favors 
shown  to  the  Indians;  but  whatever  may  have  been  the  motives, 


•N.  W.  Company  to  Drummond,   April  20,   1815,   C.  A.  Q.   132,  p.  25. 

10Graham  to  Harrison,  July  12,  1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.,  II,  p.   15. 

"Dallas  to  Harrison,  McArthur,  and  Graham,  June  9,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.,  II,  p.   13. 

14 


no  sooner  had  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  been  announced  than  Prevost, 
administrator  of  affairs  in  Canada,  issued  an  address  which  de 
clared  that  presents  should  continue  to  be  given  to  his  dusky  allies. 
He  ordered  Drummond  to  select  a  deputation  of  regular  officers  or 
members  of  the  Indian  Department,  send  them  immediately  to  Bur 
lington  Heights,  Saquina  Bay,  Michillimackinac,  Green  Bay  and 
Prairie  du  Chien,  call  the  Indians  together  at  these  points,  and  tell 
them  that  the  Good  Spirit  had  "moved  the  heart  of  their  Great 
Father  beyond  the  Great  Lakes  to  give  peace  to  the  nations ;"  that 
peace  had  been  made  with  the  last  enemy,  and  the  Indian  had  not 
been  forgotten ;  that  according  to  promises  already  given  these 
children  were  to  have  all  the  rights  possessed  by  them  before  the 
war;  this  meant  that  they  were  to  return  to  their  lands,  plant  their 
corn,  and  hunt  the  deer ;  traders  would  bring  them  their  supplies  as 
formerly,  and  special  care  would  be  taken  that  the  presents  should 
be  sent  to  the  frontier  posts  and  should  not  be  diminished ;  peace 
it  was  hoped  would  last  forever;  but  if  it  were  broken,  it  would 
be  by  the  fault  of  the  Long  Knives  for  the  heart  of  their  father  was 
spotless.12 

Thus  Prevost  promised  peace  and  presents.  Monroe,  on  the  other 
hand,  with  much  less  tact  promised  peace  and  posts.  Clark, 
Edwards,  and  Chouteau  were  told  to  make  treaties  with  the  Indian 
tribes,  to  confine  these  treaties  to  the  sole  objects  of  peace,  but  at 
the  same  time  to  avail  themselves  of  the  opportunity  to  inform 
the  Indian  tribes  that  it  was  intended  to  establish  strong  posts  very 
high  up  the  Mississippi,  and  from  the  Mississippi  to  Lake  Michigan, 
and  to  open  trading  houses  at  these  posts  or  other  suitable  places 
for  their  accommodation.13  The  very  mention  of  posts  was  objec 
tionable  to  the  Indians.  In  the  United  States  territory  the  Indian 
saw  the  British  only  as  a  trader  and  friend,  never  as  one  taking  up 
his  land  and  encroaching  upon  his  hunting  grounds. 

In  order  to  placate  the  Indians  the  Washington  authorities  ordered 
their  agents  in  the  Northwest  Territories  to  explain  that  the  "policy 
of  introducing  factories  and  military  stations  generally  into  the 
Indian  territory"  was  really  in  the  interests  of  the  Indian.  The 
chain  of  outposts  from  Chicago  along  the  Illinois  to  St.  Louis  was 
intended  not  only  to  guard  against  encroachments  upon  the  property 
and  people  of  the  United  States,  but  to  aid  and  protect  the  Indian, 


"Prevost  to  Bathurst,  C.  A.  Q.  131,  p.  75,   March   13,  1815. 

"Monroe  to  Clark,  Edwards,   and  Chouteau,   March   11,   1815,  A.   S.  P.,  I.  A.,  II,  p.   6. 

15 


to  furnish  him  supplies,  to  afford  him  an  occasional  asylum,  to  give 
him  an  opportunity  to  claim  redress  for  grievances,  or  to  com 
municate  intelligence  of  any  danger  he  might  apprehend  at  home 
or  abroad.14  But  neither  the  President's  explanations,  nor  his 
presents  which  he  also  found  it  expedient  to  grant,  appeased  the 
tribes.  The  Indian  looked  to  the  British  colonies  for  help  and  the 
Canadian  authorities  were  often  only  too  eager  to  encourage  the 
Indian  to  do  so. 

The  Canadians,  however,  were  not  the  only  ones  responsible  for 
the  Indian  trouble.  Subordinates  in  the  employ  of  the  American 
government  seem  to  have  been  fond  of  using  threats  of  force 
rather  than  employing  that  "skillful  cajolery"  which  would  obtain 
the  same  ends  with  less  friction.  At  Green  Bay  it  was  reported 
by  the  Indians  that  American  agents  had  made  boisterous  threats 
to  seize  lands  which  the  Indians  claimed  to  be  their  own  and  which 
they  refused  to  sell.  In  such  resistance  as  this  the  Indians  knew 
where  to  find  sympathy.  Even  Drummond  hastened  to  acquaint 

Bathurst  that  he  was  "concerned that  there  appeared 

a  strong  indication   on  the  part  of  the  American  government  to 

violate  the  existing  treaty as  far  as  related  to  the 

infringement  of  Indian  territories."15  He  had  heard  of  a  strong 
American  force  having  been  sent  to  establish  forts  at  Green  Bay. 
Chicago,  Prairie  du  Chien,  and  at  the  Falls  of  St.  Anthony  and  that 
the  plans  to  do  so  were  openly  reported.  Under  pretext  of  calling 
a  numerous  council  of  Indians  to  make  peace,  the  intention,  he  said, 
seemed  to  be  to  destroy  the  tribes  who  would  surrender  their  lands  in 
these  parts ;  and  Major  Morgan,  an  American  officer  commanding 
at  Michillimackinac,  had  frankly  admitted  to  Lieutenant  Colonel 
McDouall  that  the  American  forces  had  "no  right  to  occupy  Indian 
territory  or  to  construct  forts  upon  it  which  they  did  not  possess 
before  the  war,  but  that  still  it  was  determined  upon  and  should 
be  done  !"16  General  Brown;  Drummond  said,  was  hourly  expected 
with  a  strong  body  of  men  on  his  way  to  Michillimackinac  to  carry 
out  these  designs.  Certainly  the  Indians  believed  that  their  lands 
and  rights  were  being  unjustly  trespassed  upon  and  the  Northwest 
Company  supported  them  in  this  belief.17 


"Dallas  to  Harrison,   June   9,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.,  II,  p.   13. 

"Drummond  to  Bathurst,  August  27,  1815,  0.  A.  Q.  133,  p.  82. 

16Ibid. 

"McGillivray  to  Harvey,   April   17,   1815,   G.  A.  Q.   132,   p.   35. 

16 


The  first  serious  dispute  was  at  Green  Bay ;  it  was  there  that  the 
Indians  refused  to  sell  their  lands.    The  few  white  or  mixed  settlers 
in  that  place  were  exclusively  French  or  British,  and  we  may  be 
sure  that  these  people  were  not  enthusiastic  in  urging  the  Indians 
to  comply  with  American  demands.     At  Prairie  du  Chien,  where 
another  dispute  arose,  the  Northwestern  Company  vigorously  sup 
ported  the  Indians.18     This  place  had  not  been  occupied  by  Amer 
icans  before  the  war  and  therefore  the  Company  maintained  that 
|the  rights  of  the  Indian  should  be  as  in  1811.    Previous  to  the  war 
the  most  advanced  post  of  the  United  States  in  this  region  was 
Fort  Madison  on  the  Mississippi,  some  four  hundred  miles  south 
of  Prairie  du  Chien.    During  the  war  a  stockade  had  been  built  at 
Prairie  du  Chien  and  this  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  an  American 
force  but  had  been  recaptured  by  British  and   Indians.     At  the 
close  of  the  war  when  other  forts  were  given  up,  no  restitution  was 
made  of  this  one  on  the  ground  that  it  was  Indian  territory — not 
a  part  of  the  United  States — and  had  not  been  included  in  the  gen 
eral  surrender  of  posts.20     When   the  Americans,  therefore,   now 
attempted  to  erect  a  trading  post  and  a  military  station  at  Prairie 
du  Chien,  the  Indians  and  the  Northwest  Company  objected,  de 
claring  that  without  previous  purchase  and  express  permission  no 
one  had  a  right  to  take  possession  of  the  place.     Quasi  sovereign 
rights  were  claimed  for  the  Indians ;  and  they,  resenting  the  prox 
imity  of  soldiers  and  settlers,  appealed  to  their  father  across  the 
ocean  for  protection.     Native  warriors  were  thus  zealously  trying; 
to  block  the  westward  march  of  the  Americans  and  were  encouraged 
to  do  so  by  the  foreign  traders. 

The  President's  agents  were  fully  aware  of  these  facts.  "The 
commotion  of  the  Indians  about  Prairie  du  Chien  and  the  failure 
of  the  Winnebagoes,  Menomonies,  and  the  Chippewas  to  meet  the 
Americans  in  council,"  wrote  Clark,  Edwards,  and  Chouteau,  "is 
thought  by  most  intelligent  white  men  as  well  as  by  most  respectable 
friendly  Indians  to  be  the  result  of  the  immense  presents  which 
the  British  government  have  lately  distributed  to  the  constant 
intrigues  of  British  traders  who  certainly  have  a  greater  quantity 
of  merchandise  on  the  Mississippi  at  present  than  they  have  ever 
had  in  any  former  year.  They  are  making  the  greatest  efforts  to 
retain  their  influence  and  to  engross  the  whole  of  the  trade."21 


"McGillivray  to  Harvey,  April  17,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  132,  p.  35. 

^Kingsford,   IX,   p.    70. 

"Letter  of  Clark,   Edwards,  and  Chouteau,  Oct.  18,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  9. 

17 


Clark  and  his  two  companions  also  blamed  the  "contemptible  British 
trader"  for  the  trouble  they  were  having  with  the  Sacs  and  Foxes.22 
Another  American  Indian  agent  declared  that  "every  British  trader 
among  the  Indians  is  a  political  partisan,  sowing  the  seeds  of 
distrust  and  dislike  against  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  through  this  description  of  persons  that  all  the  plans 
of  the  late  Indian  war  were  laid,  matured,  and  brought  into  opera 
tion."23  From  Fort  Wayne  it  was  reported  that  even  the  kindness 
of  the  United  States  had  been  misinterpreted  and  that  enemies  had 
persuaded  many  Indians  to  believe  that  the  United  States  permitted 
goods  to  be  sold  on  credit  so  that  later  these  land-grabbers  might 
seize  the  lands  in  payment  for  unpaid  debts.25 

In  a  treaty  with  several  tribes  in  the  fall  of  1815  special  pains 
were  taken  to  offset  this  reported  intriguing.  Emphasis  was  laid 
upon  the  assertion  that  the  United  States  were  really  taking  care 
of  the  tribes,  that  British  intercourse  was  entirely  a  matter  of  in 
dulgence,  and  that  it  must  not  be  believed  for  a  moment  that  Great 
Britain  had  obtained  any  special  benefits  for  them.26  But  intriguing 
did  not  cease.  Eight  years  later  the  British  traders  in  the  farther 
West  were  accused  of  continuing  this  same  kind  of  influence. 
Major  O'Fallon,  a  man  who,  according  to  the  National  Intelligencer 
of  St.  Louis,  enjoyed  a  "reputation  for  penetration"  and  for  an 
"intimate  acquaintance  with  the  Indian  character,"  reported  that 
many  circumstances  had  transpired  to  induce  a  strong  belief  that 
the  Hudson  Bay  Company  was  then  exciting  the  Indians  to  drive 
the  Americans  from  that  quarter  so  as  to  reap  the  fruits  of  Amer 
ican  labor.  He  had  been  in  hopes,  he  said,  that  the  British  traders 
had  some  bounds  to  their  rapacity,  but,  like  the  greedy  wolf,  not 
yet  gorged  with  flesh,  they  guarded  the  bones,  they  ravaged  the 
fields,  and,  not  satisfied  with  participating  in  the  Indian  trade,  they 
had  become  alarmed  at  the  individual  enterprise  of  American  people, 
and  were  exciting  the  Indians  against  them.27  Such  evidence  shows 
how  bitter  was  the  feeling  in  the  western  territories  against  the 
intrusive  foreigner  and  how  this  hostility  continued  long  after  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent  had  declared  for  a  return  of  friendly  intercourse. 


KA.  s.  P.,  i.  A.  ii  p.  9-10. 

^Letter  of  John  Johnston,  Agent,  Piqua,   Sept.  6,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,   I.  A.  II,  p.  83. 
»Stickney  to  Crawford,  Oct.  1,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  85. 

"Treaty,  Sept.  8,  1815,  with  tribes  in  Ohio.  Indiana,  and  Michigan,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II, 

p.   13. 
"National  Intelligencer,  Aug.  10,  1823,  O.  A.  G.  222. 

18 


Not  only  the  British  trader  in  general,  but  the  British  agents  at 
Amherstburg  in  particular  were  constantly  exciting  the  ill  will  of 
their  neighbors  across  the  river.  In  the  summer  of  1815  Harrison, 
McArthur  and  Graham,  American  commissioners,  called  a  council 
of  Indians  at  Detroit  to  inform  them  of  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
of  Ghent  and  to  "concert  with  them  the  proper  measures  for  carry 
ing  the  same  into  effect."  28  This  meeting  was  called  for  August 
25th,  1815,  but  the  invitation  did  not  produce  the  desired  effect. 
The  Indians  did  not  come.  The  commissioners  were  told  that  the 
Indians  had  been  detained  by  the  British  agents.  A  request  was 
therefore  made  to  the  senior  officer  at  Maiden  to  take  "measures, 
to  give  full  effect  to  the  9th  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,"  and 
Major  Langham  was  sent  to  deliver  this  request.  While  in  the 
discharge  of  this  duty  Langham  felt  that  he  had  been  rudely  re 
ceived  by  the  Canadian  officers  and  returned  in  high  dudgeon  to 
Harrison.  •  The  Americans  were  now  doubly  irritated.  Their  own 
Indians  had  been  induced  to  stay  away  from  the  council  and  an 
officer  had  been  insulted. 

Barracks,  temporarily  in  command  at  Maiden,  and  Lieutenant 
Colonel  James,  who  had  been  absent  when  Langham  arrived,  sent 
replies  to  Harrison's  note.  They  declared  that  the  Indians  were 
a  free  and  independent  people  at  liberty  to  act  for  themselves  and 
"had  considered  it  a  matter  of  greater  importance  to  attend  the 
Council  ordered  to  assemble  in  Amberstburg  on  the  26th  instant 
for  the  explaining  of  the  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent."  No 
inducements,  they  said,  were  held  out  to  detain  the  Indians  but  it 
was  not  surprising  if  Indians  on  the  left -bank  had  not  crossed  over 
when  pains  had  so  recently  been  taken  to  prevent  any  one  of  them 
from  ever  passing  over.  Barracks  was  "unable  to  account  for  the 
mysterious  conduct"  of  Langham.29 

The  curtness  and  general  tone  of  the  British  replies  was  suf 
ficient  to  make  Harrison  still  more  indignant.  After  calling  atten 
tion  to  the  discourteous  reception  of  his  aide,  and  the  hasty  reading 
or  misinterpretation  of  his  first  note,  Harrison  wrote  James  that  he 
had  never  asked  the  British  to  compel  the  Indians  to  cross  to  the 
Council  at  Detroit — as  Barracks  had  intimated — and  it  was  to  be 
regretted  that  the  British  had  not  explained  the  terms  of  the  treaty 


"Harrison,  McArthur,  and  Graham  to  the  commanding  officer  at  Maldon,  Aug.  26,  1815, 

A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  15. 
^Barracks   to    Harrison,    Aug.   27,    1815.   A.    S.    P.,    I.   A.   II,    15.      James  to   Harrison, 

Aug.  29,  1815,  I.  A.  II,   15. 

19 


much  earlier  and  so  have  prevented,  perhaps,  Indian  depredations, 
vexatious  and  injurious  to  American  citizens,  and  troublesome  to 
the  British  themselves.  Cass,  he  said,  was  now  trying  to  prevent 
these  depredations  by  limiting  intercourse  with  his  people  but  it 
was  never  intended  to  prohibit  Indians  from  crossing  the  inter 
national  boundary.31 

Such  letters  and  such  actions  are  typical  of  the  state  of  affairs 
in  this  district  all  through  the  year  1815.  Even  if  James  did  not 
willfully  try  to  hamper  Harrison,  undoubtedly  he  would  have  been 
better  pleased  if  the  Indians  had  not  gone  to  the  American  councils. 
It  looked  suspiciously  like  an  effort  to  exert  influence,  when  he 
called  an  Indian  meeting  on  the  Canadian  side  at  the  very  time 
set  by  the  Americans  for  their  council.  If  the  civil  or  military 
authorities  in  Canada  were  desirous  of  maintaining  friendly  inter 
course  with  their  American  neighbors  in  the  Amherstburg  district 
— and  all  evidence  seems  to  point  in  favor  of  such  desire — then 
a  man  less  adapted  to  foster  peace  and  harmony  could  scarcely 
have  been  found  than  Lieutenant  Colonel  James,  the  commanding 
officer  in  that  district. 

But  if  James  and  his  subordinates  were  trying  to  cater  to  the 
red  men,  it  is  evident  that  the  American  officers  had  no  thought  of 
retreating.  Harrison  persisted  in  his  efforts  to  gather  the  Indians 
before  him,  though  forced  to  postpone  this  meeting  from  day  to 
day  until  the  council  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  had  been  dis 
solved.  At  last  when  his  patience  had  been  partly  rewarded,  he 
endeavored  to  make  up  for  lost  time  by  vigorously  berating  the 
British  and  extolling  the  virtues  and  bravery  of  his  own  country 
men.  He  told  the  prophet  and  other  red  men  in  the  assemblies  that 
their  late  British  father  had  acknowledged  his  error  and  had  agreed 
to  make  peace;  that  the  British  had  been  defeated  in  the  war  with 
the  Americans,  and  in  Europe  they  had  not  been  unassisted  in  their 
victorious  struggle  against  Napoleon ;  other  nations  had  cooperated 
with  them;  that  in  America  the  British  agents  had  seduced  the 
chiefs  and  warriors  from  their  duties  to  the  United  States  and 
were  now  deceiving  them ;  that  their  great  father  at  Washington 
was  their  only  true  friend  and  wanted  peace  and  prosperity  and 
happiness  to  continue  among  his  children.32 


"Harrison  to  James,  Aug.  30,   1815,  A.  S.   P.,  I.  A.  II,   p.   15,   16. 
32Harrison's  Speech,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  20,  25.     See  p.  18,  19  also. 

20 


Harrison  was  not  alone  in  complaining  against  British  officers 
during  this  first  year  of  peace.  United  States  Secretary  of  State 
Adams  reported  to  Earl  Bathurst  of  the  British  Colonial  office  that 
a  British  colonel,  Nicholls,  "after  the  conclusion  of  the  peace, 
actually  concluded  a  pretended  treaty  of  alliance,  offensive  and 
defensive  against  the  United  States."33  Bathurst  expressed  him 
self  in  terms  of  unqualified  disapprobation  at  this  pseudo  treaty. 
It  had  not  been,  he  said,  approved  of,  for  no  such  treaty  could  be 
made  by  Great  Britain.  In  this  action  of  Nicholls  there  is  one  of 
the  first  instances  after  the  war  of  a  colonial  officer's  clashing: 
with  the  desire  of  the  British  government.  It  must  be  kept  in  mind 
that  the  actions  of  the  British  frontier  officers  were  not  always  in 
harmony  with  the  will  of  the  home  government;  at  all  events  the 
Colonial  Office  more  than  once  disclaimed  any  part  in  incidents 
that  caused  offense  to  the  goverment  at  Washington. 

In  October  of  this  same  year  serious  trouble  was  threatened  from, 
two  other  sources.  On  the  morning  of  October  5,  Richardson, 
surgeon  and  justice  of  the  peace  of  the  Western  District  of  Upper 
Canada,  a  man  who  apparently  bore  no  love  for  the  Americans, 
officially  reported  to  James  that  an  "unprovoked  and  most  wanton 
act  of  violence,"  namely  the  killing  of  an  Indian,  had  been  com 
mitted  the  day  before  by  a  number  of  Americans  near  Grosse 
Island.  Some  Indians  had  gone  to  the  island  "to  shoot  squirrels," 
when  they  were  approached  by  the  Americans,  "damned,  told  to 
embark  immediately,  which  they  did,"  and  were  then  fired  upon, 
the  shot  resulting  in  the  death  of  one  of.  their  number  the  next 
morning.34  James  immediately  wrote  to  Cass,  briefly  informing 
him  that  an  Indian  had  been  "murdered  under  the  most  aggravated 
circumstances"  by  eight  or  ten  Americans,  including  an  officer  who 
was  with  them  at  the  time  the  cruel  act  was  perpetrated.  Then,  in 
language  most  untactful,  and  which  Cass  was  justified  in  con 
sidering  offensive,  he  continued:  "I  need  not  point  out  to  you 

the  line  of  conduct  necessary  on  this  occasion, my 

pointing  out  to  you  the  custom  of  savages  in  the  present  instance 
would  be  needless."  35  Even  if  the  Indian  had  really  been  wantonly 
murdered  and  if  it  had  occurred  within  British  territory,  both  of 
which  we  may  presume  James  had  been  led  to  suppose,  such  a 
message  was  unnecessary  and  ungentlemanly.  Cass  replied  with 


33Adams  to  Castlereagh,  March  21,  1816,  C.  A.  Q.  138,  p.  215. 
34Bichardson  to  James,  Oct.  5,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.  199. 
to  Cass,  Oct.  5,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.  181. 

21 


dignity  and  firmness:  he  would  make  inquiry;  if  Americans  were 
guilty,  American  courts  of  justice  would  operate  with  rigid  im 
partiality;  a  person  would  be  sent  over  to  attend  the  inquest  in 
order  to  procure  evidence.36  But  he  incidentally  reminded  James 
that  some  suggestions  he  had  made  in  his  note  were  unnecessary. 

At  the  coroner's  inquest,  held  October  6th,  sworn  evidence  of 
two  of  the  Indians  who  were  with  Akochis,  the  deceased,  showed 
that  some  five  Kickapoo  Indians  had  been  innocently  hunting 
squirrels  on  the  island  and  were  about  to  embark  for  Amherstburg 
when  ten  American  soldiers,  one  of  them  apparently  an  officer, 
approached  and  asked  the  Kickapoos  if  they  were  British  subjects. 
When  answered  in  the  affirmative,  they  motioned  the  Indians  to 
leave  the  island.  This  command  was  immediately  obeyed  but  as 
soon  as  they  had  pushed  off  their  canoe,  one  of  the  Americans 
loaded  his  gun.  The  officer  spoke  to  him  and  endeavored  to  grasp 
the  gun,  but  before  this  could  be  done,  the  soldier  had  fired, 
wounding  Akochis  in  the  back.  The  coroner's  jury  declared 
Akochis  to  have  been  murdered  " feloniously,  willfully,  and  with 
malice  aforethought  by  an  unknown  person  supposed  to  be  an 
American."  37 

It  must  be  noticed  that  the  coroner's  jury  simply  stated  that 
this  murder  occurred  in  the  waters  of  the  Detroit  River,  apparently 
indifferent  whether  the  scene  of  the  shooting  was  in  American  or 
British  territory  or  else  willfully  concealing  the  fact  that  it  was  on 
the  American  side  of  what  was  then  generally  considered  to  be 
the  dividing  line.  It  must  also  be  noticed  that  the  American 
soldiers  had  not  been  heard  in  self-defense.  The  evidence  of  the 
savages  delivered  through  an  interpreter  was  all  that  the  jury  had 
upon  which  to  base  their  verdict  of  willful  murder. 

The  next  day  Cass  again  wrote  to  James  stating  that  he  had 
"ascertained  with  precision  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction." 
The  Indian,  he  said,  was  killed  while  in  the  act  of  presenting  his 
gun  to  McComb,  the  officer  referred  to  by  James.  The  event  was 
connected  with  the  predatory  system  which  the  Indians  had  pursued 
for  some  time  on  the  Island  and  which  the  American  soldiers  were 
trying  to  check.  Since  the  shooting  had  occurred  within  the  ter 
ritorial  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  a  British  officer  had  con 
sequently  no  right  to  require  nor  ought  an  American  officer  to  give 


MCass  to  James,  Oct.  5,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.   182. 

^James  to  Robinson,   Oct.  16,   1815,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.   179. 

22 


any  explanation  upon  the  subject.38  Cass  then  sent  an  officer, 
McDougall,  to  hold  a  personal  interview  with  James,  because,  as 
reported  by  the  latter,  "letters  are  apt  to  lead  to  rancour  and 
personal  interviews  avoid  it." 39  Cass,  evidently,  was  unwilling 
to  allow  this  unfortunate  incident  to  lead  to  further  trouble,  but 
James  was  not  of  so  peaceful  a  temperament. 

According  to  McComb's  testimony,  and  surely  his  testimony 
ought  to  bear  at  least  equal  weight  with  that  of  a  savage,  these 
Indians  had  been  killing  his  cattle  on  the  island.  He  ordered  the 
marauders  to  leave  the  island  and  they  had  just  pushed  off  from 
the  shore  when  one  of  them  aimed  his  gun  at  him.  A  soldier  stand 
ing  by,  noticing  the  danger,  quickly  drew  his  gun  and  shot  the 
Indian.  This  story  is  more  probably  the  true  one,  but  both  James 
and  the  magistrates  jumped  recklessly  at  conclusions,  impelled  by 
the  spirit  of  vengeance  rather  than  wisdom.  Paying  no  attention 
to  the  letter  from  Cass,  James,  on  October  I2th,  requested  the 
justices  of  the  peace  to  "take  such  steps  and  measures"  as  would 
most  likely  protect  the  British  subjects  as  well  as  those  entitled  to 
and  claiming  that  protection.41  Accordingly  on  the  i8th  of  October, 
there  was  issued,  most  imprudently  on  the  part  of  the  British  officers 
concerned,  a  proclamation  offering  $500  reward  if  the  murderer 
were  secured  in  some  one  of  His  Majesty's  jails  in  Upper  Canada. 

Three  days  later  James  received  a  letter  from  Caldwell,  Deputy 
Superintendent  of  British-Indian  affairs,  which  caused  more  trouble. 
The  Prophet  had  complained  to  Caldwell  that  a  few  days  after  the 
death  of  Akochis,  some  American  had  stolen  from  Stony  Island — 
an  island  near  Amherstburg — eight  horses  and  a  colt  belonging  to 
the  Kickapoos ;  the  Indians,  Caldwell  said,  wanted  James  to  demand 
a  return  of  the  horses.42  James  wrote  a  brief  note  to  Cass  enclos 
ing  Caldwell's  letter  and  intimating  that  he  had  no  doubt  that  Cass 
would  see  to  the  restitution  of  the  property  because,  when  a  similar 
case  had  occurred  the  last  summer,  the  United  States  officer  had 
been  good  enough  to  return  the  stolen  property. 

Cass'  reply  to  James  showed  not  only  impatience  but  a  deter 
mination  not  to  budge  from  what  he  considered  the  rights  of  the 
United  States.  In  no  ambiguous  terms  he  told  James  to  attend  to 
his  own  affairs  and  cease  meddling  with  matters  purely  beyond 


»Cass  to  James,  Oct.  7,   1815,  C.   A.  jQ.   319,   p.    184. 
^Letter  written  by   Lt.    Col.   James,    C.   A.   Q.    319,   p.    186. 
*  Richardson  to  James,   Oct.    12,   1815,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.  204. 
"Caldwell  to  James,  Oct.  21,   1815,   C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.  212. 

23 


British  jurisdiction.  Stony  Island,  he  said,  was  in  the  territory  of 
the  United  States ;  the  horses  had  been  taken  from  there,  not  to 
Canada,  but  to  Michigan ;  consequently,  a  British  officer  had  no 
right  to  interfere;  "the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  and  of 
Great  Britain  within  their  territorial  limits  was  exclusive ;"  he  would 
not  "acknowledge  in  principle  nor  ever  admit  in  practice"  the  right 
of  any  foreign  authority  to  interfere  in  any  arrangement  or  dis 
cussions  between  them  and  the  Indians  living  within  his  territory. 
He  was  inclined  to  impute  the  conduct  of  Caldwell  in  interfering 
either  to  a  "profound  ignorance  of  the  relative  rights  of  nations 
or  to  a  more  artful  though  less  pardonable  motive,  that  of  preserv 
ing  an  influence  over  the  Indians  to  be  used  as  subsequent  events 
might  render  expedient."  The  letter  concluded  with  the  statement 
that  the  United  States  courts  of  justice  had  made  inquiries  con 
cerning  the  particular  case  referred  to  by  Caldwell ;  one  horse 
belonged  to  a  citizen  of  Detroit,  the  others  would  be  returned  to 
the  Indians;  but  this  information  was  given  as  a  personal  favor 
to  James,  for  American  officers  were  under  no  compulsion  to  render 
an  account  to  a  foreign  power  under  the  circumstances.43 

Cass'  fighting  spirit  was  fully  aroused.  The  next  day  he  issued 
a  proclamation  to  counteract  the  reward  offered  by  the  magistrates 
of  Upper  Canada  for  the  apprehension  of  the  murderer  of  Akochis. 
He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  killing  had  occurred  wholly 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  and  was  a  matter,  there 
fore,  that  concerned  the  United  States  alone;  and  in  order  that 
British  pretensions  so  unfounded  might  be  resisted  and  that  attempts 
so  unjustifiable  might  be  repelled;  that  the  people  of  his  territory 
might  not  be  transported  to  a  foreign  country  for  acts  committed 
in  his  territory;  that  the  Indians  residing  within  the  United  States 
might  not  be  taught  to  look  to  the  agents  of  another  country  for 
protection  and  redress  which  American  laws  so  fully  afforded ;  and 
that  a  foreign  influence  incompatible  with  the  sovereignty  of  the 
United  States  might  not  be  acquired  and  exercised  over  them,  he 
required  all  persons,  citizens  of  his  territory  or  residing  therein,  to 
repel  by  force  all  attempts  which  might  be  made  to  apprehend  any 
person  on  the  American  side  of  the  dividing  line.44 

It  will  be  noticed  that  one  of  the  principal  things  Cass  was  trying 
to  break  up  was  the  foreign  influence  over  the  Indians  of  Mich- 


*»Cass  to  James,   Oct.  26,    1815,   C.  A.  Q.  319,   p.   214. 
"Proclamation,   Oct.   27,    C.   A.  jQ.   319,   p.  306. 

24 


igan.45  If  James  had  been  trying  to  exert  undue  interference  in 
affairs  beyond  his  jurisdiction,  he  found  himself  properly  check 
mated  by  Cass.  In  a  letter  a  few  days  later,  however,  James 
defended  his  interference  by  taking  "the  liberty  to  remind"  Cass 
that  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  amply  provided  for  the  Indians  who  had 
lately  been  in  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  that  even  those  tribes 
whose  country  extended  as  far  as  the  Mississippi  were  included 
in  the  treaty,  and  looked  to  England  for  a  fulfillment  of  that  solemn 
agreement.46  Surely  James  must  have  recognized  that  the  Treaty 
of  Ghent  could  never  have  justified  him  in  all  his  claims  and 
actions. 

Meanwhile  he  had  reported  the  whole  affair  to  his  superior  officer, 
Major  General  Sir  Frederick  Robinson,  adding  that  little  friendly 
intercourse  existed  between  the  American  and  British  officers  in 
that  district  because  every  time  British  officers  were  from  curiosity 
induced  to  cross  to  the  opposite  shore,  the  visit  was  attended  by 
some  act  of  insult,  whereas  American  officers  on  the  Canadian  shore 
were  treated  with  the  greatest  respect.47  James  later  reported  to 
Robinson  that  it  was  evident  that  Governor  Cass  intended  to  cut 
off  all  British  communication  and  traffic  with  the  western  Indians 
and  that  if  this  effort  succeeded,  the  Indians  would  become  allies 
of  the  United  States,  and  if  so,  Canada  would  be  lost.  It  is  perfectly 
plain  that  James  preferred  the  good  will  of  the  Indian  to  that  of  the 
United  States.48 

Drummond,  the  Governor  in  Lower  Canada,  also  received  infor 
mation  from  James  concerning  the  killing  of  Akochis,  and  as  this 
was  his  only  source  of  information,  he  was  persuaded  that  it  was 
a  "wanton  murder  and  an  inhuman  outrage,"  and,  therefore,  he 
trusted  that  Gore,  Lieutenant  Governor  of  Upper  Canada,  would 
demand  the  "strongest  remonstrance  from  the  American  govern 
ment."  49  Gore,  on  the  other  hand,  had  heard  both  sides  of  the 
question  and  with  a  calm,  sane  judgment  and  with  that  conciliatory 
spirit  usually  displayed  by  the  central  authorities  on  both  sides,  he 
deplored  the  part  played  by  James,  Caldwell  and  the  magistrates 


484 'The  tenor  and  object  of  their  [British]  measures  is  to  teach  the  Indians  to  look 
to  them  for  protection."  Cass  in  letter  to  Monroe — see  A.  H.  A.  Reports,  1888, 
p.  77. 

*«James  to  Cass,   Nov.   1,    1815,   C.  A.   Q.   319,   p.   218. 

47At  this  very  time  an  American  officer  at  Detroit  had  just  written  to  Baltimore  com 
mending  the  great  civility  with  which  the  military  officers  and  men  treated  each 
other  on  both  sides  of  the  animosity  which  he  believed  existed  between  the 

Nil< 


citizens    of    Michigan    and    Canada.      Niles    Reg.    IX,    p.    188. 
"James  to  Robinson,  Oct.   16,  C.   A.   Q.  319,  p.   179. 
"Drummond  to  Gore,   Nov.  25,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.   177. 

20 


of  the  Western  District.  To  him  it  was  most  obvious,  from  the 
despositions  taken,  that  the  homicide  was  committed  in  the  territory 
of  the  United  States.  He  regretted  the  fact  that  the  coroner's 
verdict  seemed  to  have  been  drawn  up  with  a  view  to  conceal  this, 
and  concealment  could  have  been  designed  only  to  cover  the  extraor 
dinary  measure  of  the  proclamation  and  the  reward  offered  by 
those  magistrates.  He  blamed  James  for  not  adopting  a  more 
conciliatory  policy  and  ordered  all  further  discussions  to  be  carried 
on  between  His  Majesty's  minister  at  Washington  and  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.50  Luckily  for  the  interests  of  peace 
Gore's  influence  prevailed,  and  luckily,  too,  no  attempt  was  made  to 
earn  the  $500  reward.  The  "border  warfare"  arising  out  of  these 
two  particular  questions  was  transferred  from  Detroit  and  Am- 
herstburg  to  Washington  and  London. 

4-  Meanwhile,  however,  the  press  in  sections  of  the  United  States 
interested  in  the  West,  and  unfriendly  to  Britain,  was  discussing  the 
action  of  these  Western  magistrates.  The  Pittsburg  Mercury 
called  upon  Congress  to  take  action.  The  affairs  at  Detroit,  it  said, 
afforded  "evidence  of  the  hostile  disposition  of  the  British  com 
manding  officer  towards  the  American  government  and  people," 
and  these  transactions  showed  the  length  to  which  he  was  disposed 
to  go  and  "furnished  unequivocal  testimony  of  a  desire  in  the 
British  authorities  to  cherish  and  promote  among  the  savages  dis 
positions  hostile  to  the  United  States  to  be  employed  as  future 
events  (might)  render  necessary ;  the  pompous  interference  of  His 
Majesty's  agents  were  designed  to  give  the  untutored  savages 
exalted  ideas  of  the  friendship,  the  power,  and  the  dignity  of  the 
British  government  and  to  make  that  government  appear  to  them 
as  the  avenger  of  their  wrongs ;  these  circumstances  connected  with 
the  preparations  being  made  by  the  British  government  throughout 
the  whole  length  of  the  Canadian  lines,  loudly  called  for  preparations 
also  on  the  part  of  the  United  States."  51 

Sufficient  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  Congress  to  induce 
John  Quincy  Adams  to  enter  in  the  spring  of  1816  a  formal  com 
plaint  against  the  British  military  officers  in  America.  He  asserted 
that  these  officers  "labored  with  an  activity  as  restless  and  a  zeal 
as  ardent  as  they  could  have  done  in  the  heat  of  war"  to  instigate 
Indians  to  continued  or  renewed  hostility.  The  proceedings  of 


50Gore   to  Baker,   Dec.   26,    1815,  O.  A.   Q.   319,   p.   174. 

"Pittsburg   Mercury,    quotation   in   Niles,    IX.,    p.    241.      Dec.    2,    1815. 

26 


uu 

., 


James  and  of  the  magistrates  in  Upper  Canada  bore  such  a  strong 
resemblance  to  those  of  Colonel  Nicholls  that  he  hoped  they  would 
receive  the  same  disapproval  and  disavowal  by  His  Majesty's  gov 
ernment.  He  trusted  also  that  the  British  government  would  issue 
such  orders  that  no  doubt  would  be  left  on  the  minds  of  American 
officers  that  the  intention  towards  the  United  States  was  peace.52 

Adams'  protest  appears  to  have  borne  immediate  results.  Gov 
ernor  Sherbrooke,  who  came  to  Canada  in  July,  1816,  at  once  sent 
instructions  to  his  subordinates  to  repress  by  every  means  in  their 
power  the  hostile  disposition  of  the  Indians  towards  the  Amer 
icans,53  ordered  no  presents  to  be  sent  to  the  United  States  Indians 
and  directed  the  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs  to  adhere  strictly 
to  these  regulations.54  Gore  also  concurred  with  Sherbrooke  ill 
this  policy. 

Meanwhile  another  source  of  trouble  had  caused  irritation  along 
the  frontier.  Sailors  were  abandoning  British  vessels  on  the  Great 
Lakes  as  well  as  at  the  Atlantic  ports,  and  soldiers  were  deserting 
from  British  regiments.  Americans  were  blamed  for  not  only  entic 
ing  these  deserters  but  for  preventing  their  recovery.540  Soon  after 
the  peace  was  proclaimed  Drummond  tried  to  recall  his  runaways 
by  issuing  a  proclamation  pardoning  all  such  who  would  return 
to  their  former  regiments  before  July  7,  1815. 55  But  this  pardon 
was  not  sufficient.  More  money  and  better  opportunities  could  be 
found  under  the  American  flag,  if  not  as  a  soldier,  then  as  citizen.56 

In  the  various  controversies  caused  by  frequent  desertions  of 
British  soldiers  and  sailors  neither  side  was  blameless.  In  one 
instance  several  sailors  deserted  together,  and  landed  about  ten 
miles  from  Detroit.  They  were  followed  by  a  crew  of  officers  and 
men  who  disembarked,  examined  several  houses,  and  at  length 
seized  one  man  and  sent  him  to  the  Canadian  side.  Then  they 
placed  sentinels  on  the  American  highway,  one  of  whom  fired  on  a 
citizen.  These  events  angered  the  people  of  Detroit,  who  flew  to 
arms  and  arrested  both  the  officers  and  the  men.  Later  it  was 
agreed  to  release  all  except  one  officer  who  was  to  be  held  until 
the  men  already  sent  to  Canada  should  be  returned.  The  officer 


"Adams  to  Castlereagh,  March  21,  1816,  C.  A.  ,Q.  138,  p.  215. 

"Sherbrooke    to   Bathurst,    July    15,    1816,    C.    A.    Q.    136,    p.    7. 

"Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,  July  20,   1816,  C.  A.  Q.   137,  p.  157. 

B4a"Not    a    vessel    arrives    at    New    York    from    this    country    without    her    crew    being 

immediately   seduced  into   the  American   service."      From   a    London   paper — Niles 

Register  IX,  p.  428,  Feb.  1816. 
"Kingsford,   IX,  p.  31. 
"Glenelg   to   Head,   C.   A.   G.,  p.   79. 

27 


was  put  in  an  American  fort  and  James  was  requested  to  release 
his  prisoner  but  refused  to  do  so.  The  captive-officer  was  tried  in 
Detroit,  fined  $400  or  $500  and  released,  though  Chief  Justice 
Woodward  said  he  "ought  to  have  been  pilloried  and  imprisoned."  57 
On  another  occasion  the  bandmaster  of  the  37th  regiment  went 
to  Detroit  to  bring  back  a  boy  who  had  deserted,  but  who  afterwards 
had  expressed  a  willingness  to  return.  As  soon  as  the  bandmaster 
had  made  known  his  errand  he  was  surrounded  by  a  mob  and 
escaped  only  through  the  friendly  intercession  of  an  American 
officer.570  At  another  time  it  was  reported  that  an  orderly  sent 
to  Detroit  on  business  was  approached  by  two  who  had  previously 
deserted  and  by  two  American  citizens  who  greeted  him  with  a 
considerable  display  of  cordiality ;  these  invited  him  to  a  dance  where 
he  should  have  the  privilege  of  dancing  with  a  "major's  daughter," 
and  urged  him  to  remain  in  Detroit  wherein  he  could  escape  from 
the  tyranny  of  England.  A  newspaper  was  thrust  into  his  hand, 
containing  an  article  which  declared  that  10,000  of  the  oppressed 
in  England  were  migrating  that  summer  to  find  freedom  in  the 
United  States.  Every  artifice,  declared  James,  was  used  by  certain 
classes  across  the  river  to  entice  the  British  soldiers  to  that  side.57b 

It  might  be  considered  not  unfair  tactics  for  the  United  States 
marshal  to  encourage  desertion  during  the  war.58  But  long  after 
the  war  James  found  occasions  such  as  these  cited  above  upon  which 
to  complain  loudly  and  grievously  against  both  ordinary  citizens 
and  officers  in  Detroit  for  not  only  conniving  at  desertion  but  for 
openly  enlisting  deserters  in  their  own  army.59  On  March  2,  1816, 
James  published  a  partial  list  of  those  who  had  left  his  ranks  and 
had  been  enlisted  in  the  United  States  army.  American  deserters, 
he  said,  had  offered  to  enter  the  British  service  but  care  had  been 
taken  to  discourage  such  desertion  and  it  had  been  the  practice 
of  British  commanders  to  compel  these  deserters  to  leave  the 
Canadian  frontier  within  twelve  hours.60 

Bagot  called  the  a^ention  of  Monroe  to  this  practice  of  admitting 
deserters  "into  corps  within  sight  of  the  regiments  they  had  so 
disgracefully  abandoned,"  61  to  which  Monroe  immediately  replied 


07Niles,    IX.,  p.   104,    187,    Sept.    1815. 

""Letter  of  Lt.  Col.  James,  C.  A.  Q.   138,  p.  192. 

B7blbid. 

58Loring's  Memorandum,  Jan.  23,   1815,   C.  A.  Q.   131,  p.  26. 

B9 James  to  Robinson,  Oct.   16,    1815,    C.  A.   Q.   319,   p.   179. 

«°C.    A.    Q.    138,    p.   275. 

"Bagot   to   Monroe,   May  24,    1816,    C.  A.   Q.    138,  p.  277. 

28 


that  such  alleged  practices  were  entirely  contrary  to  the  general 
orders  of  the  war  department  and  ordered  investigations.62  General 
McComb,  writing  over  three  months  after  James  made  his  com 
plaints,  did  not  deny  the  fact  that  James'  charges  might  be  well 
founded.  What  he  did  say  was  that  though  no  recruiting  had  taken 
place  since  the  war,  substitutes  were  allowed,  and  deserters  might 
have  crept  in  by  that  means ;  however,  more  stringent  rules  had 
been  passed  since  his  attention  was  called  to  this,  and  "already 
perfect  harmony  existed  between  the  officers  on  both  sides  of  the 
line."  63 

Subsequent  desertion  of  soldiers  nevertheless  was  destined  to 
interrupt  this  "perfect  harmony."  American  troops  in  their  turn 
invaded  Canadian  soil  in  search  of  alleged  deserters  and  the  corre 
spondence  of  these  years  reveal  how  difficult,  tedious  and  expensive 
it  was  to  trace  fugitives  who  had  escaped  from  one  country  into 
the  other.  In  districts  sparsely  settled  and  comparatively  poorly 
policed  a  culprit  might  easily  secrete  himself  and  baffle  all  pursuers. 
Vexatious  delays  and  much  ill  feeling  often  arose  because  of  the 
lack  of  any  extradition  treaty  and  such  a  treaty  failed  to  be  agreed 
upon  until  more  than  twenty-five  years  after  the  war,  largely  be 
cause  the  British  government  was  reluctant  to  consider  any  terms 
which  insisted  upon  the  return  of  runaway  slaves.64 


b2Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  C.  A.  Q.  138,  p.  273. 

63McComb  to  Monroe,  June  20,   1816,  C.  A.  (Q.   138,  p.  309. 

"Richmond  to  Bagot,  Aug.  18,  1818,  C.  A.  Q.  149,  p.  78,  90.  Richmond  to  Bathurst, 
Nov.  19,  1818,  C.  A.  Q.  149,  p.  131.  Letter  of  E.  T.  Throop,  July  3,  1882, 
C.  A.  Q.  223.  Vaughan  to  Dudley,  1828,  C.  A.  Q.  185,  p.  208.  Clay  to  Vaughan, 
Jan.  23,  1828,  C.  A.  Q.  185,  p.  211.  Dalhousie  to  Bathurst,  Oct.  27,  1821,  C. 
A.  Q.  157,  p.  388.  Van  Buren  to  Vaughan,  July  21,  1829,  C.  A.  ,Q.  189,  p.  161. 
Vaughan  to  Kempt,  Aug.  1,  1829,  C.  A.  Q.  189,  p.  151.  Hillier  to  Goulburn,  Sept. 
24,  1819,  C.  A.  Q.  326,  p.  117.  Gleneig  to  Head,  C.  A.  Q.  83,  a  demand  for  the 
return  of  the  slave.  See  the  draft  on  the  Convention  sent  by  Palmerston  to 
Fox,  April  27,  1840,  and  the  letter  of  Fox  to  Poulett  Thompson,  Sept.  10,  1840, 
C.  A.  G.  226. 


20 


III. 

NAVAL  ARMAMENTS  ON  THE  GREAT  LAKES. 

The  year  1816  was  perhaps  the  most  critical  in  the  first  decade 
after  the  war.  The  intriguing  at  the  Council,  the  Indian  murder 
and  horse  stealing  incidents,  the  advance  of  American  settlers  and 
military  posts,  the  exclusion  of  British  traders  by  an  act  of  Con 
gress  and  the  more  or  less  open  sympathy  and  support  of  the 
British  trader  and  frontier  military  officer  made  the  tribes  very 
hostile  towards  the  Long  Knives.  Before  we  continue  the  con 
troversy  over  Indian  affairs,  however,  we  shall  take  up  another 
matter  which  occupied  the  attention  of  the  British  and  Americans 
during  the  summer  of  this  year.  When  John  Quincy  Adams,  the 
American  ambassador  to  England,  lodged  a  complaint  in  March 
against  certain  actions  of  James  and  others,  he  coupled  with  this 
note  to  Castlereagh  a  proposal  to  reduce  the  existing  naval  arma 
ments  on  the  Great  Lakes,  the  reductions  to  be  mutual  and  the 
degree  to  which  they  should  be  made  to  be  left  to  the  action  of 
His  Majesty's  government;  but  the  greater  the  reduction,  the  more 
acceptable  it  would  be  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  and 
most  acceptable  of  all  should  it  be  agreed  to  maintain  on  either 
side  during  the  peace  no  other  force  than  such  as  might  be  nec 
essary  for  the  collection  of  revenue.74 

This  was  a  very  timely  proposal.  For  the  continuance  of  peace 
some  such  action  was  necessary  because  the  right  of  search  after 
the  Treaty  of  Ghent  was  still  claimed  and  practised  by  the  British. 
Western  American  papers  grew  very  much  excited  over  this  prac 
tice.  The  Pittsburg  Mercury  of  June,  1816,  again  took  up  the 
cudgels  and  published  a  series  of  articles  in  regard  to  the  arrogant 
conduct  of  the  British  on  the  waters  of  Lake  Erie.  The  firm  and 
dignified  remonstrance  of  Governor  Cass,  it  said,  had  not  been 
sufficient  to  restrain  the  practice  complained  of ;  another  American 
vessel  had  been  forcibly  entered  and  searched  within  the  waters 
of  Put-in-Bay,  Ohio ;  such  insolent  conduct  could  not  and  would  not 
be  borne ;  the  government  of  the  United  States  must  take  immediate 
notice  of  the  subject  and  order  into  service  a  sufficient  force  to 


74Adams  to  Castlereagh,  March  23,  1819,  C.  A.  Q.  138,  p.  220. 

30 


compel  respect  for  the  American  flag.75  The  Buffalo  press  ironically 
and  sarcastically  declared  that  the  firing  on  the  American  schooner, 
Mink,  near  Put-in-Bay  by  his  majesty's  schooner  was  "truly  British" 
and  "magnanimous ;"  and  Niles  wrote,  "The  long  and  short  of  the 
matter  is  this — that  the  insult  must  and  will  be  atoned  for."  Niles, 
too,  was  very  much  excited  over  the  reported  increase  of  the 
British  forces  in  Canada  and  the  establishing  of  a  more  "respectable 
naval  force"  upon  the  lakes.  Movements  of  Canadian  vessels  on 
Lake  Ontario  made  him  suspect  that  the  right  of  search  would 
there  be  exercised  as  it  was  on  Lake  Erie  and  he  also  found  reason 
to  believe  that  British  officers  were  in  most  of  the  seaports  of  the 
United  States,  making  maps  of  them  and  the  places  adjacent. 
"The  danger  is  not  over,"  he  wrote.76 

,  During  the  spring  of  1816  complaints  and  affidavits  came  officially 
from  Cass  to  the  effect  that  parties  of  armed  men  from  the  British 
war  vessel  Tecumseh  on  Lake  Erie  had  boarded  several  vessels 
belonging  to  the  United  States.77  Baumgardt,  the  senior  British 
captain,  was  anxious  to  prevent  controversies.  He  wrote  to  Captain 
Bourchier,  commanding  on  Lake  Erie,  regretting  that  the  latter 
had  issued  orders  to  search  "all  vessels  passing  through  the  port 
of  Amherstburg"  and  requested  that  such  action  should  be  dis 
continued.  Later  in  1816  another  complaint  of  illegal  search  gave 
rise  to  diplomatic  correspondence.  Baumgardt  admitted  that  Bour 
chier  had  exceeded  his  power  in  searching  the  American  vessel 
and  once  more  he  ordered  that  there  should  be  absolutely  no  boarding 
or  searching  of  American  vessels.  However,  it  was  pointed  out 
that  the  complaint  had  not  "proceeded  from  the  master  or  owner 
of  the  vessel  searched,  but  from  passengers,  men  of  a  class  ap 
parently  anxious  to  blow  up  every  trifling  occurrence  into  a  flame ;" 
and,  moreover,  the  United  States  themselves  were  committing  the 
same  offense;  for  one  of  their  vessels  had  followed  a  British  boat 
from  Niagara  to  search  her  for  deserters.  The  whole  point  of  this 
particular  incident,  Baumgardt  said,  was  the  American  effort  to 
maintain  a  claim  to  Bois  Blanc,  an  island  near  Amherstburg.  If 
their  ships  kept  to  their  own  territory  they  would  never  have  been 
disturbed.78 


75Pittsburg  Mercury,   July   17,   1816,   C.   A.  Q.    138,   p.   337. 

76Niles  Register  IX.,   p.   152,   Oct.   17,   and  Oct.  24,    1815,  p.   169,   Nov.   4,   1815.      Niles 

Register    XI.,    p..    30    and   47,    Sept.    7    and    14,    1816. 
"Baumgardt  to  Bourchier,    Sept.   5,    1815,    O.  A.   Q.    146,   p.    13. 
"Baumgardt  to  Bagot,    C.   A.  Q.    146,  p.    15. 

31 


The  commanding  naval  officers  in  Canada  were  not  eager  for 
strife.  The  civil  authorities  had  also  taken  steps  to  prevent  their 
naval  force  from  meddling  with  American  vessels  and  this  action 
on  the  part  of  Lieutenant  Governor  Gore  preceded  Adams'  proposal 
to  eliminate  the  armaments  on  the  lakes.  Two  days  before  Adams 
submitted  his  proposition  to  the  court  of  Saint  James  a  Canadian 
naval  captain,  Owen,  asked  Gore  for  "unquestionable  authority"  to 
act  as  magistrate — in  other  words  to  be  empowered  to  arrest  smug 
glers.80  Gore  replied  that  the  Great  Lakes  were  open  to  the  United 
States  for  navigation  and  the  British  civil  authority  was  sufficient  to 
support  the  revenue  laws.81  Owen  was  ordered  to  cease  searching 
public  vessels,  but  he  significantly  told  Gore  that  "if  only  the  col 
lector  of  duties  had  a  right  to  visit  vessels  on  the  Lakes,  a  new 
feature  was  thereby  given  to  the  naval  service."82 

Adams'  representation  to  the  British  government  complaining 
of  improper  interference  on  the  part  of  British  naval  officers  re 
sulted  in  Bathurst's  sending  the  most  positive  instructions  to  Gore 
and  to  his  successor,  Sherbrooke,  to  discourage  "all  proceedings 
of  this  nature  and  to  exert  their  utmost  authority  and  influence  to 
maintain  within  the  limits  of  their  government  in  all  communica 
tions  and  intercourse  with  the  American  authorities  and  people,  a 
line  of  conduct  strictly  conformable  to  the  relations  of  amity  and 
friendship  so  happily  existing  between  the  two  nations."  83  The 
friendly  disposed  Sherbrooke  received  and  communicated  these 
orders  and  heartily  tried  to  enforce  them,  "because  much  inter 
ference  was  so  much  at  variance  with  the  intentions  of  His  Majesty's 
government."84  It  is  clear  that,  if  the  British  navy  on  the  lakes 
thereafter  interfered  with  American  vessels  so  as  to  provoke  ill 
feeling,  it  was  neither  in  accordance  with  the  British  wishes  nor 
with  the  wishes  of  the  Canadian  civil  authorities.  Almost  invariably 
American  protests  were  favorably  acted  upon  by  the  cabinet  in 
London. 

The  agreement  of  April  28,  1817,  to  reduce  the  naval  armaments 
went  a  long  way  towards  removing  further  trouble.85  Henceforth 
the  naval  force  to  be  maintained  upon  the  lakes,  should  be  confined 
to  the  following  vessels  on  each  side;  on  'Lake  Ontario  to  one 


"Owen   to    Gore,   March   21,    1816,   O.   A.   Q.   220,   p.   218. 
"Gore   to  Owen,   May  14,    1816,   C.   A.   Q.   320,   p.   212. 
"Owen  to  Gore,   May  27,    1816,   C.  A.  jQ.    138,  p.   91. 
••Bathurst    to    Gore,    Sept.    9,    1816,    C.   A.    G.    58. 
"Sherbrooke  to   Bathurst,   Nov.   21,    1816,    O.  A.  Q.    137,   p.   300. 
•C.  A.  Q.  146,  p.  127. 

32 


vessel  not  exceeding  100  tons  burden  and  armed  with  one  eighteen- 
pound  cannon;  on  the  Upper  Lakes  to  two  vessels;  and  on  the 
waters  of  Lake  Champlain  to  one  vessel  of  the  same  kind.  It  was 
stipulated  that  the  other  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes  should  be  forth 
with  dismantled  and  if  either  party  should  be  desirous  of  annulling 
the  stipulation,  six  months'  notice  to  that  effect  should  be  given.86 
Although  the  naval  armament  on  both  sides  was  reduced,  as 
indicated  above,  each  nation  maintained  a  limited  naval  equipment 
— not  until  fifteen  years  later  did  the  British  seriously  discuss  the 
expediency  and  policy  of  discontinuing  this  remaining  unnecessary 
and  even  baneful  establishment.  The  United  States  had  already 
set  the  example  which  the  British  admiralty  at  last  wisely  followed. 
The  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  were  prompted  to  do  this  from  motives 
quite  as  potent  as  that  of  removing  possible  friction  with  the  United 
States.  First,  there  was  the  expense;  the  pay  and  allowance  of 
the  officers  and  men,  and  of  the  civil  part  of  the  establishment 
employed  on  the  Lakes,  amounted  to  a  sum  exceeding  eight  thou- 


86The  following  is  an  account  of  the  actual  force  upon  the  lakes  in  the  spring  of  1817; 
British  vessels.     Lake   Ontario. 

St.  Lawrence  can  carry  110  guns;   laid  up  in  ordinary 
Psyche    .  .  .    .    "        "        50 
Princess 
Charlotte 

unfit  for  service 


Niagara 

Charwell 

Prince  Regent   " 

Montreal    carries 

Star 

Netley    Schooner. 


40 
20 
14 

60 


unequipped 
transport   only 
4  unfit  for  service 

0  surveyor's  boat 

Some  row  boats,  274  gun  ships  on  the  stocks  and  one  transport  of  400  tons. 

Lake   Erie. 

Tecumseh  and  New  Castle,   4  guns  each. 
Huron  and  Tank,  1  each,  transports  chiefly. 

Lake  Huron. 
2    schooners,    1   gun  each;    transports  only. 

Lake    Champlain. 
12  gun  boats,   10  of  these  laid  up  in  ordinary   (C.  A.  Q.   138,  p.  366.) 

American  vessels. 

Lake  Ontario. 
Brig    Jones 18  guns  in  service 


Schooner,  Lady  of  the  Lake 1 

Ship  New  Orleans,  Rate 14 

Chippewa     74 

Superior     44 

Mohawk     32 

General   Pike    24 

Madison     18 

Brig  Jefferson    18 

Sylph    16 

Oneida    18 

Schooner   Raven    0 

15  barges  each  one  gun,  laid  up  for  preservation. 

Lake  Erie. 

Schooner   Porcupine    1  gun,   transport 

Ghent     1     ««         •• 

Ship    Detroit,    rate 18 

Brig    Lawrence    20 

Queen    Charlotte    14 

Niagara     18 

33 


revenue  service, 
on  stocks 


dismantled 


sunk  at  Erie 


dismantled  at  Erie 


sand  pounds  a  year,  while  the  quantity  of  stores  kept  at  Montreal 
and  Kingston  ever  since  the  war  had  been  "quite  enormous"  and 
the  loss  from  waste  and  decay  had  been  ''proportionately  great."  87 
Second,  all  this  expense  was  unnecessary.  True,  the  people  of 
Canada  had  looked  to  the  fleet  as  one  means  of  defense  against 
the  United  States;  but  protection  had  been  increased  by  the  con 
struction  of  the  Rideau  Canal  and  the  fortifications  at  Quebec  and 
Kingston ;  the  line  of  forts  recommended  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
had  gone  far  to  make  Canada  impregnable.88  At  any  rate  it  was 
a  vain  effort  to  try  to  maintain  a  British  naval  supremacy  on  the 
Great  Lakes. 

The  British  admiralty,  however,  were  afraid  a  false  impression 
might  be  created  by  a  sudden  withdrawal  of  the  establishment. 
Hence,  it  was  suggested  simply  to  cease  to  repair  the  vessels. 
Definite  steps  were  not  taken  towards  decisive  reductions  till  October, 
i834.89  The  Admiralty  thereby  acted  in  harmony  with  the  general 
policy  of  the  reform  government  of  that  day,  but  incidentally  they 
removed  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  friendly  intercourse  between  the 
Canadas  and  the  United  States.  A  few  other  British  statesmen 
meanwhile  were  trying  to  lessen  expense  and  increase  international 
good  will  by  cancelling  or  decreasing  the  gifts  to  American  Indians. 
A  greater  number  of  influential  British  traders  and  government 
igents,  however,  for  various  reasons,  advised  their  government  to 
continue  the  granting  of  these  presents.  Such  traders  and  agents 
were  a  menace  to  the  westward  march  of  the  American  settlers. 


Lake  Champlain. 

Ship  Confiance,  rate 32     Laid  up  at  White  Hall 

Saratoga      22         '        "     '  ' 

Brig    Eagle     12 

Linnet     16 

Schooner    Ticonderoga    14 

6    galleys,    each 2 

0.  A.  Q.  138,  p.  370. 
*7Barrow  to  Hay,  Dec.  3,  1833,  C.  A.  Q.  210,  p.  17,  and  see  Hall's  Travels  in  Canada 

and  U.   S.    1817,   p.    100  and  101. 
«8Ibid. 

£9Barrow  to  Hay,  Oct.  7,  1834,  C.  A.  Q.  218,  p.  52,  and  see  Niles  Reg.  for  Dec.  31,  1831, 
p.   327. 


34 


IV. 
THE  INDIAN  MENACE. 

While  the  question  of  the  decreasing  of  the  naval  armaments  was 
being  discussed  in  England  and  in  Canada  during  the  year  1816, 
the  discontented  tribes  of  the  Northwest  formed  a  confederacy, 
collected  in  great  numbers  about  the  frontier  Canadian  posts,  and 
demonstrated  by  their  numbers  and  their  actions  that  they  bitterly 
resented  what  they  considered  American  encroachment  upon  their 
rights  and  privileges.  An  Indian  Council  met  at  Amherstburg  on 
June  19,  composed  of  the  Hurons,  Ottawas,  Chippewas,  Potta- 
wotomies,  Shawnees,  Kickapoos  and  Munsies.  Lieutenant  Colonel 
James  and  other  officers  of  his  garrison  were  also  present. 

The  Indians  in  this  council  complained  that  when  they  had  re 
turned  to  their  old  hunting  grounds  after  the  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent  they  had  been  ordered  to  depart,  with  the  notice  that 
if  they  refused,  they  would  be  fired  upon.  It  was  claimed,  they 
said,  that  their  lands  had  been  sold  "from  such  a  latitude  to  such 
a  latitude."  They  never  sold  lands  except  from  some  named  river  or 
creek  to  some  other  river,  lake  or  mountain ;  and  lately  they  had 
sold  no  land  at  all  to  the  United  States.  At  Detroit  a  certain  Mr. 
Godfrey,  they  declared,  had  ordered  them  back  into  Canada,  telling 
them  that  the  United  States  was  their  country  no  longer.  They 
mourned  over  losses  which  they  had  suffered  in  order  to  help  the 
British ;  they  had  not  received  the  prize  money  for  helping  to  take 
Detroit,  they  had  lost  all,  their  horses,  cattle,  plows,  houses.  They 
wanted  James  to  lay  their  complaints  before  the  government  at 
Quebec  and  insisted  that  the  British  keep  their  promises  to  recom 
pense  them  for  losses.90 

A  little  earlier  in  June  there  met  at  Drummond  Island  a  tumul 
tuous  assembly,  composed  chiefly  of  Sioux.  There  were  some  four 
hundred  at  first,  and  at  least  three  times  that  number  were  said  to 
be  on  the  way  thither.  According  to  McDouall,  commanding  officer 
at  that  post,  they  were  brooding  over  wrongs,  indignant  because 
no  assistance  had  been  given  them,  and  consequently  hazarding 
the  safety  of  the  garrison.  Presents  of  a  little  powder  and  other 


•°C.  A.  Q.  206,  p.  301;  also  Kingsford  IX.,  p.  68. 

35 


things,  he  said,  failed  to  give  satisfaction  to  the  Indians  but  angered 
the  Americans;  chiefs  of  the  greatest  reputation  could  not  divest 
themselves  of  the  suspicion  that  the  erection  of  forts  in  the  western 
territories  meant  their  complete  subjugation  if  not  entire  destruc 
tion;  and  the  little  Corbeau  considered  the  exclusion  of  British 
traders  as  sealing  the  ruin  of  the  nations.  Little  Corbeau  referred 
to  an  act  of  Congress  approved  of  by  President  Madison  April  29, 
1816,  whereby  none  but  American  citizens  was  henceforth  permitted 
to  trade  with  Indians  resident  within  the  United  States. 

McDouall  had  no  doubt  that  a  strong  confederacy  of  all  the 
nations  on  the  Mississippi  had  been  formed  for  the  avowed  object 
of  resisting  American  occupation  of  the  West.  The  Indians  seemed 
fto  be  unanimous  in  an  almost  unprecedented  degree.  They  came  to 
the  councils,  McDouall  said,  full  of  the  idea  of  receiving  British 
assistance  in  securing  for  themselves  possession  of  their  land,  rights, 
7and  privileges  assured  to  them  by  the  Treaty  of  Ghent;  Americans 
were  blaming  the  British  for  fostering  a  bellicose  spirit,  whereas 
Americans  themselves  were  using  every  art  to  add  to  the  discontents 
of  the  savages,  threatening  and  cajoling  them  by  turns  and  almost 
uniformly  concluding  with  the  boast  that  they  had  driven  their 
English  father  from  among  them  and  would  shortly  drive  him 
beyond  the  great  Salt  Lake.  Two  months  later  McDouall  informed 
Sherbrooke  that  another  Indian  council  had  been  held.  The  Indians 
were  more  excited  than  ever.  McDouall  feared  that  if  they  were 
abandoned  by  the  British  now  they  would  become  the  bitterest  of 
enemies  with  perilous  results  to  the  Canadians — but  this  was  just 
what  the  Americans  desired.  In  his  opinion  the  late  commercial 
treaty  renouncing  British  rights  to  the  Indian  trade  was  a  most 
lamentable  mistake,  because  materially  and  morally  the  natives 
had  been  supplied  and  cared  for  by  these  traders.91 

Such  were  the  sentiments  of  the  British  officer  in  close  contact 
with  the  Indians  and  with  his  American  neighbors.  Because  of  his 
position  on  the  frontier,  his  recent  task  of  defending  his  post  against 
attacks,  his  habit  of  looking  upon  the  American  as  an  enemy,  his 
contact  with  the  British  traders,  and  possibly  his  own  personal 
interest  in  the  Indian  trade,  we  may  expect  him  to  have  held  biased 
opinions ;  but  it  was  such  men  as  he  who  could  appreciate  the  loss 


"McDouall   to   Military   Secretary  June   1,    1816,    O.  A.   Q.    137,   p.    12   ff. 

McDouall   to  Mil.  Sec.,  June  17,  1816,  O.  A.  Q.  137,  p.  12  ff. 
McDouall  to  Mil.  Sec.,  June   19,   1816,   C.  A.  Q.   137. 

McDouall  to  Mil.  Sec.,  Aug.  7,   1816,  C.  A.  Q.  137,  p.   70  ff. 


of  the  good  will  of  the  tribes  and  the  consequent  danger  from 
a  military  and  from  a  commercial  standpoint. 

The  men  above  the  frontier  officer,  however,  especially  the  home 
government,  remote  from  the  scene  where  the  real  action  was  in 
progress  and  representing  not  only  Canadian  but  imperial  interests, 
looked  upon  all  this  excitement  in  the  West  in  a  far  different  light. 
While  McDouall  was  thus  worried,  John  Quincy  Adams  was 
corresponding  with  the  British  government,  endeavoring,  as  we 
have  seen,  to  preserve  peace  and  good  will  in  the  West  and  calling 
attention  to  what  had  been  represented  to  him  as  irregularities  and 
injustice  on  the  part  of  certain  British  officials.  Whether  this 
letter  from  Washington  was  the  motive  or  not,  the  British  gov 
ernment,  both  at  home  and  in  Canada,  used  redoubled  exertions 
to  appease  American  anger.  Sherbrooke  instructed  McDouall  to 
repress,  by  every  means  in  his  power,  the  hostile  disposition  of  the 
Indians  towards  the  United  States  and  informed  Bagot,  the  British 
minister  in  Washington,  of  these  instructions.  Sherbrooke  further 
instructed  McDouall  to  intimate  clearly  to  the  Indians  that  no 
presents  would  be  made  to  any  of  those  residing  within  the  limits 
of  the  United  States  and  directed  Sir  John  Johnson,  Superintendent- 
General  of  Indian  Affairs,  strictly  to  adhere  to  this  regulation  on 
all  occasions.95  Bathurst  and  Gore  entirely  concurred  with  Sher 
brooke  in  the  inexpediency  of  sending  presents  to  the  far  distance 
vSacs  or  other  tribes,  and  Drummond  was  instructed  by  them  to 
govern  his  conduct  accordingly.98 

Nevertheless,  contrary  to  the  policy  thus  dictated,  a  "few  swords, 
sashes,  and  epaulets"  were  purchased  and  given  as  a  "mark  of  the 
estimate  of  the  zeal  and  bravery  of  certain  Indian  chiefs."  Sher 
brooke,  true  to  his  policy,  refused  to  approve  of  this  expenditure 
with  the  result  that  McDouall  and  McKay  who  had  been  responsible 
for  the  purchase  were  allowed  to  pay  the  bill  out  of  their  own 
purses.97  Here  again  was  one  of  several  instances  wherein  sub 
ordinate  officers  tended  to  endanger  the  preservation  of  the  peace 
while  the  higher  authorities  were  striving  to  give  no  offense  to  the 
American  government.  To  prevent  further  trouble  McDouall  was 
again  commanded  not  to  communicate  directly  with  any  of  the 
United  States  authorities,  but  all  matters  in  dispute  were  to  be 


^Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,  July  15,  1816,  C.  A.  jQ.   136,  p.   7.     Sept.  20,  1816,  C.  A.  Q. 

"Bathurst  to  Gore,  July  13,   1816,  C.  A.   Q.   58. 

"McDouall  to  Military  Secretary,  June  19,  1816,  O.  A.  Q.  138,  p.  241. 

37 


communicated  through  Sherbrooke.'8  He  was  once  more  urged  to 
discourage  the  hostile  disposition  of  the  Indians  and  to  tell  them 
explicitly  that  the  British  government  would  neither  countenance 
nor  assist  in  any  action  against  the  American  people,  and  that  com 
plaints  they  wished  to  bring  forward  would  be  promptly  attended 
to  and  peaceful  negotiations  would  be  more  likely  to  obtain  rea 
sonable  objects  than  would  any  act  of  indiscreet  conduct." 

The  Westminster  government,  it  is  clear,  did  not  at  this  time 
encourage  the  Indian  in  his  hostility  to  the  Americans.  In  fact, 
it  may  fairly  be  conceded  that  all  through  this  period,  there  was 
an  attempt  to  maintain  the  good  will  of  the  American  government 
even  though  it  should  tend  to  the  sacrifice  of  Canadian  or  Indian 
interests.  The  commercial  regulations  had  cut  off  the  British  trade 
within  American  limits  to  the  injury  of  the  Upper  and  Lower 
Canadian  trader.  Liverpool,  Prime  Minister  of  England,  openly 
declared  that  he  had  no  intention  of  assisting  his  former  Indian 
allies  even  if  they  were  being  abused.  The  Treaty  of  Ghent,  he 
said,  stipulated  for  the  restoration  of  the  Indians  to  all  the  territories 
and  privileges  which  they  enjoyed  previous  to  the  war,  but  he 
assured  them  it  was  never  intended  to  offer  any  guarantee  for  the 
repossession  of  them.100  Liverpool's  own  policy  therefore  was  to 
do  nothing  towards  helping  the  Indians  regain  any  coveted  hunting 
grounds. 

While  McDouall  was  much  worked  up  lest  war  should  immediately 
break  out,  Sherbrooke  was  convinced  that  the  temper  and  conduct 
of  the  chiefs  indicated  no  danger  unless  they  were  first  attacked.101 
Bagot,  like  McDouall  on  Lake  Huron,  was  less  optimistic.  He  had 
been  in  communication  with  Monroe,  had  informed  that  Secretary 
what  steps  Sherbrooke  and  the  British  government  were  taking 
to  prevent  any  disturbance,  and  had  assured  him  that  Great  Britain 
would  lend  no  military  assistance  to  the  Indians.  Monroe  tried  to 
quiet  Bagot's  apprehensions  by  telling  him  that  the  United  States 
intended  to  build  only  one  fort,  the  one  at  Green  Bay,  where  there 
had  always  been  a  fort,102  and  left  the  impression  that  the  Indians 
had  no  grounds  to  fear  American  encroachment.  Bagot,  however, 
did  not  believe  this.  Notwithstanding  the  assurance  from  Monroe 


»8Hall  to  McDouall,   July  4,    1816,   C.  A.  Q.   138,  p.  327. 
*>C.  A.   Q.    136,   p.   222;    C.   A.  Q.   138,   p.   328. 
100Sherbrooke   to  Bathurst,   Aug.   9,   1816,   C.   A.   Q.   137,   p.   68. 
101Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,   Aug.  9,   1816,  O.  A.  Q.    137,  p.   68. 
102Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  Aug.   21,   1816,   C.  A.   Q.   138,  p.   313. 

38 


he  apprehended  that  the  alarms  of  these  Indians  were  in  fact  well 
founded  and  that  the  building  of  forts  was  only  a  part  of  a  larger 
scheme  by  which  it  was  intended  gradually  to  expel  or  extirpate 
the  Indian  from  the  soil.103  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  United  States 
had  already  planned  to  extend  a  line  of  forts  far  north  and  west 
into  the  Indian  territory.104 

During  the  years  immediately  following  this  stormy  year  of  1816 
the  trouble  continued,  though  it  was  less  violent.  Jealous  of  British 
influence  and  rightly  so,  the  Americans  were  endeavoring  to  exclude 
the  British  entirely  from  trading  with  Indians  residing  within  the 
United  States.105  The  Indians,  still  alarmed  at  the  extension  of 
American  posts  into  the  far  west,106  continued  to  resort  to  the 
British  posts  at  Drummond  Island,  and  bitterly  complained  that  the 
British  were  neglecting  them  by  not  preventing  the  advance  of  the 
Americans.  McKay,  writing  in  1819,  still  professed  to  be  afraid 
of  the  most  serious  consequences  to  the  garrison  at  Drummond 
Island  and  to  the  lives  of  His  Majesty's  subjects  in  that  part  of 
the  country,  unless  some  satisfactory  communication  were  made  to 
the  Indians.107  The  Indians  to  be  feared  were  those  warriors  who 
had  served  the  British  in  1812  and  whose  lands  are  now  situated 
within  the  United  States. 

Meanwhile,  Cass  failed  to  prevent  Canadian  agents  from  trading 
and  tampering  with  American  Indians,  and  therefore  collected 
affidavits  and  other  material  to  lay  before  the  administration  in 
London.  Thus,  London  found  itself  at  one  and  the  same  time 
censured  by  the  American  ambassador  for  stimulating  insurrection 
among  American  Indians  and  threatened  by  these  same  Indians 
because  the  British  were  not  providing  a  sufficiently  vigorous  and 
zealous  protection  against  American  usurpation  of  their  rights. 


103Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  Aug.   12,   1816,  C.  A.  Q.  138,  p.  313. 
104Monroe  to  Clark,  March  11,  1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  6. 
100Johnson  to  McNaughten,  March  2,   1817,   C.  A.  Q.  323,  p.   193. 
1MDalhousie  to  Bathurst,  Nov.  12,   1821,  C.  A.  Q.   156,  p.  407. 
""McKay  to  Bathurst,  Feb.   15,   1819,  C.  A.  Q.   153,  p.  211. 


V. 

THE  CANADIANS  RETAIN  THE  INDIANS'  GOOD  WILL. 

The  British  were  anxious  to  retain  an  influence  over  the  Indians 
of  the  Northwest  largely  because  of  the  lucrative  fur  trade.108  As 
early  as  1754  Green  Bay,  then  garrisoned  by  only  one  officer,  one 
sergeant  and  four  soldiers,  required  thirteen  canoes  to  transport  its 
annual  supply  of  goods  and  the  total  yearly  trade  at  this  post  was 
worth  eighteen  thousand  dollars.109  The  Northwest  Company, 
founded  in  1783,  maintained  four  emporiums  in  the  West — Detroit, 
Mackinac,  Sault  St.  Marie,  and  Grand  Portage.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century  Grand  Portage  alone  sent  annually  106,000 
beaver  skins  to  Montreal,  to  say  nothing  of  other  commodities.110 
This  extensive  trade  carried  with  it  a  market  for  British  goods 
and  so  the  manufacturers  in  England  as  well  as  the  French  Canadian 
traders  were  interested  in  this  old  Northwest. 

As  the  Americans  pushed  their  frontier  farther  North  and  West, 
they  too  became  increasingly  interested  in  this  trade.  A  keen 
rivalry  developed  between  the  French  Canadians  who  were  already 
on  the  ground,  and  the  New  York  and  New  England  adventurers 
who  claimed  jurisdiction  over  the  soil  and  over  the  natives.  Neither 
side  was  conspicuous  for  any  deep  or  sentimental  affection  for  its 
competitor.  Robert  Dickson,  a  Canadian  trader  writing  in  1814, 
reveals  the  fierce  spirit  of  rivalry.  He  said:  "The  crisis  is  not  far 
off  when  I  trust  to  God  that  the  tyrant  [Napoleon]  will  be  humbled 
and  the  scoundrel  American  Democrats  will  be  obliged  to  go  down 
on  their  knees  to  Britain."111  As  early  as  1685  New  England 
traders  had  established  posts  at  Michillimackinac  whereupon  the 
French  by  force  and  strategy  endeavored  to  drive  them  out  and 
retain  a  monopoly  of  the  trade  in  this  region.112 


108In  a  report  of  the  Lords  Commissioners  for  Trade  and  Plantation  in  1772  the 
attitude  of  the  English  government  was  stated  in  these  terms:  "The  great  object  of 
colonization  upon  the  continent  of  North  America  has  been  to  improve  and  to  extend 
the  commerce  and  manufacturers  of  this  kingdom  *  *  *  It  does  appear  to  us 
that  the  extension  of  the  fur  trade  depends  entirely  upon  the  Indians  being  undis 
turbed  in  the  possession  of  their  hunting  grounds.  *  *  *  Let  the  savages  enjoy 
their  deserts  in  quiet ;  were  they  driven  from  their  forests  the  peltry  trade  would  b« 
decreased."  J.  H.  U.  S.,  Vol.  9,  580. 

109C.   A.   Q.    1886,   p.   OLXII. 

"°J.  H.  TT.  S.,  Vol.  IX,  p.  581,  595. 

"JJ.  H.  U.  S.,  Vol.  IX,  p.   589. 

1]2J.  H.  U.  S.,  IX,  p.  513,  and  Sheldon,  Early  Hist,  of  Mich.,  p.  310. 

40 


The  Indians  meanwhile  generally  preferred  to  trade  with  the 
French  or  with  their  successors,  the  British.113  With  the  soil  the 
British  seemed  also  to  obtain  the  good  will  of  the  natives.  The 
French  in  Canada  had  known  how  to  win  the  Indians'  friendship 
and  respect.114  Under  British  regime  these  same  Frenchmen, 
Coureurs  des  Bois,  still  mingled  with  the  natives  and  both  French  and 
Indians  turned  their  allegiance  to  and  looked  for  protection  from 
their  British  father.  Furthermore  the  British  won  influence  over 
the  Indians  by  a  display  of  force.  In  succession  the  French  and  the 
Americans  had  surrendered  to  the  British  at  Detroit  and  Michilli- 
mackinac  and  the  credulous  Indian  had  become  impressed  with 
the  might  and  power  of  the  conquerors. 

The  Indians  now  needed  help,  or  thought  they  did.  This  assist 
ance  they  sought  from  the  powerful  "Redcoats"  who  instead  of 
trespassing  upon  the  hunting  grounds117  were  even  extending  in 
vitations  for  the  Indians  to  enter  Canada  and  take  up  their  abode 
in  those  unsettled  wilds.  On  the  other  hand,  immigrants  from  the 
Atlantic  states  were  both  lawfully  and  unlawfully  pressing  into 
the  Indian  lands  of  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Michigan.118  American- 
Indian  superintendents  and  agents  themselves  complained  of  insuf 
ficient  power  to  prevent  this  illegal  encroachment.  "Persons  are 
found  in  the  Indian  territory,"  wrote  Edwards,  "hunting,  tres 
passing,  trading  without  license,  or  engaged  in  any  other  unlawful 
purpose.  Many  such  offenders  pass  with  impunity  while  these 
unlawful  visits  and  intrusions  have  the  most  unhappy  effect  upon 
the  Indians  who  have  repeatedly  made  them  the  subjects  of  their 
bitterest  complaints."119 

Such  encroachments  made  the  Indian  hate  the  American.  Cal- 
houn's  policy  of  building  military  posts  in  the  West  in  advance  of 
the  settlements  only  increased  the  discontent  because  these  outposts 
themselves  were  considered  to  be  encroachments.  Even  while  the 

118A.  S.   P.,  Indian  Affairs,  II,  327  ff. 
114A.  S.  P.,  Indian  Affairs,  II,  p.  70. 

11TTecumseh's  speech  to  Gen.  Proctor  at  Amherstburg,  1813,  reveals  a  belief 
among  the  Indians  that  the  British  had  promised  to  help  them  recover  their  lands  in 
the  Northwest  territory.  "When  the  war  was  declared,"  said  the  great  Indian 
captain,  "our  father  stood  up  and  gave  us  the  tomahawk  and  told  us  he  was  now 
readjr  to  strike  the  American,  that  he  wanted  our  assistance,  and  that  he  would 
certainly  get  us  back  our  lands  which  the  Americans  had  taken  from  us."  "Summer 
before  last,"  said  Tecumseh  in  1810,  "when  I  came  forward  with  my  red  brethren 
and  was  ready  to  take  up  the  hatchet  in  favor  of  our  British  father,  we  were  told 
not  to  be  in  a  hurry,  that  he  had  not  yet  determined  to  fight  the  Americana."  School- 
craft:  H.  of  I.  T.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  351;  p.  358.  Copied  from  official  military  and  naval 
letters. 
""Schoolcraft,  H.  of  I.  T.,  VI,  p.  XIII. 

"'Edwards  to  Crawford,  Nov.,  1815,  A.   S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  63. 

41 


Indians  ceded  lands  in  councils,  there  was  always  an  undertone  of 
unwillingness  to  cede.  "The  Americans  are  never  satisfied,"  they 
declared  at  one  of  these  councils.120  Cass  and  McArthur  perceived 
how  displeased  the  Indians  were  to  give  up  their  lands  when,  in 
1818,  it  was  proposed  that  the  Wyandottes,  Shawnees,  and  Senecas 
should  remove  west  of  the  Mississippi.  The  tribes  received  this 
proposition  with  such  strong  symptoms  of  disapprobation  that  it 
was  deemed  expedient  to  postpone  the  migration.  "The  time  had 
not  yet  arrived,"  Cass  wrote,  "for  them  voluntarily  to  abandon  the 
land  of  their  fathers  ....  As  our  settlements  surround  them, 
their  minds  will  be  better  prepared  to  receive  this  proposition."  12i 
Furthermore,  the  British-Indian  department  was  undoubtedly  su 
perior  to  that  of  the  Americans.  The  latter  themselves,  acknowl 
edged  this.122  More  care  and  tact  was  exercised  in  the  manage 
ment  of  Indian  affairs ;  British  agents  were  acquainted  with  at  least 
one  of  the  native  languages  and  so  were  not  easily  imposed  upon; 
a  blacksmith  was  found  at  every  post  to  make  repairs  for  the 
Indians  ;123  and  when  military  prowess,  or  invitations  to  visit  and 
live  in  Canada,  or  ordinary  management  could  no  longer  prevail 
upon  the  Indian,  a  more  lavish  outpouring  of  presents  was  made 
to  compensate.  The  liberality  of  British  beneficence  formed  a 
marked  contrast  to  the  paucity  of  American  gifts.  The  "United 
States'  presents  are  so  small  they  might  as  well  be  discontinued," 
wrote  one  American  agent.124 

The  Americans,  however,  were  quite  as  anxious  to  win  the  favor 
of  the  tribes  and  were  using  the  same  tactics  as  the  British.125 
Harrison's  speech  in  the  council  at  Detroit  in  1815  was  a  direct 
appeal  to  the  known  instincts  of  the  Indians.  Thousands  of  dollars' 
worth  of  medals  and  presents  were  ordered  to  be  distributed  at  St. 
Louis  and  other  places.126  When  any  treaty  was  signed,  or  when 
lands  were  purchased,  the  Indians  were  bribed  to  accede  to  the 
wishes  of  the  land-grabbers  but  there  is  no  instance  recorded  as 
far  as  I  have  found,  nor  any  complaint  made,  that  the  Americans 
offered  presents  to  nonresident  Indians,  the  crime  that  was  re 
peatedly  and  justly  charged  against  the  dispensers  of  gifts  at  Maiden 


1>0Schoolcraft,  Vol.  VI,  p.  383.     And  see   speech  by  Creek  chief  in  Niles  Register 
for  June  20,    1829. 

121Cass  to  Calhoun,  Sept.  18,  1818,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  177. 
1KA.   S.  P.,  I.  A.,  II,  p.   85. 

123Forsythe  to  Clark,  A.   S.   P.,  I.  A.,  II,  p.   79. 
1Z*A.   S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  86. 
1J5C.  A.  |Q.  333,  p.  292. 
1WA.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  6. 

42 


or  Manitoulin.  The  Americans  found  too  many  Indians  already. 
They  wanted  to  expel  those  they  had  rather  than  attract  more. 

Despite  numerous  foreign  influences  and  extraneous  impediments 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States  can  blame  only  themselves  for  a 
considerable  part  of  their  failure  to  win  the  afTections  of  these 
western  tribes  and  gather  to  themselves  the  profits  from  the  fur 
trade.  Systematic  effort  to  regulate  the  Indian  trade  began  in 
1786  when  the  whole  territory  occupied  by  the  natives  was  divided 
into  two  districts  with  a  superintendent  and  deputy  over  each.  Only 
licensed  individuals  were  allowed  to  trade  and  foreigners  were 
not  permitted  to  obtain  a  license  till  1790.  In  1816  foreigners 
were  again  prohibited  unless  by  special  permission  of  the  President 
and  he  issued  instructions  to  admit  foreigners  only  as  boatmen  or 
interpreters. 

Meanwhile  the  factory  system  had  been  introduced,  but  until 
after  the  war  it  had  not  superseded  the  earlier  mode  of  carrying 
on  the  trade  by  license.  In  1796  the  President  was  authorized  to 
establish  trading  houses  and  to  appoint  an  agent  at  each  house 
to  carry  on,  as  the  act  states,  "a  liberal  trade  with  the  Indians." 
The  original  capital  of  $150,000  and  an  annual  allowance  of  $8,000 
to  pay  clerks  and  agents  had  been  increased  until  in  1811  it  stood 
at  $300,000  and  an  annual  allowance  of  $i9,25O.126a  By  authority 
of  this  act  of  1796,  renewed  and  revised  from  time  to  time,  eight 
or  ten  factories  under  government  supervision  and  regulation  were 
established  within  Indian  territory.  Such  goods  as  the  Indians 
might  require  were  here  kept  and  exchanged  for  furs,  or  whatever 
surplus  produce  the  natives  might  have.  These  storehouses  were 
intended  to  serve  as  a  check  upon  the  unfairness  or  rapacity  of 
the  licensed  trader  and  ensure  to  the  Indians  a  sufficient  amount  of 
necessary  goods  at  a  fair  price. 

Just  before  the  war,  in  1811,  there  were  in  operation  ten  such 
factories  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  Indians  within  the  limits  of 
the  whole  country.127  During  the  war  four  of  these  in  the  north 
western  districts,  namely  those  at  Michillimackinac,  Chicago,  San- 
dusky  and  Fort  Wayne,  had  been  broken  up  by  the  enemy;  but 
when  peace  was  again  assured  and  the  United  States  garrisons 
had  begun  to  occupy  Green  Bay  and  Prairie  du  Chien,  factories 
were  again  established  to  take  the  place  of  those  destroyed.  In 


128aA.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  18 Iff.     Report  of  J.   C.  Calhoun. 
137Mason's  Report,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.   68. 

43 


the  fall  of  1815  two  were  set  up  at  Chicago  and  Green  Bay.128 
Two  more  were  soon  in  operation  at  Prairie  du  Chien  and  at  a 
place  nine  miles  above  Natchitoches.129  Once,  this  machinery  for 
the  supply  of  the  Indian  needs  was  again  in  operation,  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  made  an  attempt  to  throw  the  Indian 
trade  wholly  into  the  hands  of  these  factories.  By  an  act  of  1816 
the  British  trader  was  excluded  from  holding  any  intercourse  with 
the  Indians  residing  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States. 
This  act  was  of  course  antagonistic  to  the  interests  of  the  North 
west  Company,  who  immediately  complained  that  the  natives  were 
being  deprived  of  their  rights  and  privileges  guaranteed  by  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent.130 

But  complaints  came  not  only  from  the  British  or  even  from  the 
Indians;  the  factories  met  with  harsh  criticism  from  many  of  the 
Americans  themselves.  As  early  as  October,  1815,  Governor  Clark 
from  St.  Louis  declared  that  the  "mode  of  managing  Indian  affairs 

grew  more  and  more  imperfect  every  day" and  the 

"decided  policy  of  England,  so  recently  and  clearly  developed  of 
using  the  Indian  tribes  to  vex  and  harass  the  frontier  settlements 
in  time  of  peace  and  as  active  partisans  in  time  of  war,  ought  to 
admonish  the  United  States  to  adopt  a  more  efficient  system  of 
regulating  the  Indian  concerns"  than  had  hitherto  been  in  use.  By 
the  existing  methods,  he  said,  the  tribes  were  not  at  that  time 
furnished  with  what  they  absolutely  required.131  Similar  charges 
were  reported  later. 

The  trouble  with  the  factory  system  was  not  that  the  United 
States  government  was  trying  to  make  money  out  of  the  business. 
During  these  years  the  system  was  carried  on  at  an  annual  loss  of 
over  $5,ooo.132  Undeniably  the  policy  of  the  federal  authorities  was 
to  maintain  peace  and  to  acquire  an  influence  over  the  tribes  which 
could  be  obtained  only  by  generous  treatment.  Prominent  Amer 
icans  on  the  floors  of  Congress  advocated  a  humane  and  benev 
olent  policy.  The  earnest  desire  of  the  government  was  "to  draw 
its  savage  natives  within  the  pale  of  civilization."  American  offi 
cers  on  the  ground  held  the  same  views.  The  Governor  of  Mich 
igan  Territory  at  this  time  favored  cash  payments  of  annuities, 


1J8MaBon  to  Crawford,  Feb.  9,   1816,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  68. 

1MA.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  127. 

130J.   H.   U.   S.,   IX,   p.    597.     Also  McGillivray  to  Harvey,   1815,   0.   A.   Q.    132,   p.   35. 

131Clark  to  Crawford,  Oct.  1,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,   I.  A.  II,  p.  77. 

ls>Crawford'i  Report,  March  13,  1816,   Feb.  4,   1817,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.   127. 

44 


because  it  would  be  "more  satisfactory  to  the  Indians."188  Never 
theless  the  Indians  were  not  satisfied  with  the  system  introduced 
into  the  Northwest. 

Even  while  the  act  of  1816,  providing  for  the  exclusion  of  for 
eign  traders  was  under  discussion,  Mason  pointed  out  the  peculiar 
difficulties  which  the  legislators  were  partly  creating,  partly  over 
coming.134  He  recognized  that  it  would  be  very  questionable 
whether  the  amount  of  supplies  heretofore  furnished  in  many  parts 
of  the  territories  by  the  British  traders  could,  within  a  short  period, 
be  supplied  by  the  American  factors.  He  saw  that  the  "Indian 
trade  required  certain  associations  of  local  information  and  habit 
on  the  one  hand,  and  of  capital  and  perseverance  on  the  other, 
which  could  not  be  at  once  matured."  If  British  traders  were 
excluded,  not  only  would  the  Indians  suffer  for  the  want  of  nec 
essary  supplies  but  they  would  lose  respect  for  the  American  gov 
ernment.134*1  It  is  perfectly  apparent  therefore  that  the  American 
government  had  not  been  left  entirely  ignorant  of  the  probable 
effects  of  this  act  of  1816. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  many  British  traders  managed  to 
evade  this  American  law.135  Statements  of  such  men  as  Benjamin 
O'Fallon,  Indian  agent  on  the  Missouri,  and  Matthew  Irwin,  United 
States  Factor  at  Green  Bay,  leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  great  number 
of  British  subjects  who  continued  to  trade  with  the  American 
tribes.  Writing  from  Prairie  du  Chien  in  1817,  O'Fallon  told  of 
his  extreme  "surprise  and  disappointment  in  meeting  with  nu 
merous  British  traders  equipped  with  licenses  under  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  government."138  Irwin  at  the  same  time  com 
plained  of  the  number  of  British  subjects  licensed  by  the  American 
Fur  Company  to  trade  on  the  Wisconsin,  Upper  Mississippi,  the 
Chicago  district,  and  other  places.137  He  also  pointed  out  the 
palpable  incongruity  of  allowing  such  licenses;  the  factors  were 
sent  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  Indians  and  yet  the  Indian  agents 
could  adopt  measures  so  as  to  defeat  the  plans  of  the  factors.188 
The  American  Fur  Company,  backed  up,  it  would  seem,  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  himself,  in  1817  freely  granted  licenses  to  men 


188Letter  of  Cass,  Oct.  21,   1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  75. 

^Mason  to  Crawford,  March  1,  1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  70. 

""Ibid. 

188J.  H.  IT.  S.,  IX,  p.  597. 

18flA.   S.  P.,   I.  A.  II,  p.   358-359. 

137J.  H.  U.  S.,  IX,  p.   597. 

188A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  259,  360. 

45 


who  understood  how  to  serve  the  Company;  whether  these  were 
citizens  of  the  country  or  aliens,  the  Fur  Company  doubtless  cared 
little.139  Unlicensed  British  traders  were  also  numerous.  "In  fact," 
Irwin  wrote  later,  "from  the  prejudices  they,  [the  British  traders,] 
have  excited  against  American  traders,  the  American  trade  is  con 
fined  to  the  British  traders The  Indians  are  altogether 

ted  away  by  them."139a  The  factor  at  Green  Bay  also  stated  that 
the  British  had  almost  completely  monopolized  the  trade  in  that 
vicinity.140  Many  other  Indian  agents  confirmed  the  statement 
of  O'Fallon :  "the  Indians  cannot  be  attached  to  the  factories ;  they, 
have  almost  abandoned  them."141  "Nine-tenths  of  the  Indian 
trade,"  said  Crooks,  "is  not  done  with  the  factories,  but  with  private 

traders So  small  a  trade  is  done  at  the  factories  that 

their  withdrawal  would  not  be  felt."142  The  factory  system  there 
fore  proved  to  be  a  failure. 

Various  reasons  were  assigned  for  the  failure  of  the  factor  to 
gain  the  favor  of  the  native  hunters  and  trappers.  In  the  first 
place,  he  rarely  met  the  Indians  except  during  the  process  of  barter. 
He  did  not  cultivate  intimacy  with  them  and  his  knowledge  of  them 
was  proportioned  to  an  intercourse  so  limited  and  unsociable.143 
The  private  trader  to  the  contrary  became  identified  with  the  tribe 
.  which  he  commonly  visited. 

A  second  fault  found  with  the  factor  was  that  he  too  often  sup 
plied  goods  not  suited  to  the  Indian.144  The  quality  of  the  goods 
of  the  factory  at  Green  Bay  was  reported  to  be  bad,  the  blankets 
and  woolen  goods  particularly  so.145  Both  Ramsey  Crooks,  who 
was  acquainted  with  the  factory  system  as  it  was  conducted  at 
different  periods  at  Bell  Fontaine,  Fort  Madison,  Chicago,  Michill- 
imackinac,  Fort  Osage,  Prairie  du  Chien,  Fort  Edwards,  and  Green 
Bay,  and  who  ought  to  have  been  an  authority  on  the  question,146 
and  Governor  Edwards,  who  was  quite  as  closely  connected  with 
the  system,  regretted  that  the  factories'  goods  were  inferior  and 


39Ibid. 

39albid. 

40Letter  of  August  10,   1818,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  359. 

"A.    S.   P.,   I.   A.   II,  p.   228-229. 

42Crooks  and  Biddle  to  the  Senate,  Jan.,   1822,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,   330    327. 

43Crooks  and  Biddle  to  the  Senate,  Jan.,   1822.  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  330,  327. 

^Ibid. 

45Biddle  to  the  Senate,  A.   S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.   326. 

146Crooks  to  Senate,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  329,  Jan.  23,  1822.  "The  quality  of 
the  Indian  goods,"  he  said,  "has  always  been  much  inferior  to  the  same  description  of 
articles  furnished  by  private  traders,  except,  perhaps,  during  the  late  war.  Gun 
powder,  balls,  shot,  and  the  like,  are  as  good  at  the  factories;  but  the  blankets  and 
other  drygpods  generally  have  been  from  twenty-five  to  fifty  per  cent  inferior  to  the 
corresponding  articles  supplied  by  individual  traders." 

46 


admonished  the  government  that  its  first  care  should  be  to  obtain 
goods,  particularly  the  important  articles  of  blankets  and  cloths,  of 
equal  quality  to  those  that  were  carried  into  the  Indian  market  by 
their  rivals.  This,  it  was  said,  "had  never  heretofore  been  done  in 
a  single  instance."  147  No  doubt  it  is  true,  too,  that  the  more  wily 
private  traders  taught  the  Indians  to  prefer  British  goods.  They 
told  them  that  all  blankets,  cloths,  ribbons,  shawls,  jewelry,  etc.,  of 
common  quality  were  of  American  manufacture  and  that  the  British 
made  only  the  best ;  that  only  American  goods  were  for  sale  at  the 
factory  and  that  even  if  the  price  were  lower,  the  goods  were 
dearer,  and  very  dear  considering  the  quality.148  This  argument 
hurt  the  factories  and  operated  not  a  little  in  favor  of  the  British.14* 
That  in  general,  the  Indians  considered  British  goods  superior  to 
American  must  be  accepted.  But  we  must  not  suppose  that  the 
factories  carried  poor  goods  only.  Cass,  for  instance,  just  before 
the  factory  system  was  abolished,  spoke  of  some  of  them  as 
being  "very  satisfactory"  and  "very  well  selected."  15° 

Another  objection  to  the  factories  was  that  in  some  places, 
especially  at  Green  Bay,  there  was  no  uniformity  whatever  in 
prices.151  In  this  matter  of  price  and  the  quality  of  the  goods  it 
was  not  easy  to  deceive  the  Indians.  They  were  not  uncritical  and 
not  incompetent  judges.  They  recognized  that  prices  varied  at 
both  the  factory  and  among  private  traders  and  therefore  bought 
from  those  who  treated  them  best.152 

The  crowning  fault  with  the  factors,  however,  was  that  they  did 
not  employ  the  credit  system.153  Credits  were  actually  indispensable 
because  the  hunting  grounds  were  more  distant  than  formerly.  In 
dians  were  obliged  to  go  more  than  three  hundred  miles  from  their 
villages  in  order  to  find  their  game.  They  did  not  have  furs  previous 


"7Edwards  to  Crawford,  Nov.,  1815,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  65.  The  following 
incident  emphasizes  Edwards'  views:  "A  gentleman  of  our  party,"  said  Captain 
John  B.  Bell,  in  1822,  "had  with  him  what  is  termed  by  the  Indians  a  Mackinac 
blanket,  which  is  of  a  superior  quality  of  blankets  and  such  as  are  generally  furnished 
by  the  British  traders  at  Mackinac  to  the  Indians.  Several  of  the  Indian  party 
noticed  this  blanket  and  each  proposed  to  exchange  his  blanket,  which  was  of  the 
same  description  as  those  supplied  by  the  United  States  or  their  traders,  offering 
at  the  same  time  something  very  considerable  in  addition.  *  *  *  On  inquiry,  I 
found  that  the  Indians  were  under  the  impression  that  the  blankets,  arms,  vermillion, 
etc.,  furnished  them  at  Mackinac,  were  .of  a  superior  quality  to  anything  received 
from  the  American  government  or  procured  from  its  traders."  Bell,  of  Senate  Com- 
m.ittee,  to  Benton,  Jan.  23,  1822,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  329. 
148Sibley,  Feb.  3,  1818,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  363. 
""Ibid. 

1MA.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  426. 

ulBiddle,  O'Fallon,  and  Bell,   1822,  A.  S.   P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  326-7. 
152Crooks  and  Biddle,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  331,  327. 
"'Edwards,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  66. 

47 


to  the  hunt  to  pay  for  their  goods,  and  could  not  return  on  account 
of  the  distance,  cold,  and  dangers  to  get  supplies.  These  supplies 
therefore  had  to  be  advanced  to  them  or  carried  to  their  hunting 
grounds.  The  custom  of  advancing  goods  on  credit  dated  back 
to  the  French  regime  and  was  also  used  by  the  Dutch  and  New 
Englanders.154  The  amount  of  credit  granted  varied  with  the 
reputation  of  the  individual  hunter,  from  $40  or  $50  worth  to 
$3oo.155 

Good  goods  and  courteous  treatment  drew  the  Indians  to  the 
British  rather  than  to  the  factories.  British  traders  did  their  best 
to  extend  their  credit  to  any  hunter  who  had  a  fair  reputation 
because  a  family  who  had  obtained  goods  on  credit  sold  all  of  its 
furs  to  those  who  advanced  the  goods.156  Out  on  the  hunting 
grounds,  one  hundred  or  two  hundred  miles  from  the  summer 
camp,  British  traders  built  their  cabins  alongside  those  of  the 
hunters,  collected  furs  in  payment  for  advances  already  given  and 
granted  additional  credit  to  those  who  were  prospering  in  the 
chase.  Even  a  lower  price  at  the  factory  before  the  hunt  offered  no 
inducement  for  an  Indian  to  buy  there.  Improvident  by  nature,  he 
had  no  capital  on  hand.  Well  might  he  think  that  the  attempt 
of  1816  to  shut  out  those  who  extended  credit  was  an  attempt  to 
injure  the  red  man  and  not  the  Montreal  merchant.157 

The  first  approach  of  the  American  factory  had  been  a  disappoint 
ment  to  the  tribes.  British  frontier  posts  had  been  depots  for  free 
gifts  to  the  Indians.  When  the  United  States  warehouses  were 
carried  to  the  districts  approaching  Canada  the  Indians  were  so 
firmly  of  the  opinion  that  the  goods  deposited  there  were  to  be 
disposed  of  after  the  manner  of  the  British  that  they  frequently 
charged  the  factors  with  selling  for  their  own  emolument  what 
their  great  father,  the  President,  had  intended  as  presents.  When 
they  found  that  they  were  mistaken  the  "impression  became  univer 
sal"  that  their  American  father  must  be  very  poor  indeed  since  he 
sent  his  goods  into  their  country  to  be  sold  for  skins  as  a  common 


154J.  H.  U.  S.  IX,  p.  602. 

155Schoolcraft  in  1831  estimated  $48.34  in  goods  and  provisions  at  cost  price  was 
the  annual  supply  of  each  hunter.  This  is  confirmed  by  Turner  in  J.  H.  U.  S.  IX, 
p.  603  (see  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A-  II,  p.  64; 56).  An  account  from  the  book  of  Jacques  Polier 
at  Green  Bay,  in  1823,  shows  that  the  Indian  Michel  bought  on  credit  in  the  fall, 
cloth,  $16;  trap,  $1.00;  cotton,  $3.12J;  powder,  $1.50;  lead,  $1.00;  bottle  of 
whisky,  fifty  cents;  and  other  miscellany;  making  a  total  of  about  $25.  This  was 
paid  for  in  the  spring  by  muskrat  skins,  a  foxskin,  and  maple  sugar,  to  the  full 
extent,  but  the  trader  usually  expected  to  get  at  least  one  hundred  per  cent  profit 
upon  the  credit  transactions  (see  J.  H.  U.  S.  IX,  p.  603). 
156Edwards,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II.  64,  66. 

1B7Edwards,  Nov.,  1815,  and  Forsyth,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  pp.   64,   79. 

48 


trader  had  bought  his  goods.  While  England's  king  by  unanimous 
consent  received  the  appellation  of  father,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  was  degraded  to  the  level  of  a  common  adventurer.158 

The  American  trading  houses  themselves  not  infrequently  played 
into  the  hands  of  the  British.  The  British  traders  bought  goods 
from  the  factory  at  Chicago  through  an  Indian  friendly  to  them, 
it  might  be,  and  then  the  British  traded  these  goods  with  the 
Indians  for  furs.  Thus  an  enterprising  Canadian  trader  whose 
stock  of  English  goods  had  become  exhausted  might,  nevertheless, 
collect  a  big  load  of  furs  to  sell  in  the  Eastern  or  European 
markets.159 

Against  such  odds  the  trading  post  system,  backed  up  though  it 
was  by  such  friendly  supporters  as  Jefferson  and  Calhoun,  could 
not  but  fail.  Calhoun  tried  to  improve  the  system  by  organizing  a 
still  bigger  trading  post  business  with  a  complete  government 
monopoly  managed  by  a  private  company.160  Benton  and  the  Amer 
ican  Fur  Company,  however,  were  bitterly  opposed  to  this  plan. 
They  declared  the  system  bad,  both  as  a  civilizing  and  as  a  Chris 
tianizing  influence.161  In  the  first  session  of  the  seventeenth  Con 
gress,  1822,  it  was  at  last  abolished.  The  trade  was  then  left 
entirely  to  private  enterprise,  but  until  the  Indian  moved  far  beyond 
the  Mississippi  the  British  trader  maintained  his  hold  on  the  old 
Northwest  territories  as  hitherto,  and  furs  continued  to  pass  down 
the  St.  Lawrence. 


^B8Crooks  to  Senate,  Jan.  23,  1822,  A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  331. 

159Ibid. 

180A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  181,  184. 

161A.  S.  P.,  I.  A.  II,  p.  331,  417. 


VI 
INDIAN  PRESENTS. 

Long  before  1815  the  Indians  were  accustomed  to  receive  pres 
ents  from  those  who  had  any  traffic  with  them.  Traders  had 
purely  commercial  and  selfish  ends  to  serve.  It  was  otherwise  with 
the  civil  and  military  powers,  who  in  the  second,  third,  and  fourth 
decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  continued  to  bestow  gifts  not 
only  upon  the  resident  Indians,  but  upon  those  who  lived  beyond 
their  borders.  They  defended  their  action  on  the  ground  of  grati 
tude,  of  usage,  of  pledge,  of  policy,  and  of  necessity.164  It  can 
scarcely  be  doubted,  however,  that  the  chief  motive  for  continuing 
to  give  presents  was  that  the  British  wanted  to  retain  a  dominating 
influence. 

Almost  as  soon  as  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  had  been  signed,  Bathurst 
wrote  to  Drummond:  "You  will  not  fail  to  make  liberal  presents 
to  the  Indian  tribes  who  have  cooperated  with  us."165  There  was 
not  necessarily  anything  insidious  in  this.  The  Indians  then  were 
with  or  near  the  British  army.  It  was  not  a  matter  of  bribing 
Indians  who  lived  in  the  United  States ;  it  was  merely  a  partial 
payment  of  an  honest  debt,  and  as  such  could  not  be  offensive 
to  the  United  States.  It  was  not  these  first  gifts  but  the  later  ones 
that  caused  trouble.  When  Provost  made  an  announcement  of  the 
Treaty  to  the  Indians,  he  definitely  promised  that  the  presents  sent 
to  the  frontier  posts  should  not  be  diminished.  His  military  officers 
at  Maiden,  Michillimackinac,  Drummond,  or  Manitoulin  Islands 
were  chiefly  responsible  for  the  extension  of  this  kind  of  favor 
and  on  many  occasions  it  will  be  observed  that  it  was  these  military 
officers  in  Canada  rather  than  the  civil  officers  and  rather  than  the 
distant  British  government  who  realized  the  need  of  maintaining 
the  Indian  as  an  ally.  Every  action  on  the  part  of  the  Colonial 
Office  was  an  effort  to  prevent  renewal  of  war.  Compromises  in 
the  boundary  dispute,  disavowal  of  the  deeds  of  frontier  officers, 
orders  to  cease  sending  presents,  all  bear  out  the  statement.  But 


1MCaldwell  to  Glaus,  Dec.  20,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  320,  p.  155. 

When    the    Indians'    allowance    had    been    curtailed    in    the    preceding    years,    the 
Indians  had  committed  depredations  as  the  Prophet  had  predicted. 

188Bathurst  to  Drummond,  Jan.  10,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  320,  p.  57. 

50 


certain  minor  officers  often  brought  the  two  nations  to  the  verge 
of  serious  conflict. 

Not  content  with  supplying  presents  to  the  Indians  who  came 
to  his  frontier  posts,  Drummond  in  the  fall  or  winter  of  1815  and 
1816,  even  suggested  the  advisability  of  sending  some  to  the  Indians 
residing  on  the  Mississippi.  He  did  not  wish,  he  said,  to  foment 
discord  between  Canada  and  the  United  States,  for  his  desire  was 
quite  the  opposite ;  but  faithful  services  should  be  remembered  and 
promises  should  be  kept.166  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  how  Drum 
mond  could  convince  himself  that  the  sending  of  goods  across 
American  territory  to  Indians  residing  within  American  limits  would 
not  excite  American  hostility.  Did  Drummond  really  imagine  that 
the  Indians  might  cause  trouble — as  Caldwell  reported  them  to 
have  done  before — if  presents  were  not  forthcoming  and  that  this 
was  a  means  of  preserving  peace  within  American  jurisdiction? 

Happily,  Drummond's  proposal  was  not  acted  upon.  Gore  re 
ferred  the  matter  to  Bathurst  but  informed  Bathurst  that  according 
to  information  from  the  Indian  Department  it  was  not  customary 
to  send  presents  to  these  Indians  even  in  time  of  peace,  and  now, 
while  the  United  States  were  so  extremely  jealous  of  intercourse 
with  those  residing  in  their  territory,  there  would  be  great  risk  of 
the  presents  being  seized  in  transit.167  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Drummond  as  well  as  Gore  did  not  want  to  excite  another  American 
conflict,  but  Drummond  saw  the  necessity  of  alliance  with  those 
who  had  helped,  and  might  again  be  called  upon  to  help,  his  forces. 
Gore  recognized  more  acutely  the  delicacy  that  was  necessary  in 
dealing  with  non-resident  tribes. 

In  May,  1816,  the  management  of  Indian  affairs,  which  had  been 
a  department  of  the  civil  administration  in  Canada,  was  transferred 
to  the  military  department,  and  Drummond,  therefore,  was  left  more 
free  to  carry  out  his  plans.168  Bathurst,  however,  favored  Gore's 
prudent  policy  rather  than  Drummond's  proposal,  and  accordingly 
ordered  no  presents  to  leave  Canada.169  Sir  J.  C.  Sherbrooke,  who 
landed  at  Quebec  July  u,  1816,  as  Governor  of  Canada,  instructed 
both  McDouall  and  the  superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs  to  pacify 
the  Indians  and  clearly  to  announce  to  them  that  no  presents  should 
be  made  to  any  residing  beyond  the  British  jurisdiction.170  There 


18flDrummond  to   Gore,   March  2,    1816,   C.  A.  Q.   320,   p.    79. 
187Gk>re  to  Bathurst,  March  20,  1815,  C.  A.  jQ.  320,  p.  73. 
1680.  A.  Q.   320,  p.   337. 
W»C.  A.  Q.  320,  p.  58. 
1TOC.  A.  Q.  320,  p.  136-7. 

51 


can  scarcely  be  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  that  the  protest  of  Adams 
in  the  spring  of  this  year  was  partly  responsible  for  these  instruc 
tions.  (The  Colonial  Office  was  aware  of  the  dangers  it  was  running 
in  further  irritating  the  settlers  of  the  Northwest. 

In  spite  of  these  spasmodic  efforts  of  Bathurst  and  others  in  1816, 
the  giving  of  presents  to  the  visiting  Indians  was  not  suspended. 
Cass,  who  bore  the  burden  of  maintaining  order  and  furthering  the 
prosperity  of  Michigan,  felt  the  evils  of  this  practice  more  imme 
diately  than  any  other  American  officer.  By  1818  he  had  grown 
weary  of  the  persistent  efforts  of  certain  foreign  agents  to  influence 
the  Indians  against  his  own  countrymen.  He,  therefore,  busied 
himself  collecting  affidavits  and  other  material  so  that  Calhoun 
might  file  in  the  British  Foreign  Office  a  carefully  detailed  and 
formal  protest.  In  August,  1819,  he  told  Calhoun  that  a  radical 
change  was  necessary  in  the  policy  of  the  United  States  upon  the 
subject  of  the  relations  existing  between  the  agents  of  the  British 
government  and  the  Indians  residing  within  the  United  States. 
He  had  numerous  and  grievous  charges  to  make  against  these 
agents,  but  it  was  very  difficult  he  said,  to  produce  definite  proofs 
because  all  written  communication  was  excluded  and  the  language 
was  figurative.  Large  quantities  of  clothing,  arms,  amunition  and 
trinkets,  were  annually  distributed  to  American  Indians  who  were 
invited  to  Fort  Maiden.  On  their  way  to  Maiden  these  Indians 
stole  from  and  abused  American  citizens,  thus  keeping  the  frontier 
in  a  continuous  state  of  alarm.  It  was  impossible  to  punish  the  In 
dians.  They  escaped  rapidly.  Lately,  he  said  there  had  appeared 
among  them  a  morbid  sensibility  and  restlessness,  without  any  as 
signed  cause,  all  of  which  he  blamed  to  the  British  agents.  He  feared 
there  was  an  intention  of  reviving  the  plans  and  policy  of  Tecumseh 
and  of  forming  a  general  confederacy.  Just  then  there  was  at 
Maiden  a  large  party  of  Sacs  and  Foxes,  bitter  enemies  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  greater  proportion  of  the  Indians  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  Mississippi  made  annual  visits  there.  To  prevent 
this,  he  urged  the  United  States  government  to  put  an  effective 
stop  to  the  giving  of  presents.  The  British  had  no  reason  to  give 
them,  he  maintained,  for  they  had  bought  no  land  and  owed  no 
annuities ;  it  was  not  a  debt  nor  the  price  of  services  justly  rendered, 
and  to  assign  any  philanthropic  motive  was  perfectly  farcical.  The 
obvious  motive  was  to  acquire  and  preserve  an  influence  which 
might  be  exerted  if  future  circumstances  should  render  it  expedient. 

52 


That  a  foreign  power  should  thus  subsidize  a  people  living  on  the 
soil  of  the  United  States  was  to  Cass  most  incompatible  with  the 
honor  of  his  country  and  therefore  only  two  courses  were  open 
to  allay  the  feverish  excitement  among  the  Indians  and  teach  them 
not  to  look  to  the  British  for  counsel  and  protection.  The  first 
was  a  firm  remonstrance  to  the  British  government;  the  second, 
to  prohibit  any  Indian  crossing  the  river  into  Canada  or  from  pass 
ing  to  the  island  of  Michillimackinac.172 

Two  months  later  Cass  again  wrote  that  he  was  convinced  that 
at  least  three  thousand  Indians  had  visited  Maiden  in  1819  and  that 
the  quantity  of  goods  exceeded  anything  hitherto  received  for  the 
same  term  either  in  peace  or  in  war.  The  recipients  of  these  goods 
he  said,  were  most  influential  of  the  tribes  and  had  come  from  the 
far  Mississippi.  As  far  as  he  was  concerned  he  would  prohibit 
the  Indians  from  crossing  into  Canada  and  would  send  out  in 
structions  to  his  troops  and  to  the  interpreters  to  make  this  order 
known  to  the  Indians.  Under  the  present  conditions  he  declared, 
it  was  vain  to  elevate  the  Indian  socially  or  morally  and  it  was 
equally  ineffectual  to  exclude  British  traders  while  the  Indians 
could  supply  their  wants  gratuitously  from  foreign  storehouses.171 

Whitney  reported  that  one  old  chief,  bearing  a  reputation  for 
veracity,  had  divulged  the  secret  of  a  conspiracy  that  was  being 
hatched.  The  fiery,  unbridled  imagination  of  the  chief ;  the  alarm 
and  anxiety'  aroused  in  the  minds  of  Godfrey  and  of  Whitney, 
sufferers  from  the  Indians,  and  consequently  from  those  whom 
they  believed  to  be  intriguing  with  the  Indians ;  the  fourfold  repeti 
tion  of  the  story;  these  are  factors  that  must  be  considered.  The 
story  might  easily  have  been  an  exaggeration  and  its  origin  is 
certainly  doubtful,  but  let  the  story  originate  where  it  may,  the 
repetition  of  this  particular  "conspiracy"  by  Cass  shows  the  spirit 
with  which  some  of  the  people  of  Michigan  regarded  their"  neigh 
bors  across  the  Detroit  River  and  how  eagerly  they  would  support 
Cass  in  his  attempt  to  exclude  foreign  influence. 

The  conspiracy  said  to  have  been  told  by  the  chief  to  Godfrey 
and  by  him  to  Whitney  was  this:  The  King  of  England,  in  con 
junction  with  the  Spaniards,  the  Negroes,  and  the  Indians  of  the 


172Cass  to  Calhoun,  Aug.  3,  1819,   C.  A.  Q.  156,  p.  33. 

173Whitney  to  Cass,  C.  A.  Q.  156,  p.  313.  Whitney  corroborated  the  statements 
made  by  Cass  both  as  to  the  apparent  abundance  of  the  presents  in  the  last  year  and 
to  the  effect  these  were  producing  upon  those  who  came  to  get  them.  The  savageg 
were  being  drawn  closer  and  closer  to  the  British,  they  being  much  more  liberal  than 
the  Americans  in  the  distribution  of  ammupition,  etc. 

53 


South,  was  to  join  with  the  Indians  from  the  Northwest  and  take 
from  the  Americans  the  lands  from  which  the  Indians  had  been 
expelled.  For  the  present  the  dispossessed  natives  were  cautioned 
to  return  home  to  their  villages  without  causing  any  disturbance 
and  wait  in  readiness  until  another  talk  should  be  sent  to  them. 
Hostilities  would  probably  be  begun  in  the  fall  or  early  the  next 
spring.  These  things  were  to  be  confidential  among  the  chiefs 
and  old  men.  Their  young  men,  therefore,  had  not  been  informed 
of  them.  Godfrey  was  convinced  by  the  statements  and  reputa 
tion  of  the  chief  that  the  talk  had  actually  been  made  to  these  old 
chiefs  and  that  the  simple  Indians  believed  it.  At  any  rate  the 
Indians  were  unusually  insolent  this  summer.  Doors  had  to  be  kept 
locked ;  otherwise  they  would  enter  a  house,  and  once  in,  it  was 
impossible  to  get  them  out  without  using  violence,  a  means  which 
was  dangerous.174 

By  such  documents  as  these  Cass  endeavored  to  prove  that  the 
British  agents  were  annually  distributing  presents  with  a  lavish 
hand;  that  the  purpose  was  to  acquire  an  illegitimate  influence; 
that  the  immediate  effects  were  depredations  all  along  the  routes 
leading  to  the  British  distributing  points;  that  the  increasing  num 
ber  of  recipients  were  becoming  more  discontented  and  excited, 
and  were  likely  to  join  in  a  confederacy  and  rebellion;  that  the 
critical  condition  of  the  Indians  and  the  danger  to  the  citizens 
of  Michigan  called  for  immediate  and  decisive  action.175 

This  report  from  Cass  reached  Downing  Street  in  the  spring  of 
1820  and  Bathurst,  taking  up  the  matter,  requested  the  Canadian 
officials  to  make  investigations.176  At  the  same  time  he  commanded 
these  officials  to  reduce  the  distribution  of  presents  and  to  take 
every  precaution  not  to  give  offense  to  Cass  or  his  people.  The 
commander  of  the  Canadian  forces,  Dalhousie,  in  January,  1821, 
replied  that  he  had  investigated  the  charges  made  by  the  United 
States  minister.  The  acting  Superintendent  of  the  Indian  Depart 
ment  at  the  point  in  question  had  been  interviewed  and  was  perfectly 
satisfied  that  the  complaints  of  Cass  were  utterly  unfounded  and 
the  circumstances  greatly  exaggerated.  The  policy  of  maintaining 
a  friendly  intercourse  with  the  Indians  was,  in  the  opinion  of 
Dalhousie,  too  long  established,  the  harmless  commercial  inter 
change  of  furs  for  trifling  articles  of  British  manufacture  of  too 


174Cass's  Report,  October  9,  1819,  C.  A.  Q.  156,  p.  33  ff. 
1750ass's  Report  October  9,  1819,  C.  A.  Q.  156,  p.  33  ff. 
176Planta  to  G-oulburn,  March  3,  1820,  C.  A.  Q.  156,  p.  31. 

54 


old  a  standing  and  the  affection  of  these  wandering  tribes  towards 
their  great  father  too  deeply  engraven  in  the  hearts  and  on  the 
records  of  those  people  to  admit  of  any  marked  change  of  conduct 
towards  them.  Nevertheless,  he  would  guide  himself  strictly  in 
the  line  Bathurst  had  pointed  out;  maintain  a  quiet  and  friendly 
relation  as  far  as  possible  with  all  parties ;  reduce  the  distribution 
of  Indian  presents  as  far  as  consistent  with  the  friendly  civilities 
hitherto  shown ;  and  avoid  giving  any  encouragement  beyond  what 
that  civility  had  by  length  of  time  made  necessary.177 

The  protest  of  Cass  had  once  more  an  effect  but  only  a  half 
hearted  one.  Again  we  see  the  British  foreign  office  anxious  to 
preserve  peace,  and  the  Canadian  military  officers  anxious  to  retain 
their  old-time  ally.  The  Indian  presents  were  to  continue.  The 
Indian  tribes  would  therefore  tramp  across  American  territory 
and  commit  crimes  along  the  way.  Surely  the  Canadians  could 
not  have  been  blind  to  the  fact  that  the  American  settlers  suffered 
by  the  Canadian  presents  and  if  they  were  not  blind  they  were 
morally  bound  to  take  measures  to  prevent  the  mischief. 

A  few  months  later  Dalhousie  once  more  assured  Bathurst  that 
the  presents  were  "distributed  with  due  propriety"  and  the  Indians 
were  "satisfied."  He  didn't  forget,  however,  to  inform  Bathurst 
on  the  same  occasion  that  the  Americans  were  continually  extend 
ing  forts  farther  west.  Alarm  was  intensified  by  this  and  by  the 
report  that  of  the  whole  military  force  of  the  United  States,  by 
far  the  greater  part  was  concentrated  on  this  northwest  frontier. 
It  was  reported,  too,  that  the  Americans  were  increasingly  anxious 
to  secure  the  good  will  of  the  native  tribes.178  Dalhousie  therefore 
urged  the  propriety  of  placing  a  post  at  the  Falls  of  St.  Mary, 
the  key  to  Lake  Superior,  and  of  strengthening  other  posts — another 
evidence  of  the  care  taken  by  the  Canadian  armed  forces  to  keep 
up  the  defenses  of  the  frontier,  to  display  power  in  the  presence 
of  the  Indians,  and,  despite  the  precautionary  measures  of  distant 
cabinet  officers,  to  keep  these  Indians  on  their  side. 

The  London  government,  however,  continued  to  interfere  in  this 
western  problem.  The  expensiveness  of  the  Indian  department, 
the  slow  progress  in  the  civilization  of  the  Indian,  and  the  con 
tinued  irritation  of  the  Americans  along  the  frontier  called  for 
further  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  possibility  and  practicability  of  re- 


"7Dalhousie  to  Bathurst,  Jan.  17,  1821,  C.  A.  Q.  157,  p.  36. 
""Dalhousie  to  Bathurst,   C.  A.  ft.  157,  p.   407. 

55 


form.  Horton,  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  the  colonies,  was 
anxious  to  receive  a  correct  account  of  the  number  and  condition 
of  the  Indians,  of  the  annual  amount  of  the  presents,  for  what 
proportion  of  this  annual  distribution  the  government  was  bound 
by  contract,  whether  reductions  could  not  be  made  without  a  breach 
of  faith  and  whether  the  Indian  funds  could  not  be  expended  in  a 
manner  better  calculated  to  foster  a  higher  civilization.179 

Gore's  successor,  Lieutenant-Governor  Maitland,  answered  his 
questions,  declaring  it  not  only  to  be  inconsistent  with  fairness 
and  honesty,  but  poor  policy  to  reduce  this  amount.180  Small 
reductions  had  in  some  instances  already  been  made  within  the 
provinces  but  invariably  these  had  produced  pernicious  effects. 
Maitland,  like  Dalhousie,  seemed  to  forget  that  while  the  Indian 
was  favored  by  British  magnanimity,  the  settler  in  Michigan  was 
.injured.  The  governor's  disapproval  in  this  case  did  not  prevent 
a  continuance  of  the  agitation  for  reform.  Suggestions  were  made 
that  the  presents  should  be  confined  to  useful  things  only  and 
such  objects  as  would  encourage  the  unsettled  wanderers  to  estab 
lish  homes  and  till  the  land.181 

In  September,  1828,  Sir  James  Kempt  assumed  the  government 
of  Canada  and  immediately  set  to  work  to  solve  the  problem.  He 
held  a  consultation  with  his  most  experienced  officers  and  stated 
his  policy.  He  would  proceed  slowly  at  first  but  intended  to  intro 
duce  radical  changes  later.  He  deemed  it  expedient  to  divide  the 
Indian  department  between  the  two  provinces,  still  keeping  both 
under  military  control.182  He  would  make  the  Indians  more  pros 
perous  and  cultivated,  keep  them  on  friendly  terms  with  the  United 
States  but  nevertheless  attach  them  more  firmly  to  his  Britannic 
Majesty.  His  scheme  was  to  commute  the  annual  presents  for 
something  more  substantial  by  taking  advantage  of  what  he  thought 
to  be  a  growing  inclination  on  the  part  of  the  tribes  at  this  time 
to  settle  down.  He  would  collect  them  in  considerable  numbers 
and  establish  villages  on  Canadian  soil ;  afford  them  assistance  in 
building  houses,  procuring  seeds,  implements,  etc.,  and  commute 
where  practicable  all  presents  for  these  things.  He  would  provide 
active,  zealous,  Wesleyan  missionaries  from  England  to  counteract 
the  objectionable  principles  which  the  Methodist  missionaries  from 


178Horton  to  Maitland,  C.  A.   Q.   333,  p.  290. 

180Maitland  to  Horton,  November  20,  1823,  C.  A.  Q.,  333,  p.  292. 

181Hill  to  Horton,  C.  A.  Q.,  167,  p.   181. 

1MKempt   to  Murray,   Feb.  22,    1829,  C.   A.   Q.    187,   p.  431. 

56 


the  United  States  were  supposed  to  instill  into  the  minds  of  their 
Indian  converts.183  Colborne  was  very  much  in  favor  of  Kempt's 
ideas. 

This  was  not  the  first  time  since  1815  that  the  plan  of  settlement 
and  a  commutation  of  presents  had  been  suggested  as  a  means 
for  attracting  the  allegiance  and  the  presence  of  the  Indians  from 
the  United  States  to  Canada.  Even  within  a  year  after  the  peace, 
Norton  had  made  a  similar  proposition.184  This  scheme  of  Kempt's 
— and  of  Head,  who  also  supported  it — was,  however,  doomed  to 
failure  from  the  very  nature  of  the  Indians.  These  people  had 
no  inclination  to  engage  in  agriculture  and  those  who  did  come  to 
Manitoulin  at  the  suggestion  of  Head  found  the  soil  too  poor. 
Many  of  the  tribes  who  lived  in  the  United  States  and  there  re 
ceived  annuities  knew  that  if  they  moved  to  Canadian  territory 
they  would  have  to  relinquish  the  presents,  and  therefore  stayed 
on  the  other  side.185 

At  the  very  time  Head  was  planning  to  bring  the  Indian  tribes 
over  to  Canadian  soil,  the  American  government  was  formulating 
and  carrying  into  effect  its  scheme  of  settling  these  tribes  as  rapidly 
as  possible  west  of  the  Mississippi.  This  in  itself  might  ultimately 
have  closed  the  question  of  Canadian  presents;  for  the  increased 
distance  and  the  extra  exertion  required  in  traveling  would  have 
prevented  the  Indian  from  coming  so  far  to  receive  so  paltry  an 
amount  of  blankets  or  powder.  But  not  all  the  northwestern  tribes 
would  be  induced  to  leave  their  old-time  hunting  grounds,  and  still 
the  question  of  presents  continued.  During  Kempt's  administra 
tion  Drummond  Island  was  evacuated  and  the  presents  which  had 
been  distributed  from  that  point  were  henceforth  issued  from 
Penetanguishene.  Other  points,  such  as  St.  Joseph's  Island  and 
Manitoulin,  in  turn  laid  claim  to  be  the  most  satisfactory  point, 
that  is  of  being  "most  convenient  for  the  Indians,"  which  in  itself 
shows  how  anxious  the  agents  were  to  cater  to  the  taste  and  good 
will  of  the  Indian.186 

In  regard  to  the  number  of  those  whose  representatives  received 
presents  from  Maiden  or  the  northern  post,  it  is  difficult  to  give  an 
accurate  estimate.  Schoolcraft,  from  his  intimate  connection  with 
the  Indians,  is  undoubtedly  as  reliable  an  authority  as  any.  At  the 

183Kempt  to  Murray,  June  10,   1829,   O.  A.  Q.  p.  98,  p.   110. 
^Norton  to  Colborne,   Dec.    1,   1815,   O.  A.  jQ.    135,   p.  376,   381. 
186Schoolcraft,  VI,  p.  463. 
18«Kempt  to  Murray,  C.  A.  )Q.  189,  p.  98. 

57 


outbreak  of  the  war  in   1812  he  believed  that  there  were  in  the 
Northwest  approximately  41,000  distributed  as  follows:187 

Warriors.  Total. 

Wyandottes  of  Ohio  and  Michigan 600  2,500 

Shawnees  of  Ohio,  Michigan  and  Indiana 120  600 

Senecas   of   Sandusky 100  500 

Dela wares  of  Indiana 150  750 

Ottawas   of   Maunee 80  400 

Ottawas  of  Michigan 400  2,000 

Saginaws   240  1 ,200 

Pottawatomies  of  St.  Joseph  and  Lake  Huron.  . . .     100  500 

Pottawattomies  of  Chicago  and  Illinois 400  2,000 

Chippewas  of  Lake  St.  Clair  and  Huron 1,000  5,000 

Chippewas  of  Lake  Superior  and  the  region  north 
to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  and  to  the  Missis 
sippi  2,000  10,000 

Menomonies  of  Green  Bay  and  Fox  River 600  3,000 

Winnebagoes  of  Western  Michigan  and  Wisconsin.  1,000  5,500 

Miamis,  Weas   and   Piankeshaws 900  4,500 

Sioux  and  other  bands  from  west  of  the  Mississippi 

and  visiting  and  roving  Indians  at  large....    600  3,000 


8,390        41,400 

In  1829  the  report  issued  by  General  Porter,  American  Secretary 
of  War,  estimated  the  Indian  population  in  the  Northwest  at  about 
52,ooo.188 

There  was,  then,  a  more  or  less  fluctuating  and  nomadic  body 
of  40,000  or  50,000  Indians  within  these  territories.  On  account 
of  location  or  distance  many  of  these  were  beyond  the  range  and 
influence  of  their  foreign  benefactors.  At  this  time,  however,  we 
must  remember  that  the  white  population  west  of  Ohio  was  ex 
tremely  sparse.  Indiana  and  Illinois  began  to  fill  up  with  aston 
ishing  rapidity  after  the  war ;  but  in  Michigan  there  were  probably 
not  more  than  two  or  three  thousand  in  1815,  the  population  for 
another  decade  grew  very  slowly,  and  many  of  these  settlers  were 
French  or  halfbreeds.  The  presence  therefore  of  so  many  wander 
ing  and  discontented  Indians  was  a  serious  menace  in  the  western 
part  of  this  Northwest  Territory. 


1R7Schoolcraft  V.,  p.   708. 
188Sehoolcraft   III.,   p.    591.  ( 

58 


It  is  also  difficult  to  state  precisely  what  was  the  total  annual 
or  per  capita  value  of  the  presents  distributed  to  the  nonresidents. 
The  statement  of  McDouall189  in  1816  that  the  "little  powder  pre 
sented  to  them  does  not  please  the  Indians,  but  is  blazened  over 
the  United  States  as  supplying  them  with  the  means  of  war"  min 
imizes  the  value  just  as  the  report  of  one  who  had  made  a  tour 
of  the  border  in  1817  greatly  exaggerates  the  quantity  when  he 
stated  that  from  £100,000  to  £150,000  were  expended  annually.190 
A  little  care  must  be  exercised  also  to  notice  whether  the  word 
"present"  in  British  documents  refers  to  gratuitous  gifts  or  to 
payment  for  land  cessions  for  all  passed  under  the  name  of 
presents.191  Moreover,  the  word  "pound"  sometimes  means  pound 
sterling,  sometimes  pound  currency,  a  much  smaller  amount. 

One  fact,  however,  is  at  once  patent,  namely,  that  the  goods  given 
to  the  tribes  after  the  War  of  1812-1815  averaged  half  as  much 
again  as  the  value  of  those  given  before  the  war.  During  the 
years  1807-1811  inclusive,  the  average  amount  so  expended  by  the 
government  in  Canada  was  about  £i2,5OO.192  By  1823  this  had  been 
increased  to  £23,500,  £4,500  of  which  were  paid  for  land  cessions  and 
the  remainder,  £19,000,  for  free  gifts.193  But  these  sums,  £12,500 
and  £19,000,  were  expended  on  presents  for  the  resident  as  well  as 
the  visiting  Indians. 

During  the  first  decade,  after  the  war,  when  the  Americans  began 
to  feel  the  pernicious  effect  of  Canadian  generosity  Cass  took 
pains  to  obtain  an  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  presents  given  to 
the  tribes.  His  report  computes  the  average  value  given  to  man, 
woman,  or  child  at  $10.00  worth  of  goods.194  The  general  tes 
timony  of  the  Americans  consulted  by  him  is  that  the  Indians  were 
"never  before  supplied  so  abundantly."  195  Ten  dollars  was,  there 
fore,  considered  in  1819  as  a  larger  gift  than  usual. 

We  might  be  led  to  suppose  that  Americans  would  have  a  tend 
ency  to  exaggerate  the  amount  of  these  gifts,  but  Canadian  records 
verify  these  estimates.  In  1828  the  presents  to  visiting  Indians 
averaged  about  £2  each.196  Cass,  therefore,  was  probably  quite 
correct  in  his  $10.00  estimate  for  the  decade  earlier.  Kempt, 


189McDouall  to  Military  Secretary,  June  17,   1816,  C.  A.  Q.   137,  p.   15. 

180C.  A.  Q.   323,  p.  42. 

191Maitland  to  Horton,  Nov.  20.   1823,   C.  A.  Q.   333,  p.  292. 

1920.  A.   Q.   314,  p.   25   ff. 

193MaitIand  to  Horton,   Nov.  20,   1823,  C.   A.  jQ.   333,  p.  292. 

194Walker  to   Cass,    1819,    C.  A.    Q.,    156,    p.   60. 

165Knaggs  to  Cass,  C.  A.  Q.,   156,  p.  63. 

196Wilson  to  Hay,  C.  A.  Q.  375,  p.  381. 

59 


anxious  to  modify  the  prevailing  system,  made  somewhat  careful 
investigations  to  find  out  the  exact  state  of  affairs.197  He  was 
informed  that  for  the  year  1830  the  total  value  of  the  presents 
distributed  in  Upper  Canada,  not  including  £4,426  paid  for  land 
cessions,  was  computed  at  £21,903,  175.  currency.198  This  was  the 
retail  or  merchant's  value.  They  cost  the  government  of  Canada 
only  £13,142,  6s.  3d.  currency.  The  total  number  of  Indians,  in 
cluding  those  residing  within  the  United  States  who  received  these 
presents,  was  computed  at  17,766.  The  average  value  of  the 
presents  to  each  person  was,  therefore,  approximately  253.  currency, 
retail  value.  If  the  value  of  the  goods  delivered  to  each  visitor 
was  less  than  that  in  1828,  we  must  remember  that  this  was  in 
keeping  with  Kempt's  policy  of  retrenchment. 

The  number  of  Indians  who  resided  in  the  United  States  and 
who  received  presents  by  making  visits  to  Amherstburg  or  Drum- 
mond  Island  was,  in  1830,  according  to  Kempt's  report,  4,073.  Not 
only  had  the  value  of  the  presents  given  to  each  individual  decreased 
during  the  first  two  years  of  Kempt's  regime  but  the  number  of 
visiting  Indians  was  also  smaller.  Wilson  stated  that  3,500  non 
residents  came  to  Drummond's  Island  alone  in  i828199  and  Cass, 
whose  figures  are  based  upon  observation  from  the  American  side, 
declared  that  in  1818  as  many  as  3,000  had  crossed  over  to  Maiden. 
Still  he  admitted  that  was  an  unusually  large  number. 

Routh,  of  the  Canadian  Commissariat  department,  gives  us  per 
haps  the  most  definite  and  reliable  estimate  of  the  number  and 
location  of  the  Indians  who  came  to  the  government  storehouses 
for  their  annuities.200  The  following  is  Routh's  statement  for  the 
year  1833. 

"At  Amherstburg: 

VISITING  INDIANS. 

Chippewas    1600  residing  in  Michigan  and  Ohio. 

Ottawas    900  residing  in  Michigan. 

Pottawatomies    500  residing  in  Ohio  and  Michigan. 

Shawnees 260  residing  in  Michigan. 

Six  Nations 240  residing  in  Michigan. 

Hurons    250  residing  in  Michigan. 


197Kempt  to  Colborne,   1830,  C.  A.  Q.  204,  p.  169  ff. 

198At  that  time  the  Indian  Department  was  limited  to  £20,000  for  presents  ex 
clusive  of  land  payments. 

199Wilson  to  Hay,  C.  A.  |Q.  375,  t>-  381.  Wilson  further  stated  that  a  great  number 
of  these  had  sold  their  lands  to  the  United  States  and  were  now  regularly  living  further 
west  and  hunting  largely  to  the  advantage  of  the  American  Fur  Company. 

20<>Routh  to  Stewart,  March  7,   1834,   C.  A.  Q.  218,  p.   168. 

60 


Munsees    40  residing  in  Michigan. 

Sawkees  210  residing  along  Lake  Superior. 

Total   4,000 

RESIDENT  INDIANS. 

Chippewas   1,226 

Total  visiting  and  resident   5>226 

"The  number  of  visiting  Indians  is  not  always  the  same  but 
does  not  exceed  the  above. 
"At  Penetanguishene : 

VISITING  INDIANS. 

Ottawas  and  Chippewas,  about 3,ooo 

(The  first  all  in  United  States,  the  latter  chiefly.) 
RESIDENT  INDIANS. 

"At   Penetanguishene,   about    400 

"At  York,  resident  Indians   2>596 

"At  Kingston,  resident  Indians  572 

Total 1 1,794 

See  notes  199  and  200  on  next  page. 

From  the  United  States 7,000 

Resident  in  Upper  Canada 4,794 

Nearly  three  years  later,  in  1836,  Head,  the  Governor  of  Upper 
Canada,  made  another  report.  The  average  number  of  Indians 
from  the  United  States,  he  estimated  at  3,270  and  the  value  of  the 
presents  annually  issued  to  those  Indians  £4,000,  both  figures  being 
about  twenty  per  cent  lower  than  Kempt's  estimate  for  i83O.201 

All  the  foregoing  figures  regarding  the  number  of  Indians  are 
necessarily  unreliable.  The  statement  of  Cass  (1819),  Wilson 
(1828),  and  Routh  (1834)  would  place  the  total  number  of  vis 
iting  Indians  as  high  as  6,000  or  7,000.  Kempt's  estimate,  in  1830, 
is  about  two-thirds  of  this  number  and  Head's,  of  1836,  a  little 
more  than  half.  The  numbers  necessarily  would  vary  from  year 
to  year.  The  total  value  of  the  presents  as  well  as  the  value  per 
capita  would  also  vary.  We  may  be  justified,  however,  in  accepting 
as  the  average  individual's  present  from  twenty-five  to  forty  shill 
ings  currency  and  from  £4,000  to  £5,000  as  the  average  total.  The 
reports  of  Routh,  of  Cass,  and  of  Schoolcraft  show  that  Maiden, 


to  Glenelg,   1836,   C.  A.  Q.  391,  p.  214. 

61 


rather  than  Northern  Lake  Huron, -became  the  metropolitan  center 
for  distribution.202 

To  return  to  the  controversy  in  Canada  as  to  whether  these  pres 
ents  should  be  continued  after  1830:  Proposals  to  reduce  them 
were  persistently  made  by  the  British  Foreign  Office  and  were  as 
persistently  met  by  stubborn  resistance.  Some  colonials  as  well  as 
Englishmen  opposed  the  Canadian  policy.  As  early  as  1817  a  pro 
test  was  made  by  one  who  had  traveled  along  the  frontier  and 
believed  that  there  were  thousands  of  pounds  annually  and  uselessly 
expended.  The  fine  cambrics,  Irish  linens,  etc.,  which  were  given 
to  the  Indians  were  rarely  seen  upon  them.  The  Indians  made 
promises  to  the  Americans  when  coming  to  Canada  that  they 
would  return  by  the  same  route.  Their  goods  were  then  exchanged 
for  a  little  Yankee  rum.203  Vigorous  protests  against  the  Canadian 
policy  were  submitted  from  time  to  time. 

Wilson  reported  in  1832  that  neither  Canada  nor  the  visiting 
Indians  were  being  benefited  by  the  distribution  of  presents.  The 
Indians  visiting  Drummond  Island  and  receiving  Canadian  pres 
ents  straightway  crossed  the  channel,  he  said,  and,  following  the 
old  custom,  exchanged  a  great  part  of  their  presents  for  liquors. 
He  also  observed  that  several  children  came  to  the  Canadian  post 
from  a  missionary  school  at  Michillimackinac.  Upon  visiting  this 
school  he  found  that  the  children  were  being  taught  principles  an 
tagonistic  to  the  British,  and  Canadian  presents  were  supporting 
\  an  institution  which  was  disseminating  a  veneration  for  the  United 
States  and  a  dislike  for  monarchy.204  At  Amherstburg  he  found 
the  service  equally  objectionable.  At  Grape  Island  the  Indians 
were  altogether  under  the  management  of  an  American  Methodist 
missionary  from  Pittsburg.  He  therefore  recommended  the  grad 
ual  reduction  not  only  of  the  Indian  presents,  but  of  the  whole 
expensive  Indian  department.  Routh,  also,  in  1834,  questioned 
the  expediency  of  giving  presents.  The  assistance  of  the  Indians, 
he  thought,  might  be  obtained  by  other  means  if  the  occasion  de 
manded  it.205  Colborne,  however,  desired  the  continuance  of  Brit 
ish  generosity  and  argued  that  no  diminution  of  the  presents  should 
be  made  because  if  this  were  done,  the  Indians  would  not  take  their 
laborious  journey  to  obtain  them.  When  their  active  cooperation 


202Schoolcraft,   vol.  VI.,  p.  449. 
^December  3,   1817,   C.  A.  Q.   323,  p.  342. 
204Wilson  to  Hay,  Jan.  5,   1832,  C.  A.  Q.  375,  p.  281. 
^Routh  to  Stewart,   March  7,   1834,   C.  A.  jQ.  218,  p. 


168,   ff. 
62 


was  necessary  the  British  had  cringed  before  them.  It  was  his 
opinion  that  they  could  not  cease  to  give  now  without  forfeiting 
their  self-respect;  they  could  not  so  easily  get  rid  of  an  inconven 
ient  debt.206  The  Northwest  Company  likewise  recommmended  the 
continuance  of  a  liberal  supply  of  presents.207 

In  the  meantime  a  committee  of  the  British  Parliament  reported 
that  the  expensive  Indian  department  must  be  reduced,  if  not  en 
tirely  abolished.  This  called  forth  more  arguments  from  the  ad 
herents  of  the  old  system.  Stewart  of  the  Colonial  Office  was 
again  informed  in  October,  1835,  that  the  time  had  not  yet  come 
when  it  was  either  expedient  or  just  to  abolish  the  department,  the 
well  worn  arguments  of  pledge,  custom,  the  keeping  of  faith,  etc., 
being  brought  into  play.208 

The  British  Foreign  Office  nevertheless  still  kept  up  its  efforts. 
Early  in  1836  Glenelg  informed  Head  that  he  believed  it  would 
be  a  breach  of  faith,  unjust  and  impolitic,  to  withdraw  the  presents 
suddenly,  but  he  could  not  say  they  should  be  indefinitely  perpet 
uated.  He  wanted  to  know  if  the  free  consent  of  the  Indian  could 
not  be  obtained  for  the  commutation  of  presents  for  money  or  for 
the  immigration  of  non-residents  to  Canada.  Nothing,  however, 
should  be  done  which  would  not  be  for  the  permanent  benefit  of 
the  tribes.  Consistently  with  Canadian  policy,  Head  replied  to 
Glenelg  that  the  presents  could  not  be  refused.  Promises  had  been 
invariably  made  never  to  desert  the  Indian.  No  restrictions  had 
been  made  in  regard  to  domicile.  He  did  not  deny  that  it  might 
be  considered  almost  an  act  of  hostility  for  the  British  government 
to  give  presents  of  guns  or  powder  to  a  people  with  whom  the 
United  States  were  then  engaged  in  civil  war,  but  he  said  that  the 
Americans  themselves  gave  arms  to  the  Indians.  In  compliance, 
however,  with  the  desire  of  the  British  Foreign  Office  he  hinted 
to  the  Indians  in  a  great  council  at  Manitoulin  Island  that  it  would 
be  unfair  to  the  Americans  to  give  presents  to  the  Indians  living 
in  the  United  States  after  three  years,  but  he  would  continue  to  give 
them,  if  they  resided  in  Canada.  This  proposal  seemed  to  be  re 
ceived  without  much  disapprobation  and  Head  therefore  thought 
that  a  declaration  to  this  effect  might  be  formally  made  to  the  tribes 
within  a  very  short  time.209 


^Colborne  to  Goderich,  Nov.   30,   1832,  O.  A.   Q.   374,  p.  911. 
^McGillvary  (N.  W.  Co.)   to  Harvey,  April,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  132,  p.  35. 
**C.    A.    Q.    224,    p.    217. 
209Head  to  Glenelg,  Nov.  20,   1836,  C.  A.  Q.  391,  p.  216. 

63 


In  the  early  part  of  the  year  1836  there  had  been  an  intention 
to  discontinue  the  issue  of  presents  from  Amherstburg.  The  Lieu- 
tenant-Governor  of  Canada,  however,  prevented  this.  Upon  hear 
ing  of  this  action  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury  ordered  an  investiga 
tion.  Then  two  months  later  they  approved  of  Head's  proposal 
to  discontinue  the  issue  to  non-resident  Indians  after  three  years.210 

The  Mackenzie-Papineau  disturbances  of  1837  and  the  hard  feel 
ings  engendered  against  the  United  States  by  many  Canadians  on 
account  of  the  sympathy  and  support  the  conspirators  received  from 
Americans  had  a  tendency  to  prolong  the  friendly  gifts  to  the 
Indians.  Military  officials  were  in  favor  of  this;  but  sympathetic 
and  well  meaning  men  like  Ryerson,  still  argued  on  behalf  of  the 
Indian.  The  services  of  the  Indian  during  the  rebellion  of  1837 
and  1838  demanded  additional  rewards.211  Indian  presents  were 
therefore  ordered  in  1839  as  usual.212  By  1840,  however,  the  end 
was  in  sight,  it  being  decreed  that  after  a  limited  period  presents 
should  cease  to  be  issued  to  visitors  from  the  United  States.213 

Thus  ended  a  policy  which  had  for  its  recommendations  as  far 
as  the  British  were  concerned  the  keeping  of  pledges,  the  recogni 
tion  of  gratitude,  the  relieving  of  wants,  and  chiefly  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  allegiance  and  good  will  of  the  Indian ;  but  a  policy 
which  had  for  evils  the  maintaining  of  an  expensive  institution 
for  the  procuring  and  distribution  of  the  presents,  the  irritating 
of  American  citizens,  and  the  depraving  of  the  Indian.  The  vis 
itors  were  continually  made  to  feel  that  the  United  States  were 
not  treating  them  fairly,  and  that  the  British  were  their  only  true 
friends.  Besides  this,  they  suffered  actual  material  losses  on  ac 
count  of  their  long  journeys  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Canadian 
frontier.  These  losses  were  scarcely  compensated  for  by  the  few 
dollars'  worth  of  goods,  a  large  percentage  of  which  was  squan 
dered  in  border  grogshops. 


210Spearman  to  Stephens,  Feb.  9,  1837,  C.  A.  Q.  240,  p.  211;  and  see  Glenelg  to 
Head  Jan.  20,  1837,  C.  A.  &.  78. 

aiO.  A.  Q.  42 ;  The  Indians  of  Caughnawaga  valiantly  collected  at  the  village, 
November  4,  1838,  against  the  rebels.  Glenelg  sent  the  Queen's  thanks  and  advised 
rewards. 

2iaNormanby  to  Oolborne,  April  28,    1839,   C.  A.   Q.  42. 

213Russel  to  Sydenham,  Jan.   30,    1841,   C.  A.  G.   51. 


64 


VII. 
APPREHENSION  OF  AMERICAN  AGGRESSION. 

During  the  eighteenth  and  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen 
turies  the  average  English  minister  or  legislator  was  without  doubt 
woefully  ignorant  of  American  people  and  affairs  ;214  but  in  the 
Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812  British  regiments  and  British 
vessels  had  suffered  sufficiently  for  them  to  realize,  in  part  at  least, 
the  strength  and  danger  of  their  independent  offspring.215  Coupled 
with  this  appreciation  of  the  growing  power  of  the  young  republic, 
there  was  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  her  dependencies  a  deeply 
rooted  fear  that  they  who  had  hoisted  the  Stars  and  Stripes  over 
the  thirteen  original  colonies  and  who  had  carried  it  across  the  Al- 
leghanies  and  even  to  the  vast  regions  beyond  the  Mississippi  would 
not  be  content  until  that  flag  waved  over  the  Canadas  and  maritime 
provinces.  Long  after  the  close  of  actual  hostilities  of  1814  there 
lingered  the  suspicion,  which  had  originated  before  the  war  and 
was  confirmed  by  the  proclamation  of  Hull,  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  "influenced  by  a  spirit  of  aggrandizement  not 
necessary  to  their  own  security  but  increasing  with  the  extent  of 
their  empire."  During  the  negotiations  at  Ghent  in  1814  the 
British  commissioners  gave  no  undisguised  expression  of  this  sus 
picion.  They  declared  it  was  "notorious  to  the  whole  world  that 
the  conquest  of  Canada  and  its  permanent  annexation  to  the  United 
States  was  the  declared  object  of  the  American  government."  216 
The  American  plenipotentiaries  denied  this ;  but  mere  denials  by 
treaty  makers  would  scarcely  convince  a  people  who  had  read 
certain  American  boasts  of  1812. 


214For  the  ignorance  concerning  Canadian  affairs  see  Gourlay's  address  to  the 
resident  land  owners  of  Upper  Canada,  Feb.  1818,  C.  A.  Q.  p.  324,  p.  26;  Musgrave 
to  Bannister,  Oct.  11,  1822,  C.  A.  Q.  334,  p.  133;  Lord  Durham's  Report,  p.  72. 

215Hart  Davis,  British  H.  of  C.  April  11,   1815;   Hans.  vol.  30,  p.  501. 

218"It  is  notorious  to  the  whole  world  that  the  conquest  of  Canada  and  its  perma 
nent  annexation  to  the  U.  S.  was  the  declared  object  of  the  American  government. 
*  *  *  That  of  late  years  at  least  the  American  government  has  been  influenced 
by  a  very  different  policy,  by  a  spirit  of  aggrandizement  not  necessary  to  their  own 
security  but  increasing  with  the  extent  of  their  empire,  has  been  too  clearly  mani 
fested  by  their  progressive  occupation  of  the  Indian  territories,  by  the  acquisition  of 
Louisiana,  by  the  more  recent  attempt  to  wrest  by  force  of  arms  from  a  nation  in 
amity  the  two  Floridas,  and  lastly  by  the  avowed  intention  of  permanently  annexing 
the  Canadas  to  the  United  States."  A.  S.  P.  For.  Bel.  vol.  JII.  p.  713,  ff.  (Brit. 
Plenipotentiary  to  Amer.) 

65 


In  Canada  not  a  few  looked  upon  the  Americans  as  their  nat 
ural  enemies  and  then  exaggerated  the  real  danger  of  a  renewal 
of  hostilities.  Traders,  travelers,  soldiers,  and  politicians  were 
among  those  who  fancied  they  could  see  the  Americans  lying  in 
wait  to  lay  their  hands  upon  Canada.  The  representatives  of  the 
great  British  trading  organization,  the  Northwest  Company,  re 
ferred  to  the  "grasping  proclivities"  of  "such  a  government  and 
such  a  people  as  the  Americans."217  In  the  spring  of  1815  they 
tried  to  persuade  Drummond  to  grant  no  special  favors  to  Amer 
ican  people  because  there  was  no  instance  of  an  unnecessary  con 
cession  being  made  to  the  United  States  that  did  not  engender  the 
demand  for  greater  sacrifice.  When  Captain  Hall  of  His  Majesty's 
Royal  navy  was  making  a  tour  of  the  British  and  American  pos 
sessions  in  America  during  1816,  he  had  apprehensions  of  another 
American  attack  and  recommended  therefore,  the  building  of  a 
strong  fort  on  the  Niagara  River  near  Lake  Erie.  The  proximity 
of  the  Canadas  and  their  fertile  soil  were,  he  said,  "all  motives  and 
very  legitimate  ones,  it  must  be  allowed,  to  stimulate  the  inhabitants 
of  the  United  States  to  such  a  conquest."  Drummond,  another 
army  officer  holding  the  highest  official  position  in  Canada,  felt, 
even  a  full  year  after  the  war,  that  his  American  neighbors  were 
not  only  unfriendly  but  bitterly  inimical  to  him.219  The  order  from 
Washington  in  the  spring  of  1815  to  continue  the  military  strength 
of  the  United  States  as  it  was  at  the  close  of  the  war  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  United  States  forts  in  Michigan  further 
alarmed  both  Drummond  and  Baker.  Even  wild  rumors  found 
their  way  to  the  commander-in-chief  in  Canada  that  American  sym 
pathizers  were  not  only  designing  to  help  the  French  to  release 
Bonaparte,  but  were  soon  going  to  attack  Canada  and  wrest  it  from 
the  British.220 

This  fear  of  an  American  attack  expressed  itself  in  various 
forms  during  the  first  years  after  the  treaty.  Proposals  seriously 
considered  were  made  to  transfer  the  seat  of  government  of  Upper 


2"N.  W.  Co.  to  Drummond.     April  20,   1815.     C.  A.  )Q.   132,  p.   25. 

^Drummond   to   Bathurst,    May  20,    1816,   C.  A.   Q.    136,   p.   222. 

220A  certain  Francis  Story  took  the  precaution  to  warn  Drummond  of  a  design 
being  formulated  among  the  many  French  in  the  United  States  and  among  French 
sympathizers  there  to  attack  St.  Helena,  to  release  Bonaparte,  and  also  to  attack 
Canada.  Addison,  acting  for  Sherbrooke,  doubted  whether  such  a  scheme  had  ever 
been  contemplated.  There  is  an  indication  here,  however,  of  the  ease  with  which 
such  reports  of  American  invasion  could  be  believed  in  by  Canadian  people.  (Story, 
to  Commander-in-Chief,  Sept.  8,  1816,  C.  A.  Q.  137,  p.  151.) 

Two  years  later  the  Duke  of  Richmond  forwarded  a  paper  from  Ross  Cuthbert 
stating  his  belief  that  certain  French  generals  with  American  assistance  were  going 
to  make  an  effort  to  wrest  Canada  from  the  British.  (Richmond  to  Bathurst,  Aug. 
11,  1818,  C.  A.  Q.  149,  p.  9. 

66' 


Canada  from  York  to  Kingston  because  this  latter  town  was  more 
securely  protected  and  preferable  from  a  military  standpoint.  The 
Beauharnois  Canal  was  opposed  because  of  the  danger  of  American 
invasions.  A  line  of  communication  was  proposed  between  Mon 
treal  and  Kingston  by  way  of  Ottawa  and  the  Rideau  River  so  that 
the  exposed  St.  Lawrence  route  would  no  longer  be  the  only  avail 
able  one  ;221  and  the  Rideau  canal  was  soon  under  construction  and 
military  settlements  were  planted  on  its  banks  because  there  they 
would  be  protected  against  invasion  and  would  also  serve  as  a 
check  upon  the  "very  bad  description  of  Canadian  residents  on  the 
banks  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  most  of  whom  [were]  by  birth,  par 
entage,  and  education  decided  Yankees ;  so  important  were  these 
objects  considered  that  immense  sums  were  expended  for  their  at 
tainment."  222  Military  settlements  were  advocated  by  the  ministry 
in  England  as  late  as  1839. 223  The  loss  of  the  navigable  channels 
at  Barnhart's  Island,  to  which  reference  will  be  made  hereafter, 
and  the  colonization  of  Magdalen  Islands,  by  American  subjects 
were  chiefly  complained  of  because  of  the  danger  to  the  protection 
and  defense  of  Canada.224 

Another  precaution  against  or  preparation  for  anticipated  strife 
— and  a  most  primitive  and  foolish  one — was  found  in  Prevost's 
recommendation  to  Bathurst  that  nine  townships  near  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  containing  111,000  acres,  should  remain  unsettled  because 
"an  unsettled  country  on  the  frontier  is  a  better  protection  than 
any  population  that  could  be  placed  there."  22r>  Acting,  it  would 
seem,  on  Prevost's  advice,  Bathurst  ordered  Wilson  to  allow  no 
settlements  there  and  later,  on  July  i,  1816,  gave  the  same  orders 
to  Sherbrooke.  No  new  grants  were  to  be  made  in  these  counties, 
no  roads  were  to  be  built;  even  those  colonists  already  settled 
there  were  to  be  induced,  if  possible,  to  vacate  their  homes  and 
the  existing  roads  were  to  be  broken  up.  This  action  would,  it 
was  thought,  "materially  contribute  to  the  future  security  of  the 
province." 226  Such  absurd  regulations  naturally  could  not  be 
enforced.  In  1821  Dalhousie  reported  that  the  soil  and  timber  had 
attracted  a  considerable  population,  among  whom  were  felons, 
escaping  from  justice,  from  both  Canadian  and  American  courts. 


221Gore   to   Bathurst,    May,    1815,   C.   A.    Q.    319,   p.    108.      (Robinson   to   Bathurst, 
July,   1815,   C.  A.  jQ.  319,  p.   73.) 
2220.  A.  Q.    167,   p.   56. 
223Russel    to    Thompson,    Sept.    7,    1839. 
224C.    A.    Q.    169,    p.    13. 

^Prevost  to  Bathurst,  March,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  131,  p.  86;  0.  A.  Q.  137,  p.  16. 
Kingsley,  IX.  p.  41,  and  C.  A.  Q.  157,  p.   182. 

67 


Precautionary  measures  were  naturally  advocated  by  those  who 
would  be  the  most  immediately  responsible  for  the  defense  of  the 
provinces.  Not  only  were  these  alert  to  see  that  strategic  points 
along  the  boundary  line  should  be  decided  by  the  commissioners 
in  favor  of  Upper  Canada  and  that  garrisons  should  be  kept  along 
the  frontier,  but,  as  we  have  noticed  before,  they  went  to  a  great 
deal  of  trouble  to  retain  the  good  will  of  the  native  warriors.  For 
this  reason  the  officers  at  Michillimackinac  before  it  was  evacuated 
anxiously  tried  to  check  and  correct  the  report  insidiously  circu 
lated  that  the  stipulations  in  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  were  a  mere 
mockery,  that  Britain  had  betrayed  the  natives.227 

Drummond,  early  in  1815,  called  the  attention  of  Bathurst  to 
certain  movements  in  the  West  which  seemed  to  indicate  that  the 
United  States  appeared  to  be  on  the  point  of  violating  the  treaty 
as  far  as  it  regarded  Indian  territory.  He  pointed  out  the  build 
ing  of  forts  and  the  apparent  intention  of  exterminating  the  tribes. 
Bathurst's  reply  to  such  notes  of  warning  were  most  frequently 
of  the  type  of  that  sent  to  an  Indian  chief  wherein  he  advised  the 
tribe  to  take  measures  to  allay  domestic  animosities  and  return  to 
their  habits  of  friendly  intercourse  with  the  Long  Knives.228  In 
other  ways  Bathurst  exerted  himself  to  promote  peace.  Drummond 
prepared  for  self-defense,  and  as  a  first  step  ordered  the  whole  of 
Manitoulin  Island  to  be  bought  and  a  military  post  established  on 
the  western  point  of  it  to  act  as  a  substitute  for  the  former  post 
at  Michillimackinac,  the  key  to  the  land  of  the  western  Indians.229 
Then  presents  were  distributed  to  the  tribes  who  made  that  place 
a  rendezvous.230  Care  continued  to  be  taken  that  the  British  out 
posts  in  the  West  should  be  occupied  by  a  garrison  as  imposing 
as  could  be  supplied  by  the  military  chest  and  the  available  troops. 
This  policy  of  the  successive  governors  was  based  on  the  necessity 
of  preventing  the  Americans  from  "establishing  their  superiority 
in  these  distant  regions,"  231  for  it  was  learned  that  the  Americans 
were  sending  out  "battalions  instead  of  detachments"  and  were 
strengthening  their  positions  from  Detroit  to  Sault  Ste.  Marie. 
Such  action  would  tend  to  win  over  the  hitherto  comparatively 


to   Goulborn,   April   and  June,    1815,   C.   A.  ,Q.   135,  p.   225  ff. 

228Bathiirst   to   Chief  of   Muscogees,   Sept.,   1815,   C.   A.   Q.    150,  p.   70. 

229Drummond  to  Gore,  Dec.   9,    1815,   0.   A.   Q.   320,  p.    4. 

230It  was  found  '  'necessary  to  show  the  western  Indians  strong  tokens  of  their 
great  father's  satisfaction  at  their  conduct."  Drummond  to  Bathurst,  Feb.  13,  1816, 
C.  A.  Q.  146,  p.  41. 

^Dalhousie  to  Bathurst,  June,  1826,  C.  A.  Q.  176,  p.  424,  and  Kempt  to  Murray, 
Dec.  22,  1828,  C.  A.  Q.  183,  p.  319. 

68 


stable  allies  and  make  military  operations  against  the  Upper  Prov 
ince  less  likely  to  succeed.  The  friendship  of  the  Indian  must  be 
maintained  not  only  for  the  enriching  of  the  merchant  and  trader 
but  for  the  strengthening  of  the  power  of  the  military  commanders. 

While  some  of  the  British  were  trying  to  attract  or  retain  the 
Indians,  Lieutenant-Governor  Gore  and  others  were  equally  as  anx 
ious  to  keep  out  the  great  number  of  Americans  who  began  to 
enter  Upper  Canada  as  soon  as  war  ceased.  Settlers  were  wanted 
but  it  was  feared  that  American  settlers  might  be  treacherous. 
Lieutenant-Governor  Gore  urged  Bathurst  not  to  abandon  the  re 
straint  put  upon  immigration  to  the  Canadas  from  the  United  States 
for  if  free  immigration  were  allowed  the  loyal  population  would 
be  reduced  to  defend  themselves  from  the  disloyal  and  the  "next 
declaration  of  hostilities"  by  America  would  "be  received  by  ac 
clamation."  232  It  is  also  reported  in  Canada  that  the  Americans 
themselves  entertained  not  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  the  Canadas 
"becoming  an  appendage  of  the  union."  233  Lieutenant-Governor 
Maitland  in  1818  shared  the  apprehensions  of  his  predecessor  Gore, 
when  told  that  of  the  eighty  schooners  employed  in  navigating  Lake 
Erie  and  capable  of  carrying,  in  the  event  of  war,  either  one  or  two 
guns  of  the  larger  caliber,  not  more  than  ten  belonged  to  or  were 
navigated  by  subjects  of  His  Majesty.234  In  1822  another  Gov 
ernor,  Sherbrooke,  after  noting  the  intermarriages,  intercourse  and 
immigration,  doubted  very  much  whether  reliance  could  be  placed 
on  a  continuance  of  the  state  of  peace.235 

It  was  not  alone  military  officers  or  legislators  in  Canada  who 
discussed  the  probability  of  a  future  conflict.  Merchants  and  busi 
ness  men  interested  in  their  own  and  the  colonies'  prosperity  made 
reference  to  it  in  memorials  for  trade  regulation.  Perhaps  some 
of  these  utterances  may  have  been  made  for  purely  political  or 
business  ends,  but  nevertheless  it  would  have  been  folly  for  shrewd 
business  men  to  try  to  make  capital  out  of  a  specter  which  was 
believed  to  have  vanished  from  the  earth.  A  memorial  of  the 
merchants  and  citizens  of  Quebec  and  Montreal  in  1818  suggested 
the  likelihood  of  further  trouble  when  they  stated  that  it  would 


232Gore   to  Bathurst,  April  7,    1817,    C.   A.  jQ.   322,  p.   129. 

233Dr.  Mountain,  Bishop  of  Quebec,  after  a  trip  through  Upper  Canada,  related 
that  in  his  travels  he  met  a  U.  S.  Colonel  who  spoke  without  disguise  as  to  the  view 
of  his  countrymen  upon  the  Canadas  and  who  entertained  not  the  slightest  doubt  as 
to  their  becoming  an  appendage  of  the  Union.  Kingsley  IX.  p.  249. 

^Maitland  to  Bathurst,  Dec.  8,   1818,   C.  A.  Q.  324,  p.   180. 

^Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,  March  14,   1822,  C.  A.  Q.  332,  p.  114. 


be  better  to  give  United  States  citizens  an  interest  adverse  to  war, 
namely,  an  interest  in  trade  by  way  of  Lower  Canadian  ports  and 
waterways.236 

The  mutual  agreement  of  both  nations  to  abolish  the  fleets  on 
the  Great  Lakes  and  the  readiness  shown  to  settle  quietly  the  nu 
merous  disputes  of  1815  and  1816  along  the  western  frontier  must 
certainly  have  diminished,  but  did  not  entirely  dispel,  the  fear  that 
peace  was  merely  temporary,  and  that  the  United  States  would  not 
rest  contented  until  they  had  made  another  effort  to  annex  Canada. 
In  the  spring  of  1817  a  western  officer  furnished  Bathurst  with  a 
minute  description  of  the  topography  of  the  provinces  and  of  the 
inadequate  state  of  the  existing  militia  system  in  Canada  because 
it  was  believed  that  the  United  States'  ruling  bodies  were  actuated 
by  a  desire  for  conquest  or  usurpation.  The  American  population, 
it  was  feared,  stood  ready  armed,  the  sale  of  Canadian  lands  would 
pay  the  expenses  of  the  campaign,  and  the  conquest  would  enable 
the  United  States  to  disband  its  northern  army.237  A  London  paper 
commenting  upon  the  recent  dismantling  of  the  warships  upon  the 
Great  Lakes  declared  that  though  the  Americans  had  reduced  their 
naval  force,  the  exertions  with  which  that  energetic  nation  was 
cutting  roads  in  the  direction  of  those  waters,  felling  timber  and 
preparing  it  as  knees,  bends,  etc.,  for  vessels  of  war  were  circum 
stances  which  should  excite  some  attention.238 

At  almost  the  same  time  a  prominent  Canadian  warned  Bath 
urst  that  a  discontented  and  mixed  multitude  from  all  nations, 
recent  immigrants  to  the  United  States,  were  combining  with  the 
French  and  other  discontented  characters  already  there  and  were 
anxiously  awaiting  the  return  of  war.  It  was  a  well-known  fact, 
he  said,  that  those  points  of  punctilio,  namely,  the  right  of  search 
etc.,  were  as  keenly  insisted  upon  by  naval  commanders  and  as 
strenuously  opposed  by  the  Americans  as  at  any  time  previous  to 
the  war,  and  apart  from  the  exception  of  a  few  engaged  in  com 
merce  who  were  kept  from  venting  their  sentiments  from  motives 
of  interest,  there  did  not  exist  a  single  inhabitant  of  the  United 
States  who  did  not  cherish  a  hostile  principle  towards  the  British 
Isles.  Excessive  pride  and  an  ardent  spirt  of  independence,  it  was 
stated,  made  them  view  the  power  of  Britain  with  a  jealous  eye; 


^'Memorial,    1818,   0.  A.   Q.    149,  p.    142. 

237E.   McDonnell  to  Bathurst,   April,    1817,   O.  A.  Q.   147,  p.   375. 
^Quotation  from  London  paper  in  Niles  Register  for  Nov.   1,   1817.     Niles  Regis 
ter,    Vol.    XIII.    p.    156. 

70 


the  strength  and  resources  of  the  United  States  were  greater  than 
was  usually  represented;  their  population  and  revenues  were  in 
creasing  and  their  advantages  in  building  ships  for  the  navy  and 
training  men  for  the  army  were  much  greater  than  those  afforded 
the  Canadians.239 

To  some  on  the  American  side  of  the  dividing  line  a  future  clash 
of  arms  was  likewise  considered  not  an  utter  improbability.  The 
reasons  for  the  declaration  of  war  in  1812  had  been  largely  re 
moved  when  the  Napoleonic  wars  had  ceased,  but  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent  was  silent  on  the  principles  fought  for.  The  right  of  search 
was  held  in  theory  and  still  practically  applied  on  Lake  Erie  during 
the  first  two  years  after  the  war.  Pittsburg,  Buffalo,  and  Phila 
delphia  papers  cried  out  in  horror  and  demanded  that  American 
rights  be  protected  there  even  if  force  were  necessary  to  do  so.240 
British  intriguing  with  the  Indians  kept  green  the  memory  of  the 
intrigues  with  Tecumseh  and  the  Prophet,  which  were  generally 
believed  to  have  been  in  progress  for  years  prior  to  Madison's 
war  message.  The  instability  of  the  Indian  and  the  plotting  and 
scheming  of  the  traders  made  an  Indian  rising  possible  at  almost 
any  moment,  and  the  bitter  spirit  manifested  along  the  Michigan 
frontier  was  certainly  no  guarantee  for  permanent  harmony.  It  is 
true  the  American  nation  as  a  whole  had  sincerely  welcomed  the 
conclusion  of  hostilities.  They  didn't  need  more  territory.  Thou 
sands  of  square  miles  of  their  own  western  possessions  were  yet 
unexplored.  But  their  love  of  independence  and  resentment  of  any 
kind  of  foreign  dictation,  much  less  foreign  abuse  or  insult,  would 
not  let  them  be  imposed  upon.  This  spirit  was  well  exhibited  by 
the  one  who  was  nearest  to  the  zone  of  trouble.  Cass  had  suffered 
the  most  from  meddlesome  interference  by  a  power  which  had 
no  right  to  hamper  him  in  his  projects,  and  in  the  summer  of  1817, 
when  he  purchased  land  from  the  Indians  to  complete  the  union 
of  Ohio  and  Michigan,  we  find  that  he  did  it  chiefly  for  military 
purposes.  "Lake  Erie,"  he  said,  "may  once  more  become  the  the 
ater  of  desperate  exertion  and  skill."  241 

It  was  not  only  on  the  American  continent,  and  before  the  smoke 
of  battle  had  hardly  blown  away,  that  we  hear  of  the  probability 
of  a  renewal  of  the  conflict ;  but  through  the  twenties  and  on  the 
floors  of  the  British  Parliament  we  hear  the  same  topic  under 

239A.   J.   Christie   to  Bathurst,   July,    1817,    C.   A.   Q.    147,   p.    116   ff. 

240Niles  Register,   Vol.   13,   p.   156. 

241Cass  and  MacArthur  to  Graham,   Sept.  29,   1817,   A.   S.  P.,  I.  A.  II.  p.  137. 

71 


discussion.  In  1820  Marryat  in  the  House  of  Commons  pleaded  for 
better  trade  regulations  in  order  to  establish  in  the  Canadian  prov 
inces  "a  numerous  flourishing  and  well-affected  population,  able 
and  willing  to  serve  as  an  effective  barrier  against  the  future  am 
bition  of  the  United  States."  242  Four  years  later  Bright  advocated 
the  encouragement  of  the  Upper  Canadian  colony  for  the  very 
same  reasons.243  The  announcement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  must 
have  tended  to  confirm  the  opinions  of  some  who  were  afflicted 
with  the  idea  that  the  United  States  wanted  to  exclude  the  British 
altogether.  During  these  years  members  of  Parliament  like  Baring 
and  Stanley  frankly  declared  that  the  time  was  not  far  distant  when 
the  Canadas  would  no  longer  be  British  possessions,244  and  such 
debate  led  Huchinson  in  May,  1828,  to  deliver  a  strong  plea  for 
the  continuance  of  British  control  over  these  provinces  and  there 
fore  for  the  strengthening  of  British  influence  and  power  there.245 
In  the  following  July,  Sir  Robert  Peel  alluding  to  Baring's  speech 
spoke  thus:  "[Mr.  Baring]  himself  said,  'Don't  disregard  the  Amer 
icans  ;  they  are  not  inattentive  to  military  science ;  they  are  training 
up  their  youths  to  arms ;  if  that  were  true  was  it  not  wise  in  time 
of  peace  to  make  preparation  for  an  effectual  defense?'"  He  then 
supported  Harding's  motion  that  £30,000  be  granted  for  military 
works  at  Kingston,  U.  C,  and  Halifax,  N.  S.,  and  begged  the 
House  to  consider  what  would  be  the  effect  if  the  Canadas  were 
not  well  defended.  He  deplored  the  fact  that  some  members  had 
suggested  these  colonies  be  abandoned  or  allowed  to  become  free 
and  independent  states.  What  chance  was  there,  he  asked,  that 
these  colonies  could  remain  free  and  independent  with  a  powerful 
neighbor  like  the  United  States  at  their  side  ? 246  Quebec  news 
papers  would  have  supported  Harding's  motion  for  just  then  the 
Quebec  Gazette  believed  the  United  States  would  not  dislike  an 
opportunity  to  distinguish  themselves  in  war.247 

Shortly  after  this  an  "ancient  peer  of  England,"  who  had  been 
early  acquainted  with  Jefferson  and  who  professed  to  be  a  close 
student  of  American  affairs,  openly  declared  that  "Rufus  King  and 
Mr.  Canning  had  agreed  perfectly"  with  him  that  in  "succession 


242Marryat's  Speech,  June  5,    1820,  Hansard  II  series,   Vol.  I.  p.   854. 

243Bright's  Speech,   Mar.  12,   1824,   Hansard  II  series,   Vol.  X.  p.   959. 

244Baring's  Speech,  May  15,  1825,  Hansard  II  series,  Vol.  XII.  p.  1036;  also  his 
speech,  Mar.  2,  1829,  Hansard  II  series.  Stanley's  speech,  May  2,  1828,  Hansard 
II  series,  vol.  19,  p.  339. 

^Huskisson's  Speech  in  H.  of  C.,  May  2,  1828,  Hansard  and  also  see  Christie, 
Vol.  III.  p.  174,  175. 

^Peel's  Speech  July   7,    1828,   in    "Peel's    Speeches,"    Vol.   I.   p.    665. 

247Quotation   from   Quebec  Gazette   in  Niles  Register,   June  20,    1829. 

72 


the  objects  of  American  ambition  were  the  Mexican  province  of 
Texas,  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  the  Canadas."  They  were  deter 
mined  to  possess  them  and  considered  the  end  would  justify  the 
means.247a  During  the  thirties,  too,  people  along  the  frontier  in 
sisted  that  troops  stationed  there  should  not  be  removed  lest  raids 
be  made  from  across  the  border,  and  Lord  Durham  advocated  the 
removal  of  a  "barren  and  injurious  sovereignty"  which  but  tempted 
the  "chances  of  foreign  aggression  by  keeping  continually  exposed 
to  a  powerful  and  ambitious  neighbor  a  distant  dependency  in 
which  an  invader  would  find  no  resistance. "247b 

From  1815  to  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  in  1837  the  fear  of 
raids  or  of  a  more  generally  organized  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  capture  the  northern  part  of  the  continent  was 
repeatedly  expressed.  Even  men  of  the  greatest  prominence  and 
responsibility  informed  the  Colonial  Office  of  the  fear  of  renewed 
attempts  to  disturb  the  peace.  May  we  not  see  here  one  reason 
why  the  Canadians  and  the  Colonial  Office  were  so  tardy  in  break 
ing  with  the  Indians  residing  in  Michigan  or  further  west,  and 
must  we  not  read  other  actions  of  British  authorities  in  the  light 
not  only  of  an  aggrandizing  spirit  of  the  British,  of  an  insidious 
effort  to  render  insecure  the  western  territories  of  the  United 
States,  but  of  an  effort  to  be  prepared  to  meet  the  aggrandizing 
spirit  of  ambitious  and  powerful  rivals  for  the  northern  land  and 
trade  ? 

Nevertheless  with  both  central  governments  and  the  vast  ma 
jority  of  both  peoples  sincerely  anxious  for  peace,  it  was  easy  for 
sacrifices  to  be  made  on  both  sides  to  maintain  it.  Great  Britain 
was  especially  reluctant  to  encourage  discord,  so  exhausted  was 
she  by  the  two  decades  of  war  through  which  she  had  just  passed, 
so  enormous  was  her  national  debt,  and  so  much  was  she  interested 
in  the  settlement  of  European  affairs  and  of  Spanish  difficulties  in 
Central  and  Southern  America.  Members  of  Parliament  questioned 
whether  Canada  was  worth  the  expense  involved  in  its  maintenance 
and  whether  it  would  not  be  to  the  real  advantage  of  England  to 


to  a  minister,  June  3,    1830,   C.   A.  Q.   196,  p.  481. 
II   series,    Vol.    19,   p.    339. 

247bColborne  to  Glenelg,  Nov.  20,  1835,  C.  A.  Q.  387,  p.  311,  C.  A.  Q.  244,  p.  90; 
Durham's  Report,  Introd.  p.  XIII. 


73 


give  it  up  entirely.2470  The  prudent  American  diplomat,  Rush,  mean 
while  cleverly  worked  his  way  into  the  good  graces  of  the  courtiers 
at  St.  James  and  softened  the  bitterness  which  Englishmen  had  held 
against  their  disobedient  offspring.  Despite  these  things,  however, 
the  apprehension  that  the  ambition  of  the  United  States  would 
lead  to  further  trouble  could  not  easily  be  brushed  aside. 


247cMarsh  in  H.  of  C.,  Nov.  28,  1814,  asks  for  imports  and  exports  of  Canada  to 
see  if  it  is  "consistent  with  prudence  *  *  *  to  continue  the  country  at  war." 

Also  Sir  I.  Coffin,  H.  of  C.  Mar.  13,  1822:  *  *  *  "It  would  have  been 
a  good  thing  if  Canada  had  been  sunk  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea  *  *  *  it  costs 
500,000  pounds  per  annum  *  *  *  the  sooner  the  Governor  were  called  home 
and  the  sooner  the  assembly  and  colony  were  suffered  to  go,  he  should  be  sorry  to 
say,  au  diable,  the  better."  (Hansard.) 

Also  Bell's  Weekly  Messenger  (Niles  Register,  14,  p.  14,  Feb.  21,  1818):  "It 
always  has  been  our  opinion  and  we  know  it  personally  to  be  that  of  one  of  our 
greatest  statesmen  this  country  ever  produced  that  Halifax,  Canada,  etc.,  are  not 
worth  what  they  actually  cost  England  and  that  the  true  point  of  wisdom  would  be  to 
make  the  best  bargain  we  could  for  them  to  the  United  States." 


74 


VIII. 

DREAD  OF  AMERICAN  INSTITUTIONS  AND  INFLU 
ENCES. 

If  there  was  a  lingering  apprehension  that  sooner  or  later  another 
attempt  would  be  made  to  annex  Canada  there  was  also  the  fear 
that  American  influence  might  cause  the  still  loyal  colonies  them 
selves  to  take  the  initiative  and  break  off  from  the  mother  country. 
Commercial  intercourse,  immigration,  intermarriage,  the  holding 
of  Canadian  land  by  American  citizens,  the  spread  of  American 
newspapers,  magazines,  and  books,  the  increasing  number  of  Amer 
ican  missionaries  and  teachers  in  the  province — by  all  such  means 
it  was  feared  that  the  principles  of  American  democracy  were  being 
disseminated  while  monarchial  institutions  were  censured.  It  was 
feared  that  American  public  men  were  being  eulogized  and  British 
depreciated,  that  Canadians  were  being  taught  to  feel  the  weight  of 
civil  and  ecclesiastical  tyranny,  and  that  Canada  was  thus  in  danger 
of  being  slowly  but  surely  separated  from  the  mother  country. 

The  Upper  province  especially  was  intimately  bound  up  with  the 
states  to  the  south  and  east.  Much  of  its  imports  came  from  these 
states ;  many  of  its  citizens  came  either  from  or  through  them ; 
mail  frequently  came  through  the  states ;  the  money  in  circulation 
was  almost  entirely  of  Spanish  or  American  pieces,  though  English 
and  French  coins  were  met  with  occasionally2488- ;  American  laws 
suppressing  bank  notes  were  felt  severely  in  Quebec;  ideas  and 
opinions  held  on  one  side  were  reechoed  on  the  other — arguments 
made  by  Mackenzie  against  chartered  banks,  for  example,  were 
identical  with  those  of  the  Jacksonian  party 248b — for  those  who  had 
grown  up  under  liberal  institutions  or  had  become  familiar  with 
them  through  contact,  demanded  similar  ones  in  their  new  homes.2480 
A  similar  environment  gave  rise  to  similar  desires.  The  emigrant 
direct  from  Europe  breathed  the  air  of  freedom  and  often  became 
very  rapidly  "Americanized."  This  natural  evolution  was  too  often 
traced  to  influences  brought  to  bear  upon  him  by  his  cousins  south 


«8»Gosford  to  Glenelg,  Dec.  21,   1836,  C.  A.  Q.  229,  p.   863. 
^Hamilton  petition,  Aug.  29,  1833,  C.  A.  Q.  378,  p.  317. 

248cSee    speech   of   Sir   James  Macintosh,    Brit.    H.    of   C.,    May   2,    1828,    Hansard 
II   series,  Vol.  19,  p.  331. 

75 


and  east  of  the  Great  Lakes. 248d  Sherbrooke  very  much  doubted 
whether  the  provinces  could  long  withstand  the  ''loose  demoraliz 
ing  principles  introduced"  and  he  "could  not  avoid  remarking  *  * 
that  in  many  instances  a  stronger  bias  prevailed  in  Upper  Canada 
in  favor  of  the  American  than  the  British  form  of  government/'2486 

On  account  of  the  danger  of  American  contamination  many  ad 
vocated  the  need  of  more  stringent  qualifications  for  membership  in 
the  House  of  Assembly  of  Upper  Canada  because  recent  immigrants 
from  the  United  States  possessing  Republican  sympathies  and  strong 
feelings  in  favor  of  their  native  country,  might,  from  the  advan 
tages  of  wealth,  acquire  influence  sufficient  to  secure  their  elections 
to  that  body.249  Not  only  was  there  an  unreadiness  to  permit  these 
immigrants  to  be  eligible  for  administrative  or  legislative  office, 
but  obstacles  were  even  placed  in  the  way  of  American  citizens 
/  from  settling  in  Canada  at  all.250 

From  the  lands  subject  to  Talbot's  superintendence,  the  subjects 
of  the  United  States  were  absolutely  excluded.251  Beyond  the  limits 
of  Talbot's  reservation  there  were  no  legal  means  of  keeping  Amer 
ican  citizens  from  coming  in  and  taking  up  land,  if  they  so  desired. 
The  British  Colonial  Office  and  the  War  Department  would  have 
preferred  to  see  Upper  Canada  fill  up  with  British  emigrants 
but  this  did  not  deter  others.  In  the  fall  of  1815  Gore  was  loath 
to  report  to  Bathurst  that  numbers  from  the  United  States  were 
pouring  into  the  provinces  and  that  there  was  "no  legal  power  in 
the  governor  to  restrain  the  evil."  A  provincial  statute,  however, 
authorized  the  dismissal  from  the  province,  upon  very  slight  grounds, 


l,   Travels  in  Canada  and  United   States,   1816  and  1817,  p.   154. 
A   lurking   hostility   to   republicanism   has   been   too    frequently    suffered   to    color 
our   views    of    the    conduct    of    America."       (Fidler,    Observations    on    Professions,    etc., 
in   U.   S.   and  Can.   p.    159.) 

"The    malus    animus    (towards    the    British)       *      *      *         is    in   fact    the    food    on 
which  the   great  and  I  am  sorry  to  say  the  predominant  party  in  the  country    (U.   S.) 
is   nourished.1'      Quotation    from   letter   of   Bagot    to    Lord   Binning    dated   Washington, 
May  6,   1816,  found  in   "George  Canning  and  His  Friends,"   Vol.  II,  p.  22. 
see   Bagot   to    Sneyd,   Letters   of   June    12,    19,    1816.      Vol.   II,   p.   22. 

Letters  and  Dispatches   of   Lord   Castlereagh   III   series,    Vol.   Ill,   p.   437. 

Mackenzie's   Objections,   Mar.    14,    1833,   C.   A.    Q.   378,  p.   370. 

248eBut  when  I  consider  the  vicinity  of  the  latter  province  (Upper  Canada)  to 
the  United  States,  the  population  continually  flowing  in  from  thence,  the  constant 
communication  'and  intermarriages  between  the  families  on  both  sides  of  the  line, 
the  number  of  Americans  who  purchased  the  best  of  the  lands  as  soon  as  they  are 
cleared,  and  every  description  of  property  worth  having,  and  when  I  look  to  the 
loose,  demoralizing  principles  introduced  by  these  people,  I  very  much  doubt  whether 
reliance  can  be  placed  on  the  continuance  of  this  tractable  disposition  *  *  *  Cir 
cumstances  have  materially  changed  since  the  separation  of  the  two  provinces  and  I 
could  not  avoid  remarking,  when  I  was  in  Upper  Canada,  that  in  many  instances  a 
stronger  bias  prevailed  in  favor  of  the  American  than  the  British  form  of  govern 
ment  "  Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,  Mar.  14,  1822,  C.  A.  <Q.  332,  p.  114. 

249Bouchette  to  Bathurst,   Jan.   6,    1823,   C.   A.  Q.   167,   p.   244. 

^Bathurst   to   Drummond,   Jan.    10,    1815,   O.   A.   Q.    57. 

^Halton  to  Talbot,  Oct.  7,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.  147.  Talbot  had  a  large  reser 
vation  on  Lake  Erie. 

76 


of  all  such  as  had  not  been  resident  six  months  or  had  not  taken 
the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  therefore  Gore  sought  advice  from  his 
Executive  Council  how  best  "to  give  the  utmost  efficacy  to  this  stat 
ute,"  ordered  his  magistrates  to  report  the  names  and  destination 
of  all  aliens  coming  from  the  United  States  or  elsewhere,  and  di 
rected  that  the  oath  of  allegiance  should  not  be  administered  to  any 
person  without  a  special  order.252  The  British  immigration  agent 
in  New  York,  not  sharing  the  same  antipathy  to  American  settlers, 
tried  to  persuade  Gore  to  allow  some  of  these  to  take  up  their  resi 
dence  in  Upper  Canada.  Nevertheless  the  Lieutenant  Governor 
with  the  greatest  eagerness  tried  to  carry  out  Bathurst's  policy  of 
settling  the  province  with  British  emigrants  only.253 

It  must  be  noticed  that  during  his  administration  Gore  exerted 
himself  in  this  direction  to  a  greater  extent  than  he  was  legally 
warranted  in  doing.  The  popular  assembly  was  more  liberal  than 
he,  but  the  majority  of  this  parliament,  he  declared,  was  composed 
of  influential  land  speculators  desirous  of  promoting  their  own 
rather  than  imperial  interests.  In  April,  1817,  this  assembly  re 
solved  that  the  admission  of  settlers  from  the  United  States  should 
be  unrestricted  and  that  all  orders  to  the  contrary  should  be 
rescinded.  Rather  than  allow  any  measure  so  objectionable  to 
him  to  be  carried  through,  Gore  prorogued  his  legislature  and 
immediately  informed  Bathurst  of  his  motives  for  so  doing.254  The 
deadlock  between  the  governor  and  his  legislative  assembly  seems 
to  show  that  whatever  the  motives  might  be,  basely  selfish  or  purely 
honorable,  the  majority  of  the  parliament,  at  least,  neither  resented 
nor  feared  the  American  immigration  but  would  have  gladly  wel 
comed  it. 

When  the  matter  was  called  to  the  attention  of  Bathurst  this 
minister  supported  neither  Gore  nor  the  assembly.255  Gore  was 
mistaken  he  declared,  because  American  citizens,  arriving  in  the 
province,  %ere  entitled  to  have  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  the  oath 
of  their  intention  to  reside  and  settle  administered  to  them;  the 
governor  had  no  discretion  to  refuse  this;  but  the  assembly  were 
in  error  in  supposing  that  the  taking  of  such  an  oath  could  of 


2B2Gore  to  Bathurst,  Oct.   17,  1815,  C.  A.  Q.  319,  p.  120. 

0, 


to  Buchanan,  July  31,   1816,   C.   A.  ,Q.  320,  p.   319. 

^"The  interruption  of  the  flowing  migration  from  the  United  States  was  par 
ticularly  offensive  to  certain  land  speculators,  the  principal  of  these  was  William 
Dickson,  who,  I  regret  to  say,  is  a  member  of  the  Legislative  Council  and  a  commis 
sioner  to  administer  the  oath  of  allegiance  was  the  first  and  only  one  reported  to  me 
who  disobeyed  my  instructions,  that  is,  to  administer  the  oath  of  allegiance  without 
license  from  the  governor."  Gore  to  Bathurst,  April  7,  1817,  C.  A.  &.  322,  p.  129. 

K5Bathurst  to  Smith,   Nov.   13,   1817,  C.  A.   Q.  p.   58. 

77 


itself  qualify  an  American  citizen  to  hold  land  in  the  province.  A 
previous  continued  residence  of  seven  years  was  the  indispensable 
condition  of  being  entitled  to  hold  lands  and  it  was  His  Royal 
Highness'  wish  that  this  law  should  be  enforced.  Those  persons 
who,  since  the  war,  had  violated  this  law  should  be  dispossessed. 
Drummond,  the  administrator  at  Quebec,  bore  the  same  sentiments 
as  Gore,  and  strongly  recommended  his  Parliament  to  revive  im 
mediately  the  old  regulations  respecting  aliens,  for  he  feared  "dis 
contented  adventurers  and  mischievous  agitators  from  the  continent 
of  Europe,  who  had  recently  migrated  to  the  neighboring  states."255a 
Drummond's  successor  charged  the  strong  republican  sentiment 
of  his  Parliament  to  the  American  education  of  many  of  its 
leaders.25515 

In  spite,  however,  of  prejudice  of  governors  and  irritating  in 
structions,  hundreds  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  continued 
to  come  in  and  take  possession  of  the  land.256  Not  until  1825  did  an 
order  come  from  the  Colonial  Office  to  remove  from  'settlers 
already  in  Upper  Canada  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  their  complete 
citizenship  in  that  province.257  But  restrictions  were  still  left  on 
prospective  immigrants  from  the  United  States  and  this  led  to  a 
clash  between  the  Assembly  in  Upper  Canada,  who  favored  the 
abolition  of  all  restrictions,  and  Bathurst,  who  would  not  go  so 
far.  An  address  was  sent  from  the  Assembly  to  England  animad 
verting  upon  the  losses  sustained  through  this  action  of  the  colonial 
department.  In  the  absence  of  commercial  and  manufacturing 
capital,  land  was  the  chief  basis  of  public  credit  and  further  popula 
tion  was  necessary  in  order  that  the  land  might  be  occupied  and 
made  productive.  "  Many  United  States  citizens  had  come  in 
and  were  among  the  most  useful  and  loyal  subjects  and  many 
thousands  of  families  would  have  entered  during  the  last  few 
years  if  they  had  not  been  discouraged.258  Bathurst's  reply  to 
this  address  was  quite  unsatisfactory  to  the  Upper  Canadians;  but 
Kempt,  who  shortly  after  this  came  out  as  Governor,  saw  the 
expediency  of  procuring  more  favorable  legislation  in  favor  of  the 
foreigners,  and  he  was  particularly  anxious  that  the  Americans, 


^"Drummond's  Address  to  Parl,  Jan.  26,   1816,    Christie  II,  p.  252. 
255bSee    Kingsford,   IX,   p.    176. 

^Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,   C.   A.  Q.   163,  p.   186  and  letter  by  an  English  farmer 
settled  in  Upper  Canada,   1820,  Provincial  Archives. 

a7Bathurst  to  Maitland,  July  22,   1815,  C.  A.  Q.,  p.   67. 
^Address  from  Commons,  Jan.  16,   1826,  C.  A.  Q.,  p.   18. 

78 


settled  in  Lower  Canada,  should  have  as  much  relief  as  had  been 
granted  to  those  in  the  Upper  Province.259 

So  long  as  it  was  the  desire  and  policy  to  maintain  special 
privileges  for  any  ecclesiastical  organization  or  to  bolster  up  an 
autocratic  irresponsible  government,  the  British  governors  in  the 
provinces  and  the  Colonial  Office,  which  sent  them  out,  were 
perfectly  justified  in  trying  to  cut  off  or  restrict  American  immigra 
tion  and  American  influence.  Property  and  prominent  political 
positions  were  falling  rapidly  into  the  possession  of  these  immi 
grants  and  so  rapidly  was  this  process  carried  on  that  the  assertion 
was  made  that  if  purchases  by  the  people  of  the  United  States 
should  continue  as  they  had  done,  Americans  would  in  a  short 
time,  without  treaty  or  conquest,  become  the  owners  of  Canada.260 
The  people  in  the  provinces  did  not  regard  them  as  foreigners  and 
thus  their  influence  and  the  proximity  of  the  United  States  made 
it  hazardous  to  maintain  invidious  distinctions  in  favor  of  any 
particular  class  or  denomination. 

The  desire  for  greater  local  autonomy  increased  and  as  late  as 
1838  Lord  Durham  reported  that  undoubtedly  there  were  many 
who  wished  to  assimilate  the  institutions  of  the  province  rather  to 
those  of  the  United  States  than  to  those  of  the  mother  country,  and 
that  a  few  persons,  chiefly  of  American  origin,  had  entertained 
those  designs  from  the  outset.  The  extensive  internal  improvements 
of  the  Republic,  producing  marvelous  growth  both  in  wealth  and 
in  population,  were  enviously  marked,  Durham  declared,  by  the 
discontented  provincials.2COa  The  political,  social,  and  religious  con 
troversies  which  dated  from  the  beginning  of  Dalhousie's  adminis 
tration  up  to  that  of  Sydenham's  plainly  proved  how  strong  a  factor 
this  American  influence  was  and  how  much  unconcealed  sympathy 
and  proffered  support  the  agitators  received,  if  not  from  the  legis 
lative  or  executive  body  within  the  United  States,  from  many  of 
the  people  who  voted  into  office  those  governing  bodies.  En 
lightened  statesmen,  such  as  Durham,  saw  how  to  direct  the  spirit 
of  this  mixed  Canadian  population.  His  predecessors  had  clung 
to  the  old  colonial  policy  of  suppression,  of  domination,  and  vainly 
sought  to  crush  out  everything  tainted  with  republicanism. 


KeC.   A.    Q.,    193,   p.    120. 

260Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,    1822,   C.  A.   Q.   163,  p.   186;    Bigg  to   Stanley,   1833.   0. 
A.  Q.  379,  p.   188;   Gould  to  Glenelg,  '1835,   C.  A.  Q.  224,  p.  470. 

^"Durham's  Report,   p.    108   and  p.    113. 

79 


Immigration  from  the  United  States  was  thus  impeded,  but  mis- 
government  of  the  provinces — and  a  misgovernment  that  native 
Englishmen  like  Bennet  and  Hume  vigorously  condemned  on  the 
floors  of  the  British  Parliament26015 — not  only  tended  to  exclude 
Americans,  but  was  largely  responsible  for  the  fact  that  many  of  the 
newcomers  at  Quebec  passed  through  the  fertile  unoccupied  Upper 
Province  and  took  up  lands  in  what  is  now  Ohio,  Indiana,  Michigan, 
or  even  in  the  farther  west.  That  twenty  or  twenty-five  per  cent 
of  all  immigrants  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  river  did  this,  is 
perhaps  a  conservative  estimate ;  and  before  the  rebellion  of  1837 
many  who  had  already  settled  in  the  Canadas  sold  their  homesteads 
and  removed  across  the  border.2600 

These  immigrants  who  were  forsaking  Canada  and  the  discon 
tented  who  remained  were,  for  the  first  few  years  after  the  war, 
confined  solely  to  the  English  speaking  element ;  but  later  the  French 
also  became  dissatisfied.  During  the  war  and  for  some  years  aft 
erwards,  the  British  could  count  on  a  hearty  support  from  these 
people  in  the  Lower  Province.  In  1814  citizens  of  Quebec  memo 
rialized  the  Prince  Regent  to  retain  Prevost  as  Governor.261  But 


280bBennet's  Speech,  March  12,  1824,  Hansard  II  series,  Vol.  10,  p.  958;  Hume's 
Speech,  March  15,  1825,  Hansard  II  series,  Vol.  12,  p.  1035. 

2GOcHume,  Apr.  15,  1825,  said  that  he  was  "creditably  informed  that  eighteen 
out  of  every  twenty  emigrants  that  went  to  Upper  Canada  passed  on  to  the  United 
States."  Hansard  II  Series,  Vol.  12,  p.  1360.  Astle  to  Gregory,  June  30,  1823, 
C.  A.  ,Q.  167,  p.  228.  Maitland  to  Gore,  Feb.  6,  1838,  C.  A.  Q.  244,  p.  90. 

"I  have  observed  myself  and  I  find  from  information  that  many  American  fami 
lies  settled  in  this  part  of  the  country  are  leaving  it.''  Buchanan,  Chief  Emigration 
Agent,  Quebec,  Statistics  for  1834  and  1836.  (C.  A.  Q.  217,  p.  680  and  229,  p.  877 
resp.) 

1834  Distribution  of  immigrants,  Quebec: 

To   Dower   Canada    4,090 

To   Upper   Canada    22,210 

Died     800 

Returned    to    Gt,    Brit 350 

To    United    States    3,485 


Total      30,485 

1836  Distribution  of  immigrants,  Quebec: 

To   Lower   Canada    9,600 

To    Upper    Canada 13,000 

Died     145 

To    United    States     4,973 


Total      27,728 

281Memoir  of  Citizens  of  Quebec  to  Prince  Regent,  Nov.   1814,  C.  A.  (Q.  135,  p.  37. 

"Ce  pays  une  fois  perdu,  ils  n'ont  plus  de  patrie  ou'  ils  puissent  tpurner  les 
yeux;  un  Anglois  a  encore  sa  patrie.  Si  le  Canada  passe  sous  la  domination  des  of 
Etats-unis,  leur  population  sera  submergee  par  celle  des  Etats-unis,  et  ils  deviendront 
nuls,  sans  aucune  influence  dans  leur  governement;  incapables  de  se  proteger,  de  pro- 
teger  leur  religion"  *  *  *  ending  with  the  declaration  that  the  British  govern 
ment  caused  no  such  dangers  to  be  feared. 

Hall  (Travels  in  Canada  and  United  States,  1816  and  1817,  p.  94)  says:  "The 
Canadians  (i.  e.,  Lower  Canadians)  bear  a<  considerable  antipathy  to  the  Americans 
whom  they  dominate  Sacres  Bastonnais." 

Sherbrooke  to  Bathurst,  May  14,  1822,  C.  A.  Q.  332,  p.  14,  says  that  he  is  con 
vinced  that  the  Catholics  in  Lower  Canada  feel  a  deep-rooted  antipathy  to  the  Govern 
ment  in  the  United  States  and  have  no  dread  equal  to  that  of  one  day  falling  under 
its  dominion.  He  feels  that  whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  the  Upper  Province,  Amer 
icans  would  never  be  able  to  establish  themselves  in  Lower  Canada. 

80 


by  1839,  so  completely  had  the  forces  brought  to  bear  upon  these 
people  reversed  the  situation  that,  according  to  Dunham's  acute 
observation,  "an  invading  American  army  might  rely  on  the  co 
operation  of  almost  the  entire  French  population  of  Lower 
Canada.261a 

Some  persons  high  in  official  positions  would  gladly  welcome  the 
American  negro262  but  there  were  more  who  would  as  gladly  erect 
a  Chinese  wall  against  American  missionaries  and  teachers.  Meth 
odist  ministers  in  particular  met  with  no  cordial  reception  from 
those  who  basked  in  the  gubernatorial  rays.263  The  average  settler 
undoubtedly  welcomed  them  with  open  arms,  but  the  high  church 
men  and  the  absolute  monarchists  fancied  that  they  saw  these 
teachers  and  ministers  disseminating  dangerous  republican  doc 
trines.264  Maitland  was  among  those  who  did  not  welcome  the 
foreign  missionaries.  In  1819  he  extolled  the  loyalty  of  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Church  of  England  during  the  war  and  made  a  plea 
for  thirty  or  forty  more  clergymen  from  his  church,  chiefly  because 
many  Canadians  were  joining  the  Methodists,  whose  preachers 
came  mostly  from  the  United  States.265  A  little  later  he  regretted 
the  decision  of  the  Washington  Congress  whereby  the  London 
Wesleyan  Methodists  had  been  prevailed  upon  to  withdraw  their 
missionaries,  thus  leaving  the  field  open  to  American  Methodist 
preachers  only.  He  had  just  as  little  faith  in  the  loyalty  of  Amer 
ican  preachers  as  he  had  in  the  loyalty  of  American  teachers.2™ 

In  May,  1827,  Strachan  congratulated  the  Church  of  England 
upon  the  considerable  progress  being  made  by  it  in  Upper  Canada, 
the'  more  especially  because  teachers  of  the  different  denominations, 
with  a  few  named  exceptions,  were  all  from  the  United  States  from 
which  they  brought  sentiments  of  hostility  to  the  established  gov 
ernment  and  church.267  During  the  same  summer  Dr.  Weld  peti 
tioned  for  forty  more  clergymen  from  England,  the  need  being 
more  urgent  he  said,  since  Methodists  in  the  United  States  were 
establishing  themselves  in  the  province  of  Upper  Canada  with 


261aDurham's  Report,  p.  40. 

282Certain  American  negroes  had  petitioned  for  permission  to  establish  a  settle 
ment  in  Upper  Canada.  Gould  sympathized  with  the  petitioners,  because  they  were 
being  oppressed  by  their  very  "liberal  brothers,  the  professors  of  liberality,  the 
Yankees."  Letter  to  William  Allen,  July  20,  1830,  C.  A.  Q.  196,  p.  187. 

See  also,  Knill  to  Glenelg,   Nov.   19,   1835,  C.  A.  Q.  388,  p.  416. 

263Methodist  ministers  in  1816  were  charged  with  raising  an  insurrection  in  the 
West  Indies.  See  Hansard  II  Series  Vol.  34,  p.  1216. 

264Minutes  of  British  Wesleyan  Methodists  at  Montreal,  May,  1827,  C.  A.  Q.  344, 
p.  332. 

^Maitland  to  Bathurst,  June  4,    1819,   C.  A.  ,Q.   325,  p.  222. 

^Maitland  to  Bathurst,  Jan.  4,   1821,  C.  A.  Q.  321,  p.  2. 

26TStrachan  to  Morton,   May  16,   1827,   C.  A.  Q.  325,  p.  342. 

81 


increasing  rapidity.268  A  little  later  Colborne  complained  that  these 
Methodists  had  become  a  political  body  that  they  might  strengthen 
their  influence  against  the  established  church.  Four  or  five  news 
papers  allied  with  them,  he  said,  were  spreading  anti-British  feeling 
and  attempting  to  undermine  the  patriotism  of  the  people.269  Col- 
borne  was  no  more  solicitious  for  the  welfare  of  the  white  race 
than  Kempt  was  for  the  red.  He  believed  that  among  the  most 
effectual  means  of  ameliorating  the  condition  of  the  Indians  would 
be  the  providing  of  active,  zealous,  Wesleyan  missionaries  from 
England  to  counteract  the  antipathy  to  the  established  church  and 
other  objectionable  principles  which  the  missionaries  from  the 
United  States  were  supposed  to  instill  into  the  minds  of  their  Indian 
converts.270 

A  charge  of  another  kind  was  made  against  these  missionaries. 
A  petition  from  the  bishop  and  clergymen  of  Quebec,  men  inter 
ested  in  the  pecuniary  as  well  as  the  spiritual  welfare  of  the  denom 
ination,  stated  that  the  most  active  efforts  put  forward  to  secure 
the  sale  of  clergy  reserves  for  educational  and  internal  improve 
ments  were  made  by  Methodists,  most  of  whom  were  ordained  in 
the  United  States  and  had  no  ecclesiastical  connection  with  the 
Methodist  conference  in  England.271  Another  Episcopal  clergyman 
in  Upper  Canada  about  the  same  year  (1832)  wrote  that  "most  of 
f  the  Methodist  ministers  in  Canada  are  from  the  States  and 
have  a  double  object:  they  ostensibly  minister  in  sacred  offices 
but  secretly  and  effectively  disseminate  principles  destructive  of 
the  present  order  of  affairs.  They  are  concerting  schemes  for 
the  establishment  of  republican  institutions  and  plans  of  govern 
ment."272  A  short  time  after  this  complainant  added  his  grievances, 
the  Lords  of  the  Treasury  in  England  refused  to  admit  free  of 
duty  books  and  tracts  from  the  United  States  for  the  benefit  of 
their  Bible,  Sunday  School,  and  Tract  societies,  because  these  books 
and  tracts  were  represented  as  being  politically  dangerous.273 

This  persistent  and  potent  resistance  to  the  Methodist  ministry 
continually  led  its  champions  to  deny  the  charges,  and  the  vigorous 
denial  of  disloyalty  serves  only  to  show  how  much  opposition  there 
was  to  this  so-called  American  influence.  By  addresses  of  attach- 


M8Dr.  Weld  to  Horton,   May  16,    1827,   C.  A.  Q.   325,   p.   342. 
»Colborne  to  Hay,   March   13,    1829,   C.   A.   Q.   351,  p.   85. 
""Kempt  to  Murray,   May  16,   1829,   C.  A.   Q.   188,   p.  345. 
^Petition,  December,    1831,   C.  A.  jQ.   200,  p.  291. 
272Rev.   I.   Fidler,    "Observations,   etc.,"    p.    124. 
273Spearman   to   Stephen,  April  7,   1837,   C.  A.   Q.  240,  p.   236. 

82 


ment  to  the  British  Crown  and  mother  country274  and  through  the 
press  and  on  the  platform,  such  men  as  Ryerson  hurled  back  the 
violent  onsets  of  their  adversaries.  This  leader  of  the  denomination 
boldly  rebuked  the  Lieutenant  Governor  himself,  declaring  that 
the  majority  of  the  Methodist  preachers  were  British  born  subjects, 
that  they  had  no  dislike  for  the  Church  of  England  and  were  inno 
cent  of  secular  interference.  He  complained  that  the  Lieutenant 
Governor's  remarks  "must  produce  the  impression  in  an  unin 
formed  mind  that  the  Methodist  clergy  as  a  body  was  a  company 
of  ignorant,  political  demagogues,  alike  divested  of  religious  prin 
ciple  and  public  character." 275  Hume  in  Parliament  likewise 
stoutly  maintained  that  Dr.  Strachan  had  grossly  misrepresented 
these  missionaries  in  Upper  Canada  and  produced  statistics  to  dem 
onstrate  that  far  the  larger  percentage  of  the  Methodist  and  Bap 
tist  preachers  in  Canada  were  born  and  educated  in  British  do 
minions.276 

Though  Hume  and  Ryerson  and  others  might  deny  the  charges 
of  their  adversaries,  one  must  now  see,  as  the  Lieutenant  Governors 
and  the  established  church  then  saw,  that  the  Methodists  really 
were  a  force  representing  and  advocating  "American  principles," 
and  if  this  Americanizing  of  Upper  Canada  was  baneful  as  the 
Governor  and  established  church  believed  it  to  be,  then  the  Meth 
odists  ought  to  have  been  condemned.  Ryerson  undoubtedly,  how 
ever,  had  the  sympathy  and  generous  support  of  an  extensive  group 
and  voiced  their  sentiments  in  saying  that  there  was  no  general 
wish  expressed  in  the  province  for  the  return  of  British  Wesleyan 
missionaries,  that  only  some  political  newspapers  were  clamoring 
for  this,  that  nine-tenths  of  the  European  population  in  Upper 
Canada  were  decidedly  favorable  to  the  principles  of  civil  and  reli 
gious  liberty  as  advocated  in  a  memorial  from  the  Methodist  con 
ference,  and  that  at  least  one  quarter  of  the  people  of  the  Upper 
Province  preferred  the  ministrations  of  the  Methodist  clergy.277 
His  references  to  the  provisions  made  by  the  constitution  of  six 
teen  of  the  United  States  for  the  diffusion  of  virtue,  wisdom,  and 
knowledge  among  the  humblest  classes  of  the  people  shows  his 
familiarity  with  the  affairs  of  the  United  States.  The  entire  de 
fense  of  Ryerson  only  tended  to  show  the  growth  of  the  so-called 


^Address  from  Methodist  Conference,   1834,  0.  A.  Q.   382,   p.  451.     W.  M.   S.  to 
Goulbourn  July  3,   1821,  C.  A.  Q.  330,  p.  99. 


"'Hume's  Speech,  May  2,   1828,  Hansard  II  series,  Vol.   19,  p.  341. 
277See  note  274. 

83 


American  tendencies  and  theories  and  the  need  of  greater  precau 
tion  if  the  rulers  of  Upper  Canada  were  to  preserve  their  old-time 
supremacy  over  the  government  and  religion  of  the  new  province. 

Teachers  from  the  United  States  were  no  less  undesirable.  An 
extremely  strong  plea  for  protection  against  peril  from  this  source 
came  from  the  Reverend  Alexander  Macdonell,  Vicar-General  of 
the  Catholics  in  Upper  Canada,  in  the  beginning  of  1817.  He 
suggested  that  clergymen  and  teachers  of  the  Gaelic  language  and 
Catholic  faith  should  be  sent  out  to  instruct  the  Highlanders  in 
the  Upper  Province  so  that  "thus  assured  by  the  double  barrier 
of  their  language  and  religion,  they  might  for  a  long  time  stand 
proof  against  the  contagious  politics  of  their  democratical  neigh 
bors."  He  lamented  that  boarding  schools  for  young  ladies  in 
both  the  Canadas  were  kept  principally  by  American  women,  and 
that  every  book  of  instruction  put  into  the  hands  of  their  pupils 
by  these  schoolmistresses  was  of  American  manufacture,  artfully 
tinctured  with  the  principles  of  democratic  government  and  holding 
up  American  worthies  as  perfect  patterns  of  every  moral  excel 
lence  while  British  public  and  private  characters  were  represented 
in  the  most  odious  terms.  With  more  warmth  than  pure  justice, 
Macdonell  condemned  the  crafty  arts  of  these  active  agents.  To 
demonstrate  the  extent  of  the  territory  over  which  their  teachings 
prevailed,  he  reported  that,  with  the  exception  of  the  eight  district 
schools,  which  were  taught  principally  by  clergymen  of  the  estab 
lished  church,  the  education  of  the  youth  of  both  sexes  in  Upper 
Canada  was  exclusively  entrusted  to  American  teachers.278 

It  seems  to  have  (been  true  that  most  of  the  teachers  and  text 
books  in  Upper  Canada,  as  well  as  a  majority  of  the  ministers  of 
the  gospel,  came  from  the  neighboring  states.  A  few  years  later 
Maitland  took  occasion  to  refer  to  the  preponderance  of  alien 
teachers  and  repeated  almost  the  same  language  used  by  Mac 
donell.  He  wished  that  instructors  could  be  brought  in  from 
some  central  school  "to  the  exclusion  not  only  of  American  mas 
ters  but  of  their  republican  apparatus  of  grammars  and  lesson  books, 
all  of  which  were  studiously  composed  with  a  view  of  instilling 
principles  into  the  pupil's  mind  unfriendly  to  the  existing  form 
of  government."  279  More  than  a  year  later  he  was  still  insisting 
on  the  enlargement  of  the  school  at  York  for  this  same  purpose, 


^Macdonell  to  Bathurst,  Jan.  10,  1817,  C.  A.  Q.  323,  p.  177. 
278Maitland  to  Bathurst,  Jan.  4,  1821,  C.  A.  Q.  229,  p.  2. 

84 


and  Durham  relates  that  those  in  Lower  Canada  who  wished  higher 
education  sought  it  in  American  colleges.280  Undoubtedly  seeds 
of  discontent  were  scattered  by  these  foreign  teachers  and  to  a 
governor  of  the  old  school  the  need  of  action  was  urgent.  Malcon 
tents  were  finding  sympathy,  instruction,  and  inspiration  from  their 
ambitious  neighbors,  and  it  was  easy  for  them  to  contrast  the  re 
tarded  development  of  the  Canadas  with  the  progress,  freedom, 
and  popularly  elected  governing  boards  of  New  York,  Pennsylvania, 
and  Ohio.281 

One  of  the  favorite  methods  of  airing  grievances  and  attacking 
men  and  institutions  with  impunity  was  found  in  making  use  of  the 
United  States  printing  presses.  In  the  conservative  and  best  Amer-- 
ican  newspapers,  the  administrators  of  Canada  might  often  find 
matter  not  complimentary  to  their  system  of  government,  but  there 
were  some  radical  papers  especially  objectionable.2810  Five  years 
before  the  war  of  1812  broke  out,  there  began  to  be  published  by 
Wilcox,  the  Upper  Canada  Guardian  or  Freeman's  Journal.  This 
paper,  professing  to  be  a  Canadian  publication,  was  printed  and 
published  in  the  United  States,  sustained,  it  was  currently  reported, 
by  funds  gathered  in  New  York,  and  circulating  widely  in  Can 
ada.282  That  its  aim  was  to  stir  up  discontent  in  the  British  col 
onies  and  excite  hostilities  is  evident  from  the  first  edition  of  this 
paper.  The  editor  referring  to  the  Chesapeake  affair,  wrote  therein : 
"We  are  all  confused  by  the  appearance  of  hostilities  between  the 
two  countries  and  the  honest  part  of  us  say  that  if  the  United  States 
pocket  the  indignity  now  offered  them,  they  can  no  longer  style 
themselves  a  nation."  283 

To  cite  but  one  other  glaring  instance  of  the  use  of  the  American 
press,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  only  to  L'Ami  du  Peuple,  a  paper 
published  at  Plattsburg  in  1827  and  then  with  generous  prodigality 
scattered  through  Canadian  parishes.284  The  unlearned  and  credu 
lous  inhabitants  were  told  that  the  administration  in  Canada  was 
forging  chains  to  bind  them;  their  liberties,  their  rights,  their  po 
litical  existence  were  in  danger  of  public  destruction;  kings  are 
great  and  powerful  only  because  their  subjects  bow  their  knees 
before  them ;  now  was  the  time  to  rise  up  and  shake  off  the  yoke 


290Durham's   Report,    p.    94. 

281See   Gourlay's  Address  to  resident  landholders,   Feb.   1818,   C.  A.  (Q.  324,  p.  26 
and  letter  to  Bathurst,  Dec.  3,  1817,  C.  A.  Q.,  323,  p.  42. 

^"See,  for  example,  Niles  Register,  Feb.   11,   1832,  p.  437. 

^Kingsley,  Vol.  VIII.  p.  94ff;  C.  A.  Q.  312,  p.  237;  331  C.  A.  Q.  311,  p.  53. 

ox    to    Cozens,    C.    A.    Q.    p.    329,    361. 

Kingsford  IX,  p.  355,  note. 


of  tyranny.  It  is  readily  perceived  that  men  like  Nelson,  Lount, 
Papineau,  and  Buncombe,  who  ultimately  headed  the  rebellion  of 
1837,  found  it  to  their  advantage  to  see  that  the  United  States 
papers  were  supplied  with  sensational  gossip.  American  sympathy 
and  support,  apparent  if  not  real,  would  aid  their  cause  in  Canada 
and  perhaps  raise  up  for  them  adherents  for  an  armed  force,  if 
such  should  be  required.  Credible  arguments  and  revolutionary 
teachings  could  be  circulated  while  the  editor  and  publisher  re 
mained  safely  ensconced  within  a  foreign  territory  and  entirely 
immune  from  libel. 

While  radical  papers  were  circulating  in  the  Lower  Province, 
and  while  constitutional  committees285  were  forming  there — an 
ominous  similarity  to  the  action  adopted  by  the  revolting  colonies 
of  1776 — the  local  as  well  as  the  foreign  press  was  taken  advantage 
of  by  the  opposition  party  in  the  Upper  Province.  Lieutenant 
Governor  Colborne  was  alarmed.  In  his  opinion  rebellion  was 
fostered  by  radical  newspapers  subscribed  for  chiefly  by  settlers 
who  had  lived  formerly  in  the  United  States  but  encouraged  by 
such  prominent  leaders  as  Ryerson,  "who  would  have  no  objection 
in  seeing  a  more  democratic  form  of  government  established."  288 

The  alarm  felt  by  Colborne  and  other  governors  of  Canada  may 
have  been  vastly  increased  by  the  knowledge  that  not  only  was 
there  an  organized  opposition  within  their  own  jurisdiction  but 
across  the  border  there  was  also  an  organized  body  working  against 
their  administration.  A  certain  group  professing  to  be  British 
royalists  and  calling  themselves  the  Adelaide  Association  held  meet 
ings  in  Philadelphia  to  prepare  an  impeachment  against  Colborne 
for  not  granting  them  the  privilege  of  settling  in  Seymour  Town 
ship.  The  chairman  of  this  Association,  when  demanding  redress 
from  Sir  Robert  Peel  made  a  significant  statement  which  would 
tend  to  confirm  the  worst  fears  of  such  men  as  Maitland  and  Col 
borne.  Emphasizing  the  virtue  of  himself  and  his  friends  in  order 
further  to  appeal  to  the  British  minister,  he  said  that  the  royalists 
in  the  United  States  were  the  only  men  who  had  so  long  refuted 
the  base  calumnies  disseminated  through  the  United  States  which 
were  replete  with  the  most  vindictive  vituperations  against  the 
laws  and  constitution  of  Great  Britain.287 


^Aylmer  to  Hay,  Dec.  11,   1834,   C.  A.  Q.  217,  p.  578. 
288Colborne  to  Hay,  May  and  July,  1832,  C.  A.  jQ.  374,  p.  601  and  801. 
to   Colonial  Secretary,   Oct.   3,   1835,   C.  iA.   Q.  318,  p.   210. 

86 


As  opposed  to  the  apprehensions  of  Colborne  and  others  we  must 
place  the  confidence  of  Talbot  who,  though  American  immigrants 
had  been  shut  out  from  his  reservation,  had  a  better  opinion  of 
the  loyalty  and  peaceful  disposition  of  these  foreign  settlers.  "The 
disaffected  are  but  few,"  he  wrote,  "considering  all  the  noise  that 
has  been  made."  Certainly  the  few  who  joined  the  outbreak  in 
1837  and  the  patient  endurance  for  so  many  years  of  an  almost 
unendurable  system  argues  well  for  the  law  abiding  nature  of  the 
mingled  American  and  English  residents  of  Upper  Canada  before 
the  days  of  Durham  and  Sydenham.  However,  Canadian  affairs 
had  become  so  critical  during  the  later  twenties  and  thirties  that 
members  in  the  British  House  of  Commons  also  feared  that  unless 
more  attention  was  paid  to  Canada  these  colonies  would  revolt 
and  throw  themselves  into  the  arms  of  their  neighbors.  It  was 
suggested,  therefore,  that  they  should  be  made  a  more  integral 
part  of  the  British  Empire  for  if  they  were  not  more  closely  united 
to  the  mother  country,  republican  principles  would  get  such  a  firm 
foothold  that  all  the  colonies  would  be  lost,  one  after  the  other.288 


^Pinsent  to  Murray,  May  24,   1829,  0.  A.  Q.   192,  p.   514. 


81 


IX 
BOUNDARY  LINES  AND  FREE  NAVIGATION. 

In  conformity  with  a  provision  in.  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  commis 
sioners  were  appointed  to  define  the  boundaries  westward  from  the 
point  where  the  forty-fifth  parallel  of  latitude  met  the  St.  Lawrence 
river.  The  boundary  line  must  run  through  the  Great  Lakes  and 
connecting  rivers  up  as  far  as  the  head  of  Lake  Superior,  and  the 
possibilities  for  serious  disputes  lay  only  in  connection  with  those 
islands  or  channels  which  were  of  special  military  or  commercial 
advantage.  Barclay  and  Porter  were  the  commissioners  respectively 
for  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  In  June,  1822,  they  met 
in  Utica  and  came  to  an  agreement  on  the  boundary  line  between 
the  point  on  the  St.  Lawrence  river  from  which  they  began  and 
the  Neebish  Islands  in  Lake  Huron.  In  this  Utica  convention  the 
commissioners  were  unanimous  and  therefore  according  to  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  their  decision  must  be  final. 

As  soon  as  the  terms  of  this  convention  were  made  known,  how 
ever,  a  storm  of  protest  was  directed  against  Barclay.  The  mu 
nicipalities  and  legislature  of  Upper  Canada  were  especially  irri 
tated  because  he  had  awarded  Barnhart's  Island  to  the  United 
States.  This  remarkably  fertile  island  of  over  two  thousand  acres 
lay  in  the  St.  Lawrence  river  near  Cornwall.  That  town  was 
among  the  first  to  draw  up  a  memorial  requesting  reasons  why 
Barnhart's  and  the  Long  Sault  Islands  had  not  been  assigned  to 
Canada ;  the  main  channel,  it  was  stated,  was  not  on  the  Canadian 
side  and  the  interests  and  defense  of  Canada  demanded  control  of 
them.291  Maitland,  the  Lieutenant  Governor  of  Upper  Canada, 
took  up  the  matter  and  requested  Robert  Barrie,  the  acting  naval 
commissioner,  to  give  him  a  detailed  statement  of  the  facts  con 
cerning  the  boundary  dispute  in  the  St.  Lawrence  river.  In  the 
fall  of  1823  Barrie  submitted  the  results  of  his  investigations.  As 
far  as  Barnhart's  Island  was  concerned,  and  that  was  the  real  bone 
of  contention,  this  report  was  a  stinging  criticism  of  Barclay.  Ac 
cording  to"  Barrie  the  award  seemed  to  stand  upon  no  reasonable 
basis.  The  nearest  distance  from  it  to  the  Canadian  shore  was 


I81C.    A.   Q.    167,   p.    97. 

88 


one  hundred  and  twenty-four  yards  in  high  water  and  not  more 
than  one  hundred  yards  in  low  water.  The  nearest  distance  to 
the  American  shore  was  two  hundred  and  seventy  yards,  which 
would  be  reduced  by  not  more  than  fifteen  or  twenty  yards  in  low 
water.  The  island  was  therefore  at  least  one  hundred  and  forty- 
six  yards  farther  from  the  American  shore  than  from  the  Cana 
dian.  The  American  channel  was  deep,  rapid,  and  safe ;  the  Cana 
dian,  shallow,  rocky,  dangerous,  and  in  some  places  absolutely 
fordable.  Every  winter  there  was  a  clear  and  easy  passage  over 
the  ice  to  Canada,  but  to  the  American  side  the  ice  could  not  be 
crossed  except  on  rare  occasions  and  under  great  danger.  Both 
in  winter  and  in  summer  the  possessors  of  this  island  held  an  im 
mense  military  advantage.292 

The  Council  and  Assembly  of  Upper  Canada  during  the  follow 
ing  winter  discussed  the  matter  and  in  January,  1824,  presented  a 
joint  address  to  Maitland  to  be  forwarded  to  the  king.  They,  too, 
professed  to  be  unable  to  understand  upon  what  grounds  they 
should  have  to  relinquish  all  the  navigable  channels.293  An  addi 
tional  weight  was  just  then  lent  to  the  boundary  dispute  because' 
of  the  President's  recent  message  to  Congress  claiming  the  free 
navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  The  Upper  Canadian  Legislature 
therefore  urged  the  king  to  reconsider  the  St.  Lawrence  river  boun 
dary  and  to  refuse  to  grant  the  demand  for  free  navigation.  If 
free  navigation  were  allowed  it  would  be  most  ruinous  to  the  Brit 
ish  interests,  they  said,  it  would  endanger  connection  with  His 
Majesty's  empire,  injure  commerce  and  revenues  to  an  incalculable 
extent,  and  facilitate  illicit  introduction  of  foreign  merchandise.294 
The  Barnhart  boundary  question  had  by  this  time  become  quite 
serious295  and  Maitland  himself  strongly  supported  the  sentiments 
of  the  address  and  earnestly  desired  Bathurst  to  give  the  represen 
tations  from  his  legislature  his  most  serious  consideration.296 

Although  the  boundary  question  and  the  demand  for  free  navi 
gation  were  two  entirely  distinct  matters,  the  members  of  the  Brit 
ish  Foreign  Office,  as  well  as  Maitland's  legislature,  spoke  of  them 
in  the  same  breath.  Wilmot  Horton,  commenting  on  Barclay's  ac 
tions  and  explanations  and  basing  his  conclusions  chiefly  on  Barrie's 


292Barrie  to   Maitland,   Oct.   25,   1823,   C.   A.  )Q.   335,  p.   199. 

M3C.  A.   Q.  335,  p.   193. 

2MC.    A.    Q.    335,    p.    193. 

"'Not  only  "some  Canadians"  expressed  apprehensions  but  the  "Legislature  of 
Upper  Canada  and  every  intelligent  man  of  either  province  expressed  the  greatest 
surprise  and  concern"  at  the  Barnhart  boundary  award.  C.  A.  Q.  343,  p.  530. 

29<JC.    A.    Q.    335,    p.    185. 

89 


report,  urged  the  necessity  of  Lord  Dalhousie's  examining  whether 
everything  possible  had  been  done  affecting  this  question  and  in 
the  same  paragraph  pressed  for  the  best  legal  opinion  upon  the 
assumed  right  of  the  Americans  for  free  navigation  to  the  ocean.297 

Protests  against  the  award  reached  such  formidable  proportions 
that  Barclay  felt  it  incumbent  upon  himself  to  explain  his  reasons 
for  acting  as  he  had  done  and  accordingly  prepared  and  submitted 
an  elaborate  defense.298  He  said  that  in  order  to  determine  the 
boundary  the  commissioners  at  the  outset  drew  up  a  set  of  general 
rules  by  which  they  should  be -governed.  According  to  these  rules 
the  boundary  line  was  to  be  the  "middle  line  inter  ripas ;"  islands 
intersected  by  the  middle  line  were  to  be  divided  as  equally  as  pos 
sible  between  the  two  nations  but  wherever  an  island  was  inter 
sected  by  such  middle  line  into  two  unequal  parts,  the  nation  on 
whose  side  the  larger  portion  lay  was  entitled  to  the  election  to 
retain  the  whole  or  to  exchange  its  portion  for  an  equivalent  else 
where,  at  the  consent  of  the  other  party.299  These  rules  we  shall 
see  were  not  strictly  adhered  to,  especially  at  the  two  disputed 
points,  Bois  Blanc  and  Barnhart's  Island,  for  in  both  these  places 
Barclay  speaks  of  the  channel,  rather  than  the  middle  line,  as  being 
the  real  determining  factor. 

From  the  beginning  Barclay  had  preferred  the  middle  line  to 
that  of  the  channel.300  A  channel,  he  recognized,  would  have  been 
better  and  more  proper  in  one  respect :  it  would  have  unequivocally 
established  a  free  navigation  but  the  variety  of  channels  in  places 
was  a  serious  objection.  A  marine  survey  would  have  been  neces 
sary  to  determine  where  the  channel  lay.  The  mutability  of  chan 
nels  would  be  a  cause  for  future  trouble.  The  chief  objection, 
however,  was  that  the  principal  channel  lay  close  to  the  north  or 
Canadian  shore  throughout  almost  the  whole  length  of  the  lake 
and  river  system.  There  were  only  two  exceptions  of  consequence : 
one  was  at  Barnhart  Island,  the  other  was  in  Lake  St.  Clair.  Bar 
clay  therefore  decided  not  to  favor  the  adoption  of  the  channel 
line  unless  ordered  to  do  so  by  his  government.  This  order  was 
not  given. 

According  to  Barclay,  Lord  Bathurst  was  partly  responsible  for 
the  award.  Previous  to  the  Utica  convention  Bathurst  sent  what 


29TC.  A.   Q.    167,   p.    132. 

2fiSBathurst   to   Maitland,   July  28,    1825. 

^Barclay  to  Canning,  Feb.  27,    1826,  C.  A.  jQ.  177,  p.  20. 

300Barclay  to  Canning,  June  14,   1823,  C.  A.  Q.   167,  p.  98. 

90 


he  believed  to  be  a  very  important  letter  from  Goulbourn  to  Barclay, 
saying  that  he  thought  that  the  recommendations  and  advice  con 
tained  in  this  letter  ought  to  be  followed  unless,  after  due  examina 
tion  and  a  perfect  conviction  in  the  justice  of  their  claim,  it  should 
turn  out  that  the  United  States  were  entitled  to  some  of  the  terri 
tory  therein  assigned  to  Canada.  In  this  letter  Goulbourn  warned 
the  commissioners  not  to  surrender  Bois  Blanc  nor  Navy  and  Grand 
Islands  in  the  Niagara  River,  as  these  by  the  Treaty  of  1783  were 
distinctly  British.  Attention  was  also  called  to  the  importance  of 
retaining  Bass  Island  in  Lake  Erie  and  the  best  channel  between 
Lake  Erie  and  Detroit,  namely,  that  between  Sandusky  and  Cun 
ningham  Islands.  Barclay  received  another  set  of  instructions 
from  Castlereagh,  which  requested  him  to  carry  into  effect  as  far 
as  possible  certain  objects  recommended  by  Commodore  Owen. 
Among  these  were  that  he  should,  for  military  reasons,  secure 
Picquet  Island  in  the  St.  Lawrence,  Navy  Island,  and  Bois  Blanc ; 
but  if  Navy  Island  were  secured,  Grand  Island  need  not  be  re 
quired.301 

In  defense  of  his  part  in  the  Utica  Convention  Barclay  therefore 
presented  these  instructions  saying  that  he  had  followed  them  as 
closely  as  possible,  had  obtained  most  of  the  essentially  strategic 
points,  and  had  received  more  than  his  due  share  of  landed  terri 
tory.  He  had  received  Navy  Island  but  had  surrendered  Grand 
Island,  Niagara,  for  both  positive  and  negative  reasons.  In  regard 
to  Bass  Island  both  by  channel  line  and  by  line  equally  distant 
inter  ripas  it  belonged  to  the  United  States.  Then,  as  if  to  divert 
attention  from  Barnhart  Island,  Barclay  referred  to  his  having 
obtained  Grand  Island  lying  off  Kingston,  one  intersected  by  the 
middle  line  but  unmentioned  by  Owen,  a  very  large  one  containing 
some  31,283  acres,  and  very  important  because  of  its  proximity  to 
the  Kingston  dockyards.  Thompson,  the  British  surveyor,  who  by 
the  way  seems  to  have  been  a  good  friend  of  the  British  commissioner 
though  a  rather  unreliable  surveyor  as  far  as  his  knowledge  of 
the  channels  on  either  side  of  Barnhart's  Island  was  concerned, 
eulogized  Barclay  for  his  success  in  getting  this  island.  "No  one 
looked  for  it,"  he  wrote  to  Barclay,  "at  least  for  more  than  part 
of  it.  It  was  far  more  than  Barrie  expected  and  gentlemen  of 
the  navy  and  army  and  merchants  give  you  praise."  303  Barclay 
pleaded  also  that  of  the  islands  intersected  by  the  middle  line, 


301Barclay  to  Canning,  C.  A.  Q.  177,  p.  20,  ff. 
MSIbid. 

91 


42,029  acres  fell  upon  the  American  side  and  only  31,054  fell  upon 
the  Canadian  side.  Nevertheless,  of  the  total  73,083  acres,  Canada 
had  received  34,500  acres  or  3,446  acres  more  than  her  legitimate 
share. 

Barclay  also  emphasized  the  importance  of  possessing  Bois  Blanc. 
He  said,  "In  addition  to  the  sentiments  of  Sir  E.  Owen,  to  general 
opinion  and  to  my  own  observation,  through  Mr.  Hale,  His  Maj 
esty's  agent  to  the  commission,  I  had  learned  in  what  estimation 
Earl  Dalhousie  held  this  island.  It  was  considered  the  most  im 
portant  on  the  whole  line."  30*  In  obtaining  Bois  Blanc  for  Canada 
Barclay  certainly  won  the  control  of  the  main  channel  at  this  point, 
but  the  "middle  line"  principle  would  also  have  given  him  this 
island. 

It  is  rather  curious  to  see  how  the  general  rules  were  set  aside 
or  shifted  from  "middle  line"  to  "main  channel."  When  Barnhart's 
Island  or  Bois  Blanc  was  under  consideration  the  main  channel 
seemed  to  be  the  determining  factor,  yet  we  are  told  the  rules  were 
to  follow  the  middle  line.  In  order  to  obtain  Bois  Blanc  Barclay 
said  that  it  became  "absolutely  necessary  to  forsake  the  rule  of  a 
channel  line  in  order  to  preserve  His  Majesty's  interests."  Barclay 
mentions  channel  line  here  perhaps  because  he  allowed  the  channel 
line  as  well  as  the  middle  line  to  be  forsaken  at  Barnhart's,  but  he 
says  the  Americans  "had  lost  so  many  valuable  islands  by  having 
abandoned  the  channel  line  that  they  would  not  allow  another  loss 
to  occur  to  them  *  *  *  by  the  occasional  adoption  of  it."  305 
The  British  commissioners'  argument  of  the  "occasional  adoption" 
of  the  channel  line  in  reference  to  Barnhart's  seems  to  be  purely 
specious.  He  might  better  have  come  out  boldly  and  stated  that  he 
was  dealing  with  a  shrewd  bargainer  and  that  the  decision  was 
purely  the  result  of  higgling  in  the  market.  The  Americans  it 
seems  were  more  anxious  for  the  control  of  the  channels  and  par 
ticularly  of  the  more  important  one  in  the  St.  Lawrence  than  they 
were  for  the  mere  possession  of  one  half  of  the  intersected  islands. 
Barclay  further  defended  his  action  in  regard  to  Barnhart's  Island 
by  referring  to  Mr.  Hale,  Mr.  Ogilvie  and  others  in  good  standing 
who  approved  of  the  decision ;  secondly,  by  showing  that  Canada 
already  had  more  than  its  share  of  the  acreage  of  islands  cut  by 
the  "middle  line;"  thirdly,  by  trying  to  prove  from  impressions 
derived  from  his  surveyor,  Mr.  Thompson,  that  neither  the  channel 


304Ibid. 

92 


on  the  Canadian  side  nor  the  channel  on  the  American  side  was 
entirely  satisfactory ;  that  a  canal  would  be  necessary  and  that  this 
canal  could  be  built  more  easily  on  the  Canadian  side.  The  advan 
tages  in  the  channel,  natural  and  artificial,  seemed  to  be  balanced. 
His  fourth  and  most  weighty  argument  was  that  there  was  no 
need  to  be  alarmed.  The  United  States  Commissioner  nor  no  other 
person,  he  said,  had  ever  given  the  least  suggestion  of  any  intended 
obstruction  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  Mr. 
Porter  had  even  desired  to  insert  a  declaration  that  their  decision 
had  been  made  on  that  express  understanding.306  The  British  Com 
missioner  could  thus  find  no  serious  objections  in  the  surrender 
of  the  island.  He  insinuated  that  the  leaders  among  those  who 
had  now  complained  were  a  group  of  smugglers  who  lived  on  the 
islands  and  who  feared  American  justice,  should  the  islands  fall 
into  the  possession  of  the  Americans. 

In  defending  himself  Barclay  also  mentioned  a  letter  from  Lord 
Londonderry  received  less  than  a  month  before  the  Utica  conven 
tion.308  This  letter  reveals  the  fact  that,  after  all,  the  ceding  of 
Barnhart's  Island  was  a  concession  to  the  Americans  based  on  no 
principle  except  this  that  it  was  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  fur 
ther  vexatious  delay  in  arriving  at  a  settlement  of  the  boundary 
up  to  Lake  Huron.  Barclay  himself  ultimately  admitted  this.  Had 
he  made  the  appropriation  of  Barnhart's  and  the  Long  Sault  Islands 
to  His  Majesty  a  sine  qua  non,  a  deadlock  between  the  commission 
ers,  would  have  ensued  and  the  friendly  power  to  which  reports 
must  have  been  referred  would  either  have  decided  the  respective 


^Barclay  would  not  allow  this  to  be  inserted  because  he  thought  he  had  no  author 
ity  to  do  so  but  he  told  Porter  that  he  considered  both  parties  entitled,  by  the  law  of  na 
tions,  to  the  free  navigation  of  all  the  waters  through  which  the  line  had  passed.  To 
support  this  theory  he  made  reference  to  the  treaty  concluded  at  London  in  1802  by 
Lord  Hawkesbury  and  Bufus  King,  representing  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
respectively,  which,  he  stated,  "manifests  the  opinion  that  the  fact  of  a  channel's 
being  bound  on  both  sides  by  land  of  one  nation  is  not  incompatible  with  the  free 
navigation  thereof  by  another  nation.1'  Barclay  is  here  referring  to  the  boundary 
line  through  the  St.  Croix  River.  Campo  Bello  Island  was  given  to  the  British  but 
the  main  channel  ran  between  it  and  the  British  side  of  the  river.  He  says  that  the 
ministers  do  not  add  that  there  shall  be  free  navigation  to  and  from  Campo  Bellp  Island. 
That  is  left  unnoticed  as  a  necessary  attendant  resulting  from  the  territorial  right 
and  secured  by  the  law  of  nations  as  positively  as  the  right  of  ingress,  egress,  and 
regress,  through  intervening  possessions  appertains  to  the  proprietor  of  an  estate 
under  the  common  law  of  England."  p.  118. 


e  letter  from  Lord  Londonderry  received  May  28,  1822,  reads  as  follows: 
"Nor  is  it  easy  for  us  to  understand  upon  what  equitable  principle  the  American 
Commissioner,  after  allowing  upon  every  other  point  the  equi-distant  admeasurement 
of  the  central  line  from  main  shore  to  main  shore  can  now  make  up  his  mind  wholly 
to  break  off  from  that  principle  with  respect  to  these  three  islands.  His  Lordship's 
dispatch  concluded  with  the  instructions  to  immediately  conclude  the  boundary  as  it 
had  been  provisionally  agreed  upon  by  the  commissioners,  on  condition  that  the 
American  commissioner  should  yield  all  claims  of  Bois  Blanc  upon  receiving  renun 
ciation  of  His  Majesty's  claim  to  the  other  three  islands  mentioned  in  His  Lordship's 
letter."  C.  A.  Q.  177,  p.  20  ff. 

93 


rights  as  they  at  present  stand,  he  thought,  or  would  have  given 
Bois  Blanc,  Lake  St.  Clair,  or  Grand  Island,  Niagara  River,  in 
recompense.309 

In  regard  to  Bois  Blanc  it  is  true  that  the  United  States  had 
been  very  anxious  to  obtain  it.  In  1817  a  British  admiral  had 
stated  that  one  of  the  main  objects  of  the  American  clamor  was 
to  maintain  a  claim  to  it.  Close  beside  Bois  Blanc  there  are  three 
other  islands,  namely,  Sugar,  Fox,  and  Stony,  which  are  clearly 
within  British  limits  on  the  middle  line  principle  but  which  were 
awarded  to  the  United  States  apparently  without  any  serious  strug- 
gle. 

Although  the  controversy  over  Barnhart's  Island  had  waxed 
warm,  Bathurst  refused  to  break  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  by  reconsid 
ering  the  matter  and  so  the  boundaries  remained  fixed  up  to  the 
headwaters  of  Lake  Huron.  Here  the  boundary  commissioners 
failed  to  agree  upon  the  ownership  of  the  Neebish  Islands.  Barclay 
insisted  that  two  of  the  Islands  including  the  main  channel  should 
go  to  the  British  and  the  third  island  to  the  United  States,  and 
refused  to  yield  his  point  unless  direct  orders  came  from  his  home 
government.310  As  one  looks  at  the  official  maps,  one  cannot  won 
der  at  Barclay's  stand  upon  this  question.  It  is  surprisingly  strange 
that  "that  most  incompetent  diplomatist,"311  Lord  Ashburton, 
twenty  years  later  should  have  submitted  to  the  American  demands. 
Such  sacrifice  was  not  necessary  on  Ashburton's  part.  Barclay 
had  already  shown  more  generosity  than  business  ability  and  per 
haps  in  no  case  more  than  in  this  very  neighborhood,  when  he 
allowed  the  boundary  line  to  pass  to  the  north  and  east  of  Drum- 
mond  Island.  This  island  had  always  been  regarded  hitherto  as 
indisputably  British  territory.312  The  British  garrisons  at  the  close 
of  the  war  were  withdrawn  there,  remained  there  and  no  objections 
had  come  from  the  American  government  that  they  were  still  upon 
United  States  territory.  The  old  "Detour"  to  the  west  and  south 
of  this  island  had  always  hitherto  been  considered  the  boundary 
line.  Nevertheless,  before  the  Utica  Convention  Barclay  had  de 
cided  to  give  up  this  island  for  the  sake  of  peaceful  settlement. 

When  Barclay  and  Porter  disagreed  upon  the  question  of  the 
Neebish  Islands  nothing  further  was  then  done  in  regard  to  the 


808Barclay  to  Canning,  Feb.  27,   1826,  C.  A.  Q.   177,  p.  20  ft*. 
810Barclay  to  Canning,  Feb.  27,  1826,  C.  A.  Q.  177,  p.  19. 
811Kingsford,    vol.  IX.,  p.   272. 

siaDrummond  to  Bathurst,  Aug.  27,   1815,  C.  A.  jQ.   133,   81. 

94 


boundary  farther  west  than  this  point.  From  Lake  Superior  west 
ward  the  only  British  then  greatly  interested  in  the  boundary  line 
were  the  members  of  the  trading  companies.  These  feared  lest  a 
foreign  power  should  get  possession  of  the  portages  and  other 
means  of  communication  whereby  their  merchandise  passed  from 
the  west  to  the  east.  The  Hudson  Bay  Company,  therefore,  ap 
pealed  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  to  have  their  interests  re 
spected.313  But  during  all  these  years  that  Barclay  or  others  were 
working  upon  the  boundary  settlement,  the  British  Foreign  Office, 
the  British  Parliament,  and  the  British  press  seemed  to  have  been 
almost  ignorant  of  or  indifferent  to  the  importance  of  the  whole 
matter.  Yet  they  appointed  commissioners  to  deal  with  a  people, 
alert  "full  of  the  tradesmanlike  principle  and  singularly  bargaining 
and  pertinacious."  314  In  the  United  States  the  boundary  question 
was  mentioned  prominently  by  the  President  in  his  speech,  the  Con 
vention  of  Arbitration  was  laid  before  Congress,  confidence  was 
expressed  in  the  justice  and  evidence  of  their  case,  and  the  subject 
much  boasted  and  advocated  by  their  press.315  British  silence  and 
apparent  indifference  certainly  did  not  tend  to  advance  British  in 
terests.  In  vain,  did  Howard  Douglas  or  Charles  Vaughan  or  the 
Hudson  Bay  Company  and  others  try  to  arouse  the  lethargic  For 
eign  Office.316  The  British  can  blame  only  themselves  if  British 
statesmen  sometimes  found  it  "mortifying  to  find  that  Great  Britain 
(had)  been  somewhat  outwitted."  317 

The  demand  for  the  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  although 
discussed  by  Barclay  and  Porter  in  the  Utica  convention  became 
conspicuous  for  the  first  time  during  the  early  summer  of  1823. 
In  his  December  message  to  Congress  Monroe  expressed  the  hope 
that  "the  just  claim  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  would  be 
satisfactorily  arranged."  The  concessions  already  made  to  Porter 
by  the  British  Boundary  Commissioner  doubtless  prompted  Rush, 
Adams,  and  Monroe  to  seek  for  further  concessions.  Northwest 
ern  produce  wanted  an  outlet  to  the  sea.  The  acts  of  the  British 
Parliament  of  June  24  and  Aug.  5,  1822,  had  stimulated  discussion 
within  the  United  States.  By  giving  the  Colonial  government  in 
Canada  discretionary  power  to  except  any  of  the  Canadian  ports 
from  those  to  which  American  vessels  were  made  admissible  it 


813C.   A.   Q.   169,   202   and  39  ff. 

314Vaughan  to  Hay,   Jan.   25,   1830,   C.   A.   Q.   195A,   p.  297. 

315Douglas  to  Hay,  May  16,   1830,  C.  A.  Q.  195A,  p.  112. 

31«Vaughan  to  Hay,  Jan.  25,  1830,  C.  A.  Q.  195A,  p.  297. 

317Ibid. 

95 


followed  that  the  enjoyment  of  the  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
River  was  rendered  contingent  upon  British  permission.  This  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  would  not  recognize.  Certain  regu 
lations  regarding  timber  had  already  practically  prohibited  free 
navigation  to  the  United  States  vessels.318 

When  the  news  of  the  American  demand  had  reached  the  Leg 
islative  Council  of  Lower  Canada  most  dire  apprehensions  were 
aroused.  They  knew  that  if  the  war  of  1814  had  been  continued 
the  enemy  had  intended  to  interrupt  the  water  communication  to 
Lower  Canada.319  To  comply  now  with  the  American  claims  might 
facilitate  such  an  action  in  the  contingency  of  future  struggles. 
In  their  extreme  anxiety  for  the  welfare  of  the  people  whom  they 
represented,  the  Legislative  Council  of  Lower  Canada  formulated 
an  address — in  which  for  petty,  spiteful  reasons  the  Legislative 
Assembly  did  not  join — to  be  sent  to  Governor  Dalhousie.  This 
address  declared  that  such  a  claim  was  contrary  to  the  Established 
and  recognized  law  of  nations  and  expressed  the  hope  that  innova 
tions  upon  those  laws  by  so  ambitious  a  neighbor  would  not  be 
allowed.  If  allowed,  the  effect  would  be  to  weaken  the  intimate 
connection  and  dependence  upon  the  parent  state;  it  would  tend 
to  systematize  contraband  trade  and  the  evasions  of  laws  and  be 
pernicious  in  other  respects.  The  Legislative  Council  also  hoped 
that  Great  Britain  would  take  this  occasion  to  secure  by  negotia 
tion  the  reciprocal  right  or  exercise  of  navigation  during  peace  of 
the  several  channels  of  the  St.  Lawrence  south  of  45  degrees,  no 
matter  in  whatsoever  territory  this  channel  might  happen  to  be.320 
Dalhousie  heartily  agreed  with  the  sentiments  expressed  in  this 
memorial  and  earnestly  recommended  it  to  the  consideration  of  the 
Colonial  Office.321 

While  these  and  other  residents  in  Canada  might  thus  impotently 
express  opinions,  the  power  to  act  lay  with  those  in  London  and 
between  this  city  and  Washington  diplomatic  correspondence  began 
which,  strangely  enough,  contrary  to  the  British  custom  of  making 
concessions  rather  than  of  standing  firm,  did  not  follow  the  course 
Monroe  had  hoped  it  would.  Rush  tried  at  first  to  get  an  agree 
ment  concluded  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  for 


318Rush  to  Adams,  August  12,   1824,  'C.  A.  Q.,   185,  p.  50,  if. 
319Robinson   to  Bathurst,   July  29,    1815,   C.   A.  jQ.    185,   p.    50'  ff. 
320Address  from  Legislative  Council  of  Lower  Canada,  February  7,   1824,    C.   A.  Q. 
166,  26. 

321March    10,    1824,    C.    A.  Q.    168,    70. 

96 


the  free  navigation  of  the  river,  subject  to  such  fair  tolls  as  might 
be  mutually  agreed  upon,  together  with  the  privilege  of  stopping 
at  certain  points  along  the  river  if  desirable.    These  privileges  Rush 
urged  as  a  right.    To  support  his  demand  Rush  argued  the  analogy 
of  the   Mississippi  River  which   the  British  had   freely  navigated 
and  where  they  used  New  Orleans  as  a  stopping  place  although  as 
a  matter  of  fact  they  had  no  treaty  right  to  do  so.     He  thought 
that  his  claim  was  well  established  by  the  law  of  nations,  for  up 
to  this  time  it  had  been  tacitly  conceded.     Using  the  arguments  of 
Adams,  he  declared  that  the  exclusive  right  of  jurisdiction  over  a 
river  originates  in  the  social  contract  and  is  a  right  of  sovereignty.! 
The  right  of  navigating  the  river  is  a  right  of  nature,  preceding  it 
in  point  of  time,  which  the  sovereign  right  of  one  nation  cannot 
annihilate  since  it  belongs  to  the  people  of  another.     He  declared 
that  the  practice  had  been  substantially  recognized  by  all  the  parties 
to  the  European  Alliance  and  particularly  by  Great  Britain  at  the 
negotiation  of  the   Vienna   Congress   treaties   which   declared   the 
navigation  of  the  Rhine,  the  Neckar,  the  Main,  the  Moselle,  the 
Meese,  and  the  Scheldt,  free  to  all  nations.322     Another  argument 
used  by  Rush  was  that  United  States  colonists  had  helped  Great 
Britain  to  win  the  St.  Lawrence  and  therefore  they  had  a  strong 
natural  right  of  free  use.     The  United  States  on  its  part  would, 
as  a  matter  of  right,  grant  British  subjects  the  privilege  of  navi 
gating  the  Columbia  River  if  it  were  navigable  in  British  territory. 
However  well  disposed  the  British  statesmen  were  to  treat  the 
question  as  one  of  mutual  convenience,  they  wouldn't  consider  it 
at  all  as  a  question  of  right.    The  St.  Lawrence  River  ran  for  600 
miles  entirely  through  British  territory.     The  American  claim  of 
right,  they  maintained,  precluded  all  considerations  of  good  neigh 
borhood   and   mutual   accommodations.     They   quoted   Vattel   and 
Grotius  in  regard  to  the  natural  right  or  law  of  nature  theory  to 
disprove  the  American  argument.     If  the  United  States  meant  to 
insist  on  such  demands,  that  country  must  be  prepared  to  apply 
by  reciprocity  the  same  principle  to  its  own  rivers.     This,  the  Brit 
ish  argued,  would  mean  that  Great  Britain  might  navigate  even 
the  Mississippi  River  since  there  was  only  a  short  portage  by  land 
between  British  possessions  and  the  headwaters  of  that  river.     The 
same  general  principle  would  admit  British  vessels  to  ascend  all 
the  navigable  rivers  of  the  United  States  and  would  lead  to  extraor- 


322Rush  to  Adams,  August  12,  1824,  C.  A.  Q.  p.  50  ff  and 

97 


dinary  and  unheard-of  demands;  it  would  allow  foreigners  into 
the  bosom  of  every  country.  Referring  to  the  treaties  of  Paris 
in  1814,  and  Vienna,  1815,  the  British  plenipotentiaries  said  that 
neither  in  the  general  nor  in  the  special  stipulations  relating  to  the 
free  navigation  of  rivers  was  there  anything  to  countenance  the 
principle  of  a  natural  independent  right  as  asserted  by  Mr.  Rush. 
The  Rhine  only  was  thrown  open  to  general  navigation  by  the 
Paris  treaty,  and  here  it  was  natural  for  France,  in  giving  up  terri 
tory  on  the  banks  of  the  river  to  stipulate  for  a  reserve  of  navigation. 
In  case  of  the  Vienna  treaty  the  powers  engaged  to  regulate  by 
common  consent  and  closed  saying  that  no  change  should  be  made 
except  with  the  consent  of  all  the  powers  bordering  on  the  same 
river.  The  powers,  therefore,  recognized  what  was  due  to  sov 
ereignty  and  what  was  due  to  voluntary  compact.  They  challenged 
the  American  government  to  present  a  single  instance  in  which 
the  liberty  claimed  by  the  United  States  was  exercised  explicitly 
as  a  natural  independent  right.  In  the  case  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
France  in  1763  gave  up  the  exclusive  navigation  of  it  and  the 
fact  of  stipulating  for  free  navigation  would  lead  irresistibly  to 
the  very  reverse  of  what  was  maintained  by  Mr.  Rush.  The  agree 
ment  later  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  for  the  navigation 
of  the  river  would  support  the  same  argument.  Great  Britain  was 
ready  to  meet  the  claims  of  justice  or  even  friendship  but  colonial 
policy,  commercial  and  national  interests  precluded  such  a  prepos 
terous  demand.323 

While  Great  Britain  did  stand  firm  during  the  negotiations  of 
1824  to  1827  the  merchants  of  Quebec  as  late  as  1833  had  so  little 
confidence  in  the  stability  of  the  British  plenipotentiaries  that  they 
again  transmitted  memorials  pleading  that  the  concessions  asked 
for  in  1824  be  not  granted  to  the  American  seamen.324 


323British  paper   on   the  navigation  of  the   St.   Lawrence,   24th   Protocol   C.   A.   Q. 

185,  p.   164. 

3*March  29,  1833,  C.  A.  Q.  311,  p.  365. 


98 


X. 

COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS. 

Although  many  things  of  greater  or  less  importance  tended  to 
militate  against  the  permanence  of  the  peace  agreed  to  in  1614, 
there  was  at  least  one  band  of  union  that  in  itself  went  a  long  way 
towards  fostering  the  continuance  of  peaceful  relations.  The  peo 
ple  of  both  the  northern  states  and  the  provinces  of  Canada  were 
knit  together  commercially.  The  absence  of  railroads  and  canals, 
a  similar  absence  of  good  country  roads,  and  the  consequent  ex 
pense  of  overland  transportation  induced  the  states  bordering  on 
Canada  to  export  freely  their  grain,  timber,  pot  and  pearl  ashes, 
cattle,  and  horses,  via  the  only  natural  outlets,  Lake  Ontario,  Lake 
Champlain,  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River.330 

American  trade  was  directed  towards  the  Canadas  during  the 
years  of  Jefferson's  embargo  and  routes  then  opened  by  smugglers 
were  not  closed  when  the  embargo  was  lifted.  In  fact  all  through 
and  after  the  war  American  trade  still  flowed  northward  in  in 
creasing  quantities.331  There  was  the  greater  incentive  to  take 
advantage  of  the  northern  route  because  English  goods  came  into 
Canada  almost  entirely  free  from  duty  and  could  be  purchased 
much  more  cheaply  on  the  St.  Lawrence  than  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Hudson. 

The  eighty  thousand  settlers  in  Upper  Canada  in  1815,  and  the 
two  hundred  thousand  in  Lower  Canada  found  it  as  advantageous 
to  trade  with  the  United  States  as  the  Americans  did  to  trade 
with  or  through  the  Canadas.  The  United  States  could  more 
cheaply  and  more  readily  than  England  supply  the  Canadians  with 
many  of  the  necessities  and  simple  luxuries  for  home  and  farm — 
horses,  cattle,  tea,  tobacco,  and  such  things.  As  a  British  colony, 


33°McMaster  III,   p.   464. 

331McMaster  III,  p.  460  ff. — By  1812  the  produce  of  Vermont  as  far  south  as 
Middlebury  and  of  every  county  of  Northern  New  York  from  Essex  and  Clinton  on 
Lake  Champlain  to  Niagara  was  gathered  at  Montreal  and  iQuebec.  The  Gazettes  of 
Albany  contained  many  advertisements  of  rates  of  transportation.  A  barrel  of  flour 
could  be  carried  from  Ogdensbury  to  Montreal  for  88  cents;  from  Buffalo  for  $1.50. 
Even  during  the  war  the  illicit  trade  flourished  briskly.  "In  fact,  my  lord,"  wrote 
Prevost  to  Bathurst,  "two-thirds  of  the  army  in  Canada  are  at  this  moment  eating 
beef  provided  by  American  contractors  drawn  principally  from  the  states  of  Vermont 
and  New  York."  Prevost  to  Bathurst,  August  27,  1814.  "Like  herds  of  buffaloes," 
said  Izard,  "they  pressed  through  the  forests  making  paths  for  themselves.  Were  it 
not  for  these  supplies  the  British  forces  in  Canada  would  soon  be  suffering  from  famine 
or  their  government  be  subject  to  enormous  expense  for  their  maintenance."  Izard 
to  Armstrong,  July  31,  1814,  McMaster  IV.  p.  66.  And  see  Niles  Reg.  Vol.  9,  p.  43. 


however,  the  Canadas  must  have  their  trade  relations  defined  and 
dictated  by  the  wisdom  or  interests  of  the  British  Colonial  Office. 
When  peace  was  proclaimed  commercial  intercourse  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  was  reestablished  as  it  had  existed 
previous  to  the  war  although  both  Americans  and  Canadians  were 
anxious  for  a  freer  intercourse. 

Thus  it  was  that  immediately  after  the  Peace  the  United  States 
sent  representatives  to  England  to  obtain  further  commercial  privi 
leges.  The  convention  of  July  3,  1815,  was  the  result  of  these 
negotiations.  By  this  American  ships  were  allowed  to  carry  articles, 
the  growth,  produce,  or  manufacture  of  the  United  States,  into 
any  of  the  European  territories  of  his  Britannic  Majesty,  subject 
to  no  higher  duty  than  was  demanded  from  British  ships  carrying 
like  articles,  and  reciprocal  terms  were  granted  to  British  ships 
entering  United  States  ports.  The  United  States  were  also  granted 
privileges  of  direct  trade  with  British  possessions  in  the  East  Indies 
and  India,  but  it  was  distinctly  stated  that  the  intercourse  between 
the  United  States  and  British  possessions  of  the  West  Indies  and 
on  the  continent  of  North  America  should  not  be  affected  by  any 
of  the  provisions  of  that  convention. 

In  respect  to  Canada  and  the  West  Indies  therefore,  the  old 
colonial  system  remained  in  full  force.  British  colonies  in  the  West 
had  been  discriminated  against  to  foster,  as  it  was  hoped,  British 
manufacturing,  British  shipping,  and  an  imperial  merchant-marine 
for  the  supply  of  recruits  for  the  British  navy.  This  discrimina 
tion  against  Canada  was  due  to  the  influence  of  the  British  mer 
chant.  A  month  before  this  convention,  a  committee  of  merchants 
interviewed  Bathurst  trying  to  prevent  any  commercial  treaty. 
They  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  safest  policy  was  to  leave 
trade  with  the  United  States  to  local  regulations.  From  the  mer 
chants'  standpoint  this  was  desirable,  perhaps,  because  British  mer 
chants  had  a  predominating  influence  in  the  provincial  legislatures. 
If  a  treaty  were  entered  into  the  merchants  insisted  that  United 
States  vessels  should  be  prohibited  from  the  ports  of  British  North 
America.332  This  they  claimed  would  be  the  only  means  of  pre 
venting  the  introduction  of  tea  or  Chinese  manufactures  and  East 
Indian  goods  as  well  as  foreign  European  wares  into  His  Majesty's 
colonies,  to  the  great  injury  of  the  trade  and  manufactures  of  Eng 
land. 


332C.   A.   Q.   156,   p.    172;    162,   p.   258;    170,   p.   710;    134,   p.   394. 

100 


The  convention  of  July  3,  1815,  seems  to  have  been  framed  ac 
cording  to  the  wishes  of  these  merchants,  though  Huskisson  at 
this  very  time  in  the  British  Parliament  pointed  out  the  need  of 
more  liberal  treatment  of  the  colonies.  He  noticed  how  the  "long 
established  custom  of  entire  and  rigid  exclusion  of  *  *  *  col 
onies  from  all  commercial  intercourse  except  with  the  mother 
country"  was  already  breaking  down  in  Portugal  and  Spain  and 
their  colonies  were  benefiting  thereby.  "I  am  prepared,"  said  he, 
"to  open  the  commerce  of  all  colonies  to  all  friendly  states." 333 
Baring,  Bright,  Burdett  and  others  also  stood  for  a  more  liberal 
policy  but  the  colonies  were  not  yet  to  obtain  the  legislation  best 
adapted  for  their  progress. 

While  the  mother  country  was  making  regulations  for  the  trade 
of  her  Canadian  and  other  colonies,  the  Canadians  themselves  were 
making  commercial  rules  with  only  a  partial  regard  for  imperial 
politics.  These  colonists  had  little  scruples  against  breaking  up 
the  time-honored  colonial  system.  By  an  act  of  the  Lower  Cana 
dian  Parliament  the  Canadian  governor  and  his  executive  council 
were  given  complete  control  of  trade  by  land  and  inland  navigation 
until  the  local  parliament  should  reassemble.  Therefore,  on  May 
29,  1815,  Drummond,  by  proclamation,  established  temporary  inter 
course  between  Lower  Canada  and  the  United  States,  specified 
the  tariff  and  other  conditions  under  which  the  trade  was  to  be 
conducted,  and  declared  St.  John  on  the  Richelieu  and  Coteau  dn 
Lac  on  the  St.  Lawrence — and  such  other  places  as  should  be  an 
nounced  later — the  sole  ports  of  entry.334  Ocean  navigation,  of 
course,  continued  to  be  closed  against  American  vessels  but  inland 
trade  was  now  practically  unhampered  except  for  the  small  tariff 
duties. 

When  news  of  this  proclamation  reached  England  the  committee 
of  the  Council  for  Trade  by  way  of  experiment  sanctioned  the 
arrangements  made  by  Drummond.  The  relations  of  Canada  with 
the  United  States  were  becoming  so  important  that  the  committee 
thought  it  best  to  cooperate  with  the  secretary  of  state  and  the 
colonial  legislature  in  forming  such  permanent  arrangements  as 
might  seem  best  suited  for  carrying  on  the  intercourse  and  pro 
moting  the  highest  interests  of  the  Canadas.335 


333Huskisson,    Speech    on    Colonial    Policy,    March    21,    1815,    Hansard    II    Series 
Vol.    12,    p.    1099. 

334C.   A.   Q.    132,   p   154  and    191. 

336Chetwynd  to  Goulbourne,  Nov.,   1815,  C.  A.  Q.  134,  93. 

101 


Drummond's  temporary  arrangements  were  due  to  expire  April, 
1816,  and  as  no  permanent  regulations  had  been  made  he  again 
submitted  the  matter  to  his  executive  council  in  March,  1816.  As 
a  result  a  new  proclamation  was  issued  stating  that  "original  laws" 
were  to  be  enforced.  These  laws,  as  announced  by  Drummond, 
were  that  certain  enumerated  articles  might  be  imported  from  the 
United  States  through  the  ports  of  Coteau  du  Lac,  Chateauguay 
and  St.  John ;  the  enumerated  articles  included  timber  and  its 
products — planks,  hoops,  shingles,  clapboards,  tar,  turpentine,  etc. 
; — pot  and  pearl  ashes,  seeds  and  grains,  domestic  animals,  butter, 
cheese,  fresh  fish,  and  "whatsoever  is  the  growth  of  the  United 
States  ;"  gold  and  silver  coin  or  bullion,  and  wampum.  Rum,  spirits, 
copper  coin,  and  all  other  goods,  wares,  and  merchandise  not  enu 
merated,  that  is,  practically  all  manufactured  goods  and  all  goods, 
the  growth  or  produce  of  any  country  other  than  the  United  States 
could  not  enter  Canada  by  way  of  land  or  inland  navigation.337 

Just  previous  to  this  proclamation,   Drummond  had  received  a 
report  from  a  committee  of  his  executive  council  stating  that  ac 
cording  to  the  laws  which  had  been  suspended  in  1815,  no  goods 
could  be  imported  or  exported  by  American  subjects  or  aliens  of 
any  description,  and  all  imports  by  water  must  be  made  in  British 
ships.     Drummond  apparently  did  not  care  to  exclude  Americans 
•  from  participating  in  the  trade,   for  he  did  not  call   attention  to 
Uhis   in   his   proclamation.      He   did,   however,   incorporate    within 
his  proclamation  a  very  significant  suggestion  of  the  committee  of 
his  executive  council.     The  committee  had  said,  "Inasmuch  as  it 

appears that   flour,   Indian   meal,   pork,   and   beef,   fresh 

and  salted,  are  not  allowed  to  be  imported  from  the  United  States 
and  consequently  are  prohibited,  the  committee,  after  due  delibera 
tion,  humbly  submit  the  following  considerations ;  that  it  being  a 
matter  of  public  notoriety  that  the  government  of  the  American 
states  are  using  every  possible  endeavor  to  divert  the  exportation 
of  the  produce  of  those  parts  of  the  said  states  bordering  upon  the 
Canadas  from  their  natural  outlet  by  the  waters  of  the  St.  Lawrence 

and  to  turn  the  transport  thereof  to  the  Atlantic  ports 

the  committee  recommends  Drummond  because  of  harm 

this  would  do  to  British  shipping  and  because  of  distress  that  would 
come  to  people  in  Quebec  from  failure  of  the  harvest  this  year, 
to  give  private  instructions  to  the  respective  collectors  at  the  ports 


337C.   A.   &.    136,    p.    127. 

102 


to  admit  duty  free  any  of  the  articles  of  flour,  etc.,  so  prohibited 
as  aforesaid."338  Drummond  accordingly  announced  that  the  reg 
ular  legal  duties  would  be  levied  on  all  imports  except  those  via 
Upper  Canada  and  except  on  salted  beef  and  pork,  salt  fish,  fish 
oil,  flour,  wheat,  peas,  furs,  and  skins.  These  instructions  were 
sent  privately  to  collectors  of  customs. 

This  remission  of  duties  was  a  policy  purely  of  expediency  and 
discretion  and  not  only  without  the  sanction  of  imperial  authority 
but  in  direct  opposition  to  existing  imperial  statutes.  Bathurst 
objected  to  Drummond's  proclamation  in  this  respect,  and  when 
Sherbrooke  replaced  Drummond  during  the  summer  of  1816,  the 
private  instructions  to  the  provincial  collectors  were  recalled.  How 
ever,  a  discretionary  power  was  still  left  in  the  hands  of  the 
Governor  and  when  informed  of  the  scarcity  of  flour  in  the  prov 
ince  and  the  prospects  of  a  bad  harvest,  Sherbrooke  issued  another 
proclamation  authorizing  the  importation  from  the  United  States 
during  the  period  of  six  months  of  grain,  flour,  live  stock,  and 
provisions  of  every  kind  free  of  duty.839 

Meanwhile  the  demand  for  freer  trade  and  for  permanent  reg 
ulations  with  the  United  States  became  more  persistent.  United 
States  importers  were  afraid  to  send  in  flour  lest  it  be  seized,340 
and  consequently  a  shortage  in  flour  still  continued.  Attempts  were  . 
made  to  persuade  the  local  governor  and  council  to  take  action.  It 
was  asserted  that  free  intercourse  between  Canada  and  the  United 
States  would  not  only  help  Canadians  but  would  aid  Newfoundland 
and  the  West  Indies,  for  their  merchants  could  then  buy  goods 
more  cheaply  in  a  Quebec  market.  The  inhabitants  of  Montreal 
resorting  to  the  customary  petition  pointed  out  that  ever  since  1796 
the  ordinance  prohibiting  the  importation  of  the  articles  referred 
to  above  had  been  successively  suspended  and  beneficially  to  the 
province  and  parent  states ;  the  province  often  needed  American 
produce ;  Americans  therefore  sent  this  produce  to  Montreal  and 
received  British  manufactures  in  exchange ;  these  American  goods 
re-exported  supplied  the  West  Indian  markets  and  gave  employment 
to  British  shipping.341 

A  bill  was  accordingly  framed  by  the  Lower  Canadian  Parliament     (/ 
and  submitted  to  Sherbrooke.     It  repealed  all  acts  and  ordinances 


3S8Report  of  Executive  Council  to  Di^mmond,  March  26,  1816,  C.  A.  Q.  136,  p.  139. 
339Sherbrooke    to    Bathurst,    Sept.,    1815,    C.    A.    Q.    137,    p.    169. 
340C.    A.    Q.    147,    p.    93. 
8"C.    A.   Q.    144,   p.   21    ff. 

103 


affecting  the  American  trade  and  substituted  a  general  enactment 
admitting  all  the  products  formerly  admitted  and  in  addition  flour, 
meal,  flaxseed,  hempseed,  pork  and  beef,  fresh  or  salted,  undressed 
hides,  and  skins,  cheese,  fruit,  gold  and  silver.342  Sherbrooke  re 
served  this  bill  for  the  royal  assent  because,  by  the  dispatch  of 
July,  1816,  Bathurst  had  forbidden  him  to  sanction  any  change  in 
trade  regulations.  But  Sherbrooke  had  his  own  personal  objec 
tion.343  The  bill  proposed  to  disestablish  the  border  custom  houses. 
This,  he  thought,  would  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  smuggling  trade. 
Then,  although  he  admitted  that  the  natural  outlet  for  the  enu 
merated  products  was  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  he  questioned 
whether  such  freedom  would  not  retard  the  agricultural  advance 
ment  of  the  province  and,  by  teaching  the  people  to  look  abroad 
for  supplies,  render  them  more  liable  than  ever,  especially  during 
a  period  of  unfavorable  relations  with  the  states  to  those  agricultural 
distresses  from  which  they  had  already  suffered  severely.  The 
imperial  committee  for  trade,  upon  receipt  of  this  bill,  acknowledged 
themselves  to  be  in  favor  of  freer  intercourse  but  agreed  with 
Sherbrooke  that  this  bill  should  not  be  accepted.344 

When  a  new  governor  came  out  in  1818  the  merchants  of  Quebec 
and  Montreal  and  others  interested  in  the  prosperity  of  the  province 
presented  a  memorial  to  the  new  governor,  Richmond,  who  for 
warded  it  to  Bathurst.  This  memorial  gives  us  a  good  resume  of 
the  feelings  and  wants  of  the  Canadian  merchants  in  1818.  It  stated 
that  subsequent  to  the  Treaty  of  1794  the  inland  trade  between  the 
Canadas  and  the  United  States  had  been  placed  on  a  footing  of 
nearly  perfect  freedom ;  that  this  freedom  had  subsequently  been 
restricted  by  prohibiting  the  importation  of  East  Indian  and  Euro 
pean  goods  by  way  of  the  United  States;  that  in  1816  an  old  act 
had  been  enforced  totally  inapplicable  to  present  conditions;  that 
Canadians  no  longer  enjoyed  dispensations  by  order  of  the  Gov- 
ernor-in-council  as  formerly;  that  since  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  the 
succession  of  fluctuating  and  contradictory  measures  had  been  very 
detrimental  to  commerce;  that  there  was  urgent  need  for  general 
and  permanent  regulations ;  and  that  now  since  the  expiration  of 
the  convention  of  1815  admitted  a  change,  permanent  regulations 
should  be  established  and  these  ought  to  permit  the  utmost  freedom 
in  importing  by  land  or  inland  navigation  all  articles  of  the  raw 


342C.    A.    Q.    144,    p.    21    ff.    and   eee   C.    A.    Q.    132,    p.    154. 
343Sherbrooke    to    Bathurst    May    20,    1817,    C.    A.   jQ.    144,    p.    21. 
344Lack   to  Goulbourn,   C.   A.   Q.    146,  p.    73. 

104 


produce  of  the  United  States  or  goods  in  the  first  stage  of  man 
ufacture.  Such  regulations,  it  was  said,  would  tend  equally  to  the 
encouragement  of  the  trade  of  the  province,  the  employment  of 
British  ships,  and  the  advancement  of  the  manufacturing  and  com 
mercial  interests  of  the  empire  at  large. 

The  memorialists  were  here  appealing  to  the  selfish  interests  of 
the  English  merchants,  manufacturers  and  seamen  in  order  to  break 
down  the  old  colonial  system  of  navigation  laws  and  other  restric 
tions.  But  they  ushered  in  other  arguments  to  bolster  up  their 
plea.  It  was  impossible,  they  said,  to  prevent  the  American  trade 
in  any  case  and  as  for  political  objections  there  were  fewer 
now  than  formerly  because  the  States  were  becoming  thickly 
populated  and  it  was  well  to  give  this  big  population  an  interest 
adverse  to  war — in  other  words  to  give  them  an  interest  in  a  trade 
which  would  be  cut  off  as  soon  as  hostilities  should  begin.345 

While  the  merchants  of  Quebec  were  thus  expressing  their  dis 
pleasure  with  the  existing  system,  their  American  kinsmen  were 
likewise  regretting  that  since  the  Peace  of  Ghent,  Great  Britain 
had  been  trying  to  enforce  the  colonial  system  with  unusual  vigor. 
A  report  in  Congress  declared  that  the  United  States  had  been  dis 
criminated  against,  that  American  vessels  and  property  were  ex 
cluded  from  colonies  where  other  vessels  were  at  times  admitted, 
and  that  as  far  as  Canada  was  concerned  it  was  believed  that  the 
greater  portion  of  the  apparent  Canadian  exports  of  bread  stuffs 
and  even  of  lumber  was  really  American  products  and  yet  all  must 
be  carried  by  British  vessels.346  Neither  Canada  nor  the  United 
States  was  satisfied  with  the  system,  nevertheless  on  April  20,  1818,  \  )  ^ 
the  convention  of  1815  was  simply  renewed  for  ten  years  longer 
and  direct  sea  trade  between  Quebec  and  the  United  States  was 
still  prohibited.347 

Richmond,  the  Governor  of  Canada,  at  this  time  was  sincerely 
in  earnest  in  trying  to  arrange  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the 
vexatious  trade  question,  but  he  was  uncompromisingly  a  British 
imperialist  and  little  inclined  to  give  local  authorities  much  real 
power.  He  wanted  the  imperial  Parliament  to  enact  such  legisla 
tion  as  would  provide  for  a  fixed  revenue  to  support  the  Canadian 
civil  list  without  the  need  of  annual  applications  to  the  provincial 


S45Petition  from  Merchants   C.    A.   Q.    149,   p.    142. 

^Annals  of  Congress,  H.  of  B.,  Feb.  9,  1818.  Report  of  Com.  on  For.  Relations  and 
Niles  Reg.    Apr.    11,    1818,    No.    14,   p.    113. 

347Hansard  II  Series  Vol.   39,  p.   996,  and  C.  A.   Q.   152,  p.  310  ff. 

105 


legislature.  By  a  permanent  trade  and  tariff  law  such  revenue 
could  be  received  and  the  pressing  demands  for  the  revision  of 
the  laws  regulating  American  intercourse  could  be  accomplished. 
He  feared,  too,  that  the  jealousy  and  caprice  of  both  the  Upper  and 
Lower  Canadians  and  the  successively  enacted  temporary  statutes 
or  administrative  proclamations  founded  on  the  ephemeral  needs 
of  the  moment  would  tend  to  unsettle  and  destroy  what  might 
legitimately  be  a  most  lucrative  and  growing  source  of  revenue. 
For  these  reasons  he  transmitted  for  the  approval  of  the  Colonial 
Office  a  copy  of  a  bill  framed  in  his  legislature  at  Quebec,  and 
drawn  largely  in  accordance  with  his  own  conceptions  of  what 
would  be  best.  One  of  its  main  objects  was  the  confining  of  the 
entire  trade  of  the  Great  Lake  regions  of  North  America  to  British 
bottoms.348 

Nearly  five  years  had  already  elapsed  since  the  close  of  the  war 
and  lower  Canada  had  had  only  a  series  of  shifting  and  temporary 
regulations.  It  had  not  enjoyed  any  direct  sea  communication 
with  the  United  States.  By  land  considerable  liberty  had  been  al 
lowed  and  much  more  illegally  taken.  Discontent  prevailed;  pop 
ulation  was  increasing  comparatively  slowly ;  the  demand  for  better 
commercial  arrangements  increased. 

Turning  to  Upper  Canada  we  shall  find  that  meanwhile  this 
province  has  had  somewhat  freer  communication  with  the  United 
States,  and  has  lived  a  commercial  life  almost  entirely  separate  and 
independent  from  that  of  its  sister  colony.349  One  feature  of  the 
commercial  activity  of  this  upper  province  was  the  traffic  with  In 
dians  residing  within  the  United  States.  Though  Congress  in  1816 
had  passed  an  act  forbidding  anyone  but  an  American  to  trade  with 
the  Indians,  the  act  appears  to  have  interfered  very  little  with  the 
transportation  of  goods  by  Canadian  adventurers.  The  Indians 
still  clung  to  the  British,  and  the  trading  posts  at  Amherstburg 
or  farther  west  still  received  large  consignments  of  furs  taken 
from  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  or  the  Mississippi  Valley.350 


3<8Richmond  to  Bathurst,    July   31,    1819,    C.   A.    Q.    152,   p.    313,    315. 

349Legislature  Journal   Upper  Canada,   Mar.    12,    1816,  p.   106.     Ontario  archives. 

350Sherbrooke  to  Gore,  Dec.  31,  1816,  C.  A.  Q.  322,  p.  120,  and  Gore  to  Bathurst, 
Feb.  3,  1817,  C.  A.  Q.  322,  p.  117,  p.  172. 

The  Indians  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  province  also  figured  slightly  in  com 
mercial  affairs.  Complaints  came  in  that  American  citizens  were  monopolizing  the 
Salmon  fisheries  on  the  Humber  and  Credit  Rivers  and  dispensing  ardent  spirits 
to  the  Indians.  Lieutenant-Governor  Gore  who  had  stilled  the  tumult  at  Amherstburg 
that  had  been  caused  by  the  Indian  murder  played  the  same  role  in  this  case. 
Sherbrooke  had  suggested  that  the  American  be  excluded  from  these  rivers  but 
Gore  replied  that  the  Salmon  fisheries  were  sufficrently  protected  from  abuse  and 
any  further  laws  might  appear  invidious.  He  then  resorted  to  the  more  pacific  ex 
pedient  of  removing  the  Indians. 

106 


In  regard  to  general  intercourse  between  Upper  Canada  and  the 
United  States  the  provincial  legislature  of  Upper  Canada  had 
since  1801  to  a  considerable  extent  assumed  and  exercised  the 
right  of  levying  duties  on  imports  and  making  other  regulations. 
These  laws  do  not  appear  to  have  been  disallowed  in  England  but 
rather  to  have  been  acted  upon  without  question.351  The  restric 
tions  in  matters  of  trade  and  tariff  imposed  upon  all  provincial 
legislatures  by  the  act  of  1791  seem  to  have  been  entirely  overlooked. 
The  British  Lords  of  Trade  were  either  poorly  informed  or  little 
interested  in  the  details  of  the  commercial  intercourse.352  The 
Upper  Canadians,  either  from  inattention  to  the  provisions  of  the 
navigation  laws  or  from  a  convenient  conviction  that  they  did  not 
apply  to  the  inland  navigation  of  the  waters  separating  the  Upper 
Province  from  the  United  States,  so  little  regarded  these  navigation 
laws  that  vessels  owned  and  manned  by  subjects  of  the  United 
States  were  permitted  without  the  least  interruption  to  import  and 
export  goods  and  even  to  engage  in  the  carrying  trade  from  port 
to  port  along  the  Canadian  shores  in  the  same  manner  as  the  purely 
British  vessels.353  Of  the  eighty  schooners  employed  in  navigating 
Lake  Erie  not  more  than  ten  belonged  to  or  were  navigated  by  sub 
jects  of  His  Majesty.354  So  habituated  were  the  Upper  Canadians  to 
the  practice  and  so  well  did  it  harmonize  with  the  needs  and  desires  of 
the  colonists,  many  of  whom  had  been  fellow  countrymen  of  the 
transgressors,  that  when  in  1816  and  1817  one  or  two  of  these 
American  vessels  were  seized  for  violating  the  British  navigation 
laws  there  was  not  only  objection  to  the  seizures  but  a  general  sur 
prise  that  such  seizure  could  legally  have  been  made. 

As  in  Lower  Canada  it  had  been  customary  for  the  legislature 
to  delegate  to  the  Lieutenant  Governor-in-Council  its  real  or  as 
sumed  power  of  regulating  trade,  so  in  Upper  Canada  in  the  spring 
of  1816,  on  the  failure  of  the  legislature  to  act,  Gore  took  advan 
tage  of  a  similar  privilege  and  issued  an  order-in-council  establish 
ing  trade  regulations  and  fixing  a  schedule  of  duties  for  the  year 


^Attorney-General   Robinson's    opinion,    Nov.,    1818,    C.    A.   |Q.    324,    p.    194,    nnd 
Maitland  to  Bathurst,   O.  A.  Q.   324,  p.  180. 
W2C.   A.   Q.   321,   p.   229. 
»3C.  A.  Q.  321,  p.  229  ff. 
""Maitland  to  Bathurst,   C.  A.   Q.   324,   p.   180. 


107 


ending  April,  iSi?.336  It  must  be  noticed  that  according  to  the 
schedule  of  1816  not  only  raw  materials  and  natural  products  of 
the  United  States,  but  some  manufactures  were  also  admitted,  the 
duty  ranging  from  about  twenty-two  to  thirty-five  per  cent.  The 
things  the  settler  needed  for  food  or  for  planting  and  working 
his  soil  were  admitted  free  of  duty  and  included  beef  and  pork. 
Furs  of  all  kinds  were  admitted  free  so  as  to  foster  the  Indian 
trade.  Extra  charges  were  put  upon  goods  brought  in  by  Amer 
ican  vessels  but  American  shipping  was  not  prohibited.356 

Meanwhile  a  petition  from  Kingston  merchants  revealed  the 
attitude  of  a  certain  clique  who  by  appealing  to  the  instinct  of 
patriotism,  fear,  fairness  to  Lower  Canada,  and  by  repeating  spe 
cious  economic  doctrines,  endeavored  to  induce  the  legislators  at 
York  to  favor  their  interests  rather  than  the  welfare  of  the  set 
tler.357  These  petitioners  regretted  that  the  carrying  trade  in  Upper 
Canada  was  done  by  United  States  vessels,  that  Lake  Ontario  was 
:  becoming  a  nursery  for  American  seamen,  that  American  goods 
which  would  have  to  pay  duty  in  Lower  Canada,  were  admitted 
into  Upper  Canada  duty  free,  that  by  such  laws  and  laxness  con 
traband  trade  was  increasing,  that  through  the  influx  of  American 


^Schedule   of .  duties  under  the   order-in-council,   Apr.    18,    1816: 


Ad  Val.     Specific 
Per  Cent 

Anchors     22 

Locks    and    hinges 22 

Beer,    etc.,   in   casks,   per  gal.  6d. 

Beer,   in  bottles Is. 

Books    35 

Carriage    35 

Cards,     playing     Is.  6d. 

Cards,  wool  or  cotton 5s.  3d. 

Candles,    tallow    2  l-2d. 

Candles,    wax     7  l-2d. 

Canes,     etc 35 

Cotton    goods     25 

Wool    and   Manu 35 

Cordage,    per   Ib 3  l-2d. 

Clothing    35 

Fish,    dried   per    quintal.  .  .  .  5s. 

Fish,     mackerel,    bbl 6s. 

Furs,     undressed     free 

Glass     30 


Ad   Val.      Specific 
Per  Cent 

5d. 

4d. 

7s.  6d. 

7s.  6d. 


Glue,     Ib 

Gunpowder,    Ib 

Hemp,    cwt 

Iron    

Lead     22 

Malt,    bu Is. 

Nails,   pd 2  l-2d. 

Salt,  bu Is. 

Paper     35 

Steel,    cwt 10s. 

Spirits,    from    molasses 3s.  9d. 

Spirits,  distilled  from  grain, 

per  gal 2^.  1-2  d.  to  3s.  94. 

Shoes    Is.  3d. 

Tobacco,  unmanu 4d. 

Tobacco,  manu 7d. 

Wearing  apparel  and  per 
sonal  baggage free 


All  other  goods  and  manufactures  of  the  growth  and  produce  of  the  United  States 
in  America  not  otherwise  enumerated,  30  per  cent,  except  wheat,  barley,  rye,  oats, 
peas,  beans,  pot  and  pearl  ashes,  staves,  oak  and  pine  timber,  beef,  pork,  live  cattle, 
cheese,  butter,  and  all  other  provisions,  which  may  be  permitted  free. 

Twelve  per  cent  upon  the  above  duties  to  be  paid  on  such  articles  as  are  im 
ported  in  foreign  vessels  and  every  ship,  boat,  or  vessel  exceeding  5  tons  burden 
belonging  to  subjects  of  the  United  States  entering  any  port  or  harbor  of  the 
province  should  pay  a  duty  of  12s.  6d.  per  ton.  C.  A.  Q.  324,  p.  202. 

S56Journal    L.    A.    U.    C.,  Feb.    8,    1816,    Ontario    Archives,    p.    10.      The    substance 

of    Gore's    proclamations    of  1816    had    been    suggested    by    a    special    message    from 

the    Prince     of    Ghent     and  Colonial     Office.       Gore     informed     the    Assembly    of    the 
message   on  Feb.  9,    1816. 

'"Journal  L.  A.   U.  C.,   Mar.  12,   1816,   Ontario  Archives,  p.  106. 

108 


goods  for  sale  specie  was  being  drained  from  Upper  Canada,  and, 
therefore,  the  petitioners  recommended  that  the  carrying  trade  be 
done  by  British  boats  only. 

In  the  spring  session  of  1818  the  Upper  Canadian  House  of 
Assembly  tried  to  revise  the  existing  laws  and  accordingly  framed 
a  bill  which  was  rejected  by  the  Legislative  Council.  The  bitter 
hostility  between  the  two  houses  all  through  these  years  tended 
to  prevent  legislation  of  any  kind  and  over  this  particular  bill  such 
disputation  arose  that  no  further  progress  could  be  made  and  so 
the  administrator,  Smith,  prorogued  Parliament  with  nothing  ac 
complished.  The  popular  assembly  wanted  freer  trade  with  their 
neighbors.  The  legislative  council,  looking  beyond  local  interests, 
meekly  following  British  instructions,  or  observing  British  interests, 
conceived  that  British  shipping  would  not  be  sufficiently  protected. 
In  the  fall  of  1818,  however,  sufficient  harmony  existed  between 
the  warring  elements  to  allow  a  bill  to  be  agreed  upon  by  both 
houses.358  The  governor,  Maitland,  signed  the  bill  but  neverthe 
less  had  scruples  as  to  whether  he  was  acting  within  his  constitu 
tional  limits.  No  particular  trade  instructions  had  been  communi 
cated  to  him  by  the  home  government  and  nothing  had  previously 
occurred  during  his  administration  to  call  the  navigation  laws  and 
their  application  to  Upper  Canada  particularly  into  discussion  and 
so  he  was  not  fully  aware  of  the  delicacy  of  the  question  involved. 
His  attorney-general  informed  him  that  provincial  acts  had  repeat 
edly  exceeded  the  authority  of  the  legislature,  that  the  present 
one  was  no  exception,  and  because  provincial  acts  had  been  acqui 
esced  in  since  1801,  custom  had  partly  compensated  for  non- validity. 

This  opinion  of  Attorney-general  Robinson  clearly  shows  how 
little  the  Parliament  of  Upper  Canada  understood  what  was  its 
constitutional  power.  With  characteristic  frontier  freedom 
and  with  the  natural  instinct  to  feel  that  he  is  best  served  who 
serves  himself,  they  did  not  wait  for  instructions  but  ministered 
to  their  own  needs  and  doubtless  never  questioned  whether  this 
was  legal  or  illegal.  It  seemed  necessary  and  that  was  a  sufficient 
warrant.  Maitland,  however,  stood  between  these  pioneers  and 
the  all-controlling  power  across  the  ocean.  He  was  extremely 
anxious  that  no  question  should  later  arise  concerning  constitution 
ality  and  therefore  immediately  communicated  to  Bathurst  his 


358Journal  of  L.  A.  U.  C.,   Nov.  27,  1818,   Ontario  Archives;    Maitland  to  Bathurst, 
Dec.   8,   1818,  C.  A.  ,Q.   324,   p.    180. 

109 


doubts  in  respect  to  the  tonnage  clauses  and  the  effect  of  the  navi 
gation  laws  in  general  upon  the  inland  navigation  of  America,  so 
that  if  he  had  erred  His  Majesty's  dissent  could  be  announced  by 
proclamation  before  the  next  spring.  Thus  a  similar  haphazard 
system  or  lack  of  system  prevailed  in  Upper  as  in  Lower  Canada, 
during  these  first  years  after  the  war. 

In  the  absence  of  definite  treaty  regulations  the  trade  of  Upper 
and  Lower  Canada  was  dependent  as  much  upon  acts  of  Congress 
as  upon  the  acts  of  the  Canadian  British  governments.  The  United 
States  had  not  yet  adopted  the  high  protective  tariff  system.  A 
comparatively  low  duty  was  levied  on  imports  for  revenue  purposes 
only  and  many  foreign  goods  were  admitted  duty  free.  The  fur 
trade  was  profitable  and  so  while  Canadians  were  forbidden  to 
trade  with  American  Indians,  Canadian  furs,  and  peltry  were  among 
the  goods  admitted  free  of  duty.  Before  the  opening  of  the  Erie 
Canal  the  people  of  the  Northern  States,  anxious  for  an  outlet 
for  their  produce,  desired  freer  commercial  intercourse  with  the 
Canadas.  When  this  was  not  granted  by  the  British  government, 
Congress  in  1818  intimated  to  Great  Britain  that  unless  certain 
concessions  were  made,  the  United  States  would  close  its  ports 
against  British  vessels  arriving  from  any  colony  of  Great  Britain 
closed  against  vessels  owned  by  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and 
would  prohibit  the  exportation  in  British  vessels  to  all  such  col 
onies  of  any  article  the  growth,  produce,  or  manufacture  of  the 
United  States.  Even  British  vessels  taking  on  board  productions 
of  the  United  States  in  United  States  ports  would  be  obliged  to 
give  bond  not  to  land  them  in  a  British  colony  from  which  vessels 
of  the  United  States  were  excluded.  These  provisions  would  be 
injurious  to  St.  John,  New  Brunswick,  and  Halifax,  Nova  Scotia, 
rather  than  to  Quebec,  for  Quebec  as  yet  did  not  enjoy  the  liberties 
of  these  two  places.362  Two  years  later  Congress  did  definitely 
close  the  ports  of  the  United  States  against  every  British  vessel 
coming  from  Lower  Canada,  New  Brunswick,  Nova  Scotia,  New 
foundland  or  the  West  Indies,  and  British  vessels  must  give  bond 
not  to  land  United  States  goods  in  any  of  the  prohibited  places. 

Undoubtedly  influenced  by  movements  in  the  United  States  and 
by  newspaper  articles,  by  petitions  and  by  discontent  in  the  Can 
adas  the  tardy  Colonial  office  began,  during  the  early  twenties,  to 


3"2United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  Chapter  LXX,  Apr.  18,  1818. 

110 


consider  more  carefully  the  Canadian  trade  problem.362*  Bathurst 
prepared  a  sketch  of  a  bill  for  the  regulation  of  the  Canadian 
commerce  and  sent  it  to  Governor  Dalhousie  for  consideration.368 
This  proposed  bill,  though  more  liberal  than  the  previous  statutes, 
kept  distinct  the  sea  navigation  from  the  inland  trade  and  con 
tinued  in  the  British  Parliament  the  sole  power  of  regulating  both. 
Certain  enumerated  goods  either  for  home  consumption  or  for 
exportation  were  to  be  admitted  duty  free,  others,  subject  to  duty, 
some  entirely  prohibited,  but  in  general,  these  were  the  same  as 
those  already  existing  in  Lower  Canada.  There  was  a  proviso 
that  by  proclamation  the  governor,  if  he  deemed  it  expedient,  might 
exclude  flour  except  for  exportation.  All  goods  the  growth 
or  manufacture  of  the  United  States  which  might  be  admitted 
into  England  might  also  be  admitted  into  Canada  free  of  duty 
provided  that  these  goods  were  exported  in  British  ships  to  any 
place  other  than  the  King's  colonial  dominions.864 

While  this  bill  was  being  discussed  the  British  merchants,  manu 
facturers,  and  shippers  were  not  standing  idle,  for  they  were  anx 
ious  to  retain  or  increase  their  present  profits  unfettered  by  foreign 
or  colonial  competitors.  More  than  one-half  the  Canadian  imports 
continued  to  be  British  manufactures.365  The  population  of  Upper 
and  Lower  Canada  was  now  between  four  and  five  hundred  thou 
sand  and  was  increasing  at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent  per  year.  The 
trade,  therefore,  made  it  worth  while  to  bring  influence  to  bear 
upon  Parliament  or  upon  the  Colonial  Office  in  particular.  The 
British  agriculturists  were  no  less  active  than  the  merchants.  It 
was  to  satisfy  them  that  no  colonial  corn  had  been  admitted  into 
England  for  consumption  unless  the  average  price  of  British  wheat 
exceeded  675.  per  quarter.  Hence,  all  that  had  arrived  in  England 
after  October  20,  1818,  had  laid  unsold  in  English  warehouses. 
Colonial  grain  was  thus  rendered  almost  valueless.  Then  in  1821 
and  1822  the  colonists  were  in  dire  distress,  burdened  with  a  double 
monopoly — bound  to  buy  from  the  British  only  and  forced  to  sell 
their  surplus  in  British  markets  under  most  disadvantageous  terms. 


362a"It    may    seem    strange,     incredible,    that    the    bounty    of    nature,    the    finest 
navigable    river    in    the    world    should    be    rendered    useless    as    an    outlet    to    the    sea 

but   whoever   will    consider   by    what    law    trade    is    naturally    regulated    the 

course  which  we  have  supposed  the  trade  of  the  Canadas  will  take  under  the 
permanency  of  the  existing  legislative  regulations  of  Great  Britain  is  neither  fanci 
ful  nor  far  distant."  From  the  Quebec  Gazette,  Aug.  30,  in  Niles  Register  for 
Oct.  13,  1821 — an  editorial  on  the  opening  of  the  Erie  Canal. 

»"O.  A.  Q.   157,  p.  129. 

««*C.   A.   Q.    157,   p.    129. 

to  Wortley,  May  28,  1819,   C.   A.  Q.   153,  p.  470. 
Ill 


MIL 

Despite  the  distress  of  these  years  some  British  merchants  still  pe 
titioned  Goulbourn  that  no  alteration  be  made  in  the  duties,  so  as 
tip  give  advantages  to  foreigners  greater  than  those  already  pos 
sessed.  Other  merchants  waited  upon  Bathurst  with  a  similar 
petition.3ae  The  Canadians,  on  the  contrary,  demanded  the  right 
either  to  make  their  own  regulations  entirely  or  have  the  liberty 
to  purchase  at  least  all  heavy  goods  in  the  United  States.367  By 
addresses  to  the  imperial  parliament  and  by  petitions,  powerful  pleas 
were  made  for  better  terms.  The  hard  times  and  distress,  especially 
severe  in  Lower  Canada,  were  traced  to  the  lack  of  market  from 
produce,  and  the  restrictions  upon  importations.368 

Although  the  Canadian  felt  himself  oppressed,  he  was  not  so 
generous  as  to  favor  proposals  to  open  to  American  shippers  and 
merchants  the  ports  of  a  sister  colony,  the  West  Indies.  He  ob 
jected  because  Canada  supplied  these  islands  with  grain  and  re 
ceived  rum,  sugar,  etc.,  in  return.  The  heavy  crops  of  1822  gave 
promise  that  Canada  alone  could  supply  all  the  needs  of  the  West 
Indies  if  rid  of  competitors.369  The  practical  exclusion  of  colonial 
grain  from  England  compelled  the  farmers  to  demand  some  exter 
nal  market,  even  if  another  colony  should  suffer. 

Fortunately,  there  were  in  England  itself  persistent  advocates 
for  Canadian  rights.  One  has  only  to  read  the  debates  of  the 
House  of  Commons  of  February,  1821,  or  March,  1822,  to  perceive 
that  the  Canadian  colony  was  not  forgotten.  Mr.  Marryat,  on  the 
floor  of  the  House  impassionately  and  forcefully  described  how 
the  colonist  was  bound  by  Britain  in  trade ;  how  he  must  draw  all 
his  supplies  from  Great  Britain ;  how  everything  about  him  and 
belonging  to  him  was  British ;  his  woolens,  linens,  and  leather,  the 
ax  with  which  he  felled  his  timber,  the  grate  with  which  he  cooked 
his  food,  the  plates,  the  dishes,  knives  and  forks,  mugs  and  glasses 
with  which  he  ate  his  food,  were  British ;  his  surplus  means  were 
spent  in  British  manufactures  and  produce  and  this  expenditure 
gave  life  and  animation  to  British  industry.370  It  was  again  this 
same  man  who  a  year  later  called  the  attention  of  the  Commons 
to  the  fact  that  the  levying  of  a  duty  on  Canadian  timber  and 
the  lowering  of  a  duty  on  timber  from  the  Baltic  had  so  reduced 


366Petition  June   19,    1820,  C.  A.  Q.   156,  p.    172;   Feb.   25,   1822,   C.  A.  (Q.   162,  p. 
;   Feb.   12,    1824,   C.  A.  Q.    170  p.   710. 
367March    30,    1822,    C.    A.   Q.    163,    p.    485. 
36SC.   A.    Q.    162,   p.   259. 
369C.  A.   Q.   163,   p.   522. 
370Marryat's  speech,  Feb.  9,   1821,  Hansard  II,   Series  4,  p.  549. 

112 


the  price  of  colonial  timber  that  it  would  not  pay  the  expenses  of 
cutting  and  transportation.  He  pointed  out  how  the  revenue  in 
Lower  Canada  had  fallen  from  twenty  to  thirty  per  cent  in  one 
year  and  this  was  due  to  British  imposition.371  Others  in  the  same 
debate  came  to  Marryat's  support.  Ellice  noted  the  decline  in  the 
prosperity  of  the  Canadas,  especially  since  1822.  Ricardo  argued 
that  Canadians  ought  not  to  be  forced  to  buy  in  British  markets. 
Sir  J.  Mackintosh  declared  that  "the  House  was  bound  to  consult 
the  feelings  of  the  people  of  Canada."371*  These  men  at  length  pre 
vailed  over  Brougham,372  who  favored  the  duty  on  Canadian  timber, 
and  Bennet,373  who  thought  that  the  English  agriculturists  had 
already  been  sufficiently  injured  by  American  grain  smuggled  into 
the  Canadas  and  reexported  as  Canadian  grain.  Revised  regulations 
were  prepared  and  received  the  royal  assent  on  June  20,  i822.374 
By  this  bill  Quebec,  for  the  first  time,  was  opened  to  direct  trade 

between  United  States  and  Canada.     Either  British  or  American 

m 

vessels  were  permitted  to  carry  enumerated  articles  which  included 
grains,  domestic  animals,  flour,  and  tobacco,  but  manufactured 
goods  were  almost  entirely  excluded.  In  the  levying  of  duties  there 
was  a  curious  recognition  and  incorporation  of  Canadian  statutes. 
Imperial  duties  were  assigned  but  if  there  were  a  colonial  duty  on 
the  same  article,  then  the  imperial  duty  should  be  paid,  provided 
the  colonial  duty  were  less ;  if  not,  the  colonial  duty  would  be  paid. 
Ocean  navigation  was  now  partially  freed  from  shackles  and  this 
new  liberty  diminished  the  occasion  for  special  privileges  and  legal 
dispensations  as  well  as  for  the  very  illicit  intercourse  by  which 
Canadians  had  hitherto  evaded  restrictions  and  exchanged  goods 
with  their  neighbors  to  the  south.375 

Influenced  by  the  British  legislation  of  June,  1822,  Congress  sus 
pended  the  acts  of  April  18,  1818,  and  May  15,  1820,  as  far  as 
Quebec  was  concerned.  By  this  suspension  any  British  vessel  was 
permitted  to  come  directly  from  that  port  bringing  any  article  of  the 
growth,  produce,  or  manufacture  of  that  colony — except  specie  and 
bullion — as  long  as  these  same  goods  might  be  exported  from  that 
part  on  equal  terms  in  vessels  of  the  United  States.376  The  President, 
however,  until  assured  that  tonnage  duties  had  entirely  ceased  in 

371Hansard's  Debates,  Mar.  13,  1822,  series  2,  vol.  6,  p.  1073. 

371aSir  J.    Mackintosh   in   H.   of   C.,   July   18,    1822.      (Hansard.) 

S72Hansard,  for  Mar.    13,    1822. 

373Ibid. 

s74Act   II,    George   IV,   p.   44,    45. 

375Robinson's   speech,    Apr.    1,    1822,    Hansard,    series   2,    vol.    6,   p.    1414. 

S76Statute   United   States,   March   1,   1823. 

113 


Quebec,  ordered  that  there  be  continued  the  discrimination  against 
British  shippers  of  the  one  dollar  tonnage  and  the  ten  per  cent  extra 
duty.  In  retaliation  a  British  order-in-council  was  issued  charging 
the  same  tonnage  and  extra  duty  on  American  vessels  and  goods 
entering  Quebec  and  other  British  ports.377  Thus,  these  extra 
charges,  continued  on  both  sides.  In  the  spring  of  1824  Congress 
passed  a  new  tariff  law  making  a  general  and  considerable  augmenta 
tion  in  the  import  duties.  This  affected  the  British  at  home  much  more 
than  it  could  affect  the  North  American  colonies  and  in  the  fol 
lowing  year  the  imperial  Parliament  revised  its  tariff  laws  and, 
recognizing  that  the  "law  of  customs  (had)  become  intricate  by 
reason  of  the  great  number  of  acts  relating  thereto"  repealed  all 
existing  acts  and  issued  new  and  detailed  regulations  for  the  trade 
of  the  British  possessions  abroad.378 

By  this  British  act  of  July,  1825,  Quebec,  Halifax,  and  other 
enumerated  ports  in  British  North  America  and  the  West  Indies 
were  declared  "Free  Ports,"  that  is,  to  these  the  ships  of  foreign 
nations  might  bring  the  produce  of  their  own  country  and  carry 
back  the  produce  of  the  British  possession  on  condition  that  British 
vessels  were  guaranteed  the  same  favors  in  the  colonies  of  these 
foreign  countries;  or  if  any  foreign  nation  not  in  possession  of 
colonies  desired  to  trade  with  colonies  of  Great  Britain  it  might 
obtain  this  privilege  by  a  special  order-in-council  from  His  Britan 
nic  Majesty.  In  other  words,  the  direct  trade  of  Canada  and  the 
West  Indies  was  thrown  open  to  the  United  States  provided  tht 
United  States  placed  Great  Britain  among  the  most  favored  nations. 
a  list  of  articles  which  no  foreign  vessel  might  carry  into 


British  possessions  in  America  we  find  gunpowder,  arms,  ammu 
nitions  or  utensils  of  war,  tea,  which  had  previously  been  prohibited, 
and  beef  and  pork,  which  had  previously  been  admitted  into  the 
Canadas  through  special  orders  of  the  governors.  A  duty  of  from 
seven  to  ten  per  cent  ad  valorem  was  levied  on  live  stock  and  a  host 
of  other  imports,  one  shilling  per  bushel  upon  wheat,  thirty  per 
cent  ad  valorem  upon  leather  and  linen  manufactures,  twenty  per 
cent  upon  soap,  sugar,  and  tobacco,  and  fifteen  per  cent  upon  goods 
not  otherwise  enumerated,  which  would  include,  as  far  as  the  Can 
adas  were  concerned,  the  clothing,  implements  and  tools  of  the  col 
onists.  While  Quebec  was  the  only  authorized  seaport  for  the 


377British   State   Papers,   1822 — 23,   Vol.  X,   p.    781. 
378An  Act  of  VI  George  IV,   Chap.   114. 

114 


Canadas,  inland  trade  with  the  United  States  was  permitted  subject 
to  the  same  duties  and  other  regulations  as  for  goods  brought  in 
at  Quebec.  One  of  the  new  features  of  the  act  was  the  establishing 
of  bonded  warehouses  where  imported  goods  might  be  housed  tem 
porarily  free  of  duty  until  either  sold  or  reexported. 

When  introducing  this  bill  Earl  Bathurst  tried  to  convince  the 
Lords  that  this  proposed  act  was  a  "complete  abandonment  of  what 
had  hitherto  been  regarded  as  the  English  Colonial  System  *  *  * 
(that)  it  could  no  longer  be  said  that  Britain  placed  her  colonies 
in  a  worse  situation  with  respect  to  trade  than  the  United  States 
*  (that)  the  colonies  would  now  enjoy  not  only  the  same 
advantages  as  the  United  States,  but  colonial  vessels  would  be  en 
titled  to  all  the  advantages  of  British  ships  *  *  *  (that)  in 
all  former  measures  for  regulating  the  colonial  trade  prohibi 
tion  formed  the  rule,  admission  the  exception,  but  now  admission 
was  the  rule,  prohibition  the  exception."37821 

This  speech  is  interesting  from  the  fact  that  the  spokesman  of 
the  Colonial  Office  is  here  frankly  and  officially  announcing  the 
passing  of  the  old  Colonial  System.  The  liberal  views  of  Hus- 
kisson,  Marryat,  Baring,  Bright  and  others  were  apparently  be 
coming  embodied  in  legislation.  Complete  liberty,  however,  in  trade 
and  navigation  was  as  yet  by  no  means  obtained  and  not  a  year  had 
elapsed  until  the  House  of  Commons  heard  Baring  declare  that  "it 
was  not  possible  to  preserve  them  (the  North  American  Colonies) 
but  by  giving  them  all  the  advantages  of  a  free  trade  *  *  * 
Since  the  American  war  these  colonies  felt  their  own  power  and 
knew  their  own  interest  and  it  was  not  possible  to  retain  them  by 
violence  or  subject  their  trade  to  unnecessary  restraints."  379 

What  goods  could  be  legally  imported  or  exported,  what  goods 
should  be  free  from  duty,  and  what  should  be  the  rates  charged 
on  the  unfree  goods,  whether  goods  could  be  carried  in  British  or 
American  bottoms,  and  what  should  be  the  ports  of  entry — ever 
changing  regulations  in  these  matters  by  provincial,  British,  or 
American  government  had  annoyed  and  even  yet  continued  to 
annoy  and  inconvenience  the  Colonists.  To  cite  but  a  few  cases  of 
this.  During  the  year  1823  merchants  acting  in  good  faith  im 
ported  in  American  bottoms  pot  and  pearl  ashes,  etc.,  which  were 


378aEarl  Bathurst  in  H.  of  L.,  June  14,  1825,  Hansard,  series  2,  vol.  13,  p.  1132. 

379Baring's  Speech,  May  13,  1826,  Hansard  II  series,  Vol.  XV,  p.  1190;  Huskis- 
son's  Speech,  Feb.  14,  1826,  Hansard  II  series,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  361;  Ibid,  May  12,  1826, 
Hansard  II  series,  Vol.  XV,  p.  1144. 

115 


allowed  to  pass  through  the  customs  houses  at  Coteau  du  Lac,  but 
were  seized  at  Montreal.  The  case  was  referred  to  Governor 
Dalhousie  who,  appreciating  the  merchants'  position,  released  the 
goods  on  account  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  law,  and  requested  the 
home  government  to  take  steps  to  prevent  repetitions  of  this  sort.380 
A  little  later  merchants  of  Montreal  made  vigorous  complaints  be 
cause,  through  lack  of  definite  information,  duties  were  being 
levied  by  Canadian  custom  house  officers  on  goods  admitted  free 
by  imperial  acts.381  An  imperial  order,  decreeing  that  the  remun 
eration  for  custom  house  officers  should  be  by  definite  salary  and 
not  by  fees,  tended  to  remove  trouble  of  this  kind  arising  from 
unscrupulous  officials  who  endeavored  to  collect  all  the  duty  pos 
sible  so  as  to  swell  their  own  private  purses.382  Montreal  mer 
chants,  however,  still  felt  themselves  unprotected  from  the  meddle 
some  legislator,  and  customs  officer,  and  even  after  the  act  of  July, 
1825,  prayed  the  imperial  government  that  no  further  alterations 
be  made  in  the  trade  relations  until  time  and  experience  should 
prove  the  effects  of  existing  laws.383 

In  the  United  States  a  similar  sentiment  prevailed.  President 
Monroe  realized  the  baneful  results  of  temporary  and  unstable 
regulations.  In  his  message  at  the  opening  of  the  second  session 
of  his  last  Congress  he  said  that  it  appeared  from  long  experience 
that  no  satisfactory  arrangement  for  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  British  possessions  in  America  could  be  maintained  by  legis 
lative  acts  while  each  party  pursued  its  own  course.  His  propo 
sition  was  to  regulate  commerce  by  treaty. 

However  desirable  it  might  be  that  the  stream  should  run  in  a 
less  tortuous  and  tumultuous  course,  the  fates  had  decreed  other 
wise.  No  treaty  was  signed.  Instead,  an  order-in-council  of  July 
27,  1826  declared  that  the  United  States  had  not  fulfilled  certain 
conditions  required  for  the  continuance  of  the  act  of  July,  1825,  and 
therefore,  the  British  ports  of  South  America,  West  Indies,  Ber 
muda,  and  Newfoundland  were  to  be  closed  to  the  United  States.384 
To  meet  this  new  turn  of  events  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
attempted  to  father  a  bill  abolishing  discriminating  duties  against 
goods  imported  in  British  vessels  from  Lower  Canada  and  other 
British  American  colonies  if  the  British  would  recall  this  order-in- 


38°Dalhousie  to  Bathurst,  Feb.  27,   1824,  C.  A.  Q.   168,  37. 

881Kempt  to  Murray,   Oct.  26,   1828,   C.   A.  Q.   183,   82,  and   86. 

382Bathurst  to  Maitland  June  7,  1826,  C.  A.  Q.   62. 

383C.  A.   Q.   176,  p.  2. 

^American   State   Papers,  vol.  XIII,   p.   366. 

116 


council  and  agree  not  to  levy  any  discriminating  duties  on  goods 
imported  by  American  vessels  into  British  ports;  but  the  House 
of  Representatives  threw  out  the  bill,  and  President  Adams  by 
proclamation  prohibited  all  trade  and  intercourse  authorized  by  the 
American  act  of  1823  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
ports  in  South  America,  West  Indies,  Bermudas,  Bahamas,  and 
Newfoundland.585  This  state  of  affairs  continued  until  Jackson's 
proclamation  of  October  5,  1830,  which  reestablished  the  inter 
course.  The  closing  of  the  West  Indian  ports  to  the  United  States' 
trade  had  been  beneficial  to  the  Canadas  and  these  provinces  were 
loath  to  hear  that  trade  would  be  reopened.386  They  had  sent 
their  surplus  produce  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  general  carrying 
trade  had  been  increased  for  American  produce  of  the  lake  region 
found  its  way  into  Canada  en  route  to  England  rather  than  to  the 
West  Indies  where  otherwise  it  would  have  gone. 

The  formal  convention  of  July,  1815,  renewed  in  1818,  was  again 
renewed  in  1827,  this  time  indefinitely  or  at  least  until  either  party 
should  give  twelve  months'  notice  that  they  wished  it  to  be  annulled. 
The  renewal  of  this  convention  practically  meant  nothing  except 
the  continuance  of  the  existing  status;  but  in  April,  1831,  the 
Imperial  Parliament  passed  an  act  favorable  to  the  British  ship 
ping  interests,  favorable  to  the  American  states  and  territories  ad 
jacent  to  the  Great  Lakes,  favorable  to  some  infant  manufacturing 
industries  in  Canada  but  unwelcomed  by  many  Canadian  farmers. 

By  this  act,  grain,  flour,  beef,  pork,  wood  and  lumber  were  hence 
forth  permitted  to  enter  the  Canadas  duty  free;  and  these  same 
commodities  were  permitted  to  enter  the  British  West  Indies  and 
South  America  duty  free  if  imported  from  any  other  British  pos 
session  in  North  America.386a  By  the  custom  house  construction 
of  this  act,  American  grain  and  flour  imported  into  the  Canadas 
might  be  reexported  duty  free  to  the  West  Indies  and  South  Amer 
ica  but  if  reexported  to  England  it  would  be  subject  to  all  the 
previous  duties  and  restrictions.  American  wheat,  however,  might 
be  imported  into  Canada  and  there  ground  into  flour  and  this  flour 
reexported  on  the  same  terms  as  colonial  flour.  The  practical  re 
sults  of  this  act  were  that  Canadian  wheat  was  bought  up  and 


385Senate  Proceedings,  Feb.  28,  1827,  and  U.  S.  Stat.  at  large,  1827,  App.  I, 
p.  796. 

386C.  A.  Q.  354,  p.  70 — Niles  censures  the  American  administration  for  the  con 
ditions  under  which  the  W.  I.  ports  were  opened  to  American  ships.  He  says  Cana 
dians  paid  a  lower  duty  and  nearly  monopolized  the  U.  S.  trade  even  after  1830. 
Niles  Reg.  Apr.  9,  1831,  page  90. 

38C»Statutes  at   Large,    1,    William  IV,    Cap.    XXIV. 

117 


shipped  to  England.  Then  American  wheat  was  imported  to  sup 
ply  the  Canadian  home  market  and  the  West  Indies.  After  this 
had  been  sufficed  American  imported  wheat  was  manufactured  into 
flour  and  re-exported  upon  the  same  terms  as  Canadian  flour.  The 
Canadian  flour  manufacturers,  the  West  India  planters,  the  Colonial 
and  British  shipowners,  and  every  class  within  England  except 
the  landed  proprietors  were  all  recipients  of  benefits  from  this 
act;386b  but  the  York  Colonial  Advocate  declared  that  Canadian 
farmers  were  being  sacrificed,  and  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio 
and  Michigan  enriched.3860  These  states  were  fully  aware  of  what 
this  act  meant  for  them.  The  great  natural  outlet  for  the  West  was 
now  more  freely  opened  and  although  the  Erie  Canal  offered  facili 
ties  for  transportation  to  New  York,  nevertheless  a  more  staple 
market  and  higher  prices  were  offered  in  Montreal  and  conse 
quently  a  large  part  of  the  produce  of  the  Northwestern  States 
passed  into  Canada.3863 

The  general  course  of  trade  during  the  early  thirties  was  com 
paratively  smooth,  yet  petitions  continued  to  be  sent  to  governors 
and  to  Parliament,  and  disputes  of  one  kind  or  another  were  not 
infrequent ;  controversy,  for  instance,  arose  over  the  circumstance 
that  tonnage  duties  continued  to  be  levied  on  American  vessels, 
entering  British  ports  on  Lake  Champlain,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  order-in-council  of  July,  1826,  had  been  superseded  by  another 
order  of  November  5,  1833,  abolishing  the  tonnage  duty  of  45.  3d.  and 
extra  duty  of  10  per  cent  ad  valorem,  the  United  States  having 
agreed  to  abolish  duties  on  British  shipping.  The  affair  was  settled 
by  the  Canadians  explaining  that  the  charge  in  Lower  Canada  by 
the  customs  house  officer  there  was  only  a  mere  trifle  to  help  pay  for 
the  expenses  of  the  post,  and  it  had  been  established  by  a  local 
provincial  act.  Nevertheless,  it  was  discontinued  at  the  expiration 
of  the  provincial  act  in  i834.38r  In  Upper  Canada  similar  troubles 
arose  over  the  coasting  trade  until  Colborne  sent  definite  instructions 
to  the  local  collectors  in  1833  to  cease  collecting  any  charges  ex 
cept  such  as  were  enacted  from  Canadian  or  British  boats  in  Ameri- 


386hMontreai  Herald  quotation  in  Niles  Register,  July  2,  1831,  p.  310;  Montreal 
Gazette  quotation  of  Nov.  8,  1831,  in  Niles  Register,  for  Nov.  26,  1831,  p.  238. 

386cYork  Colonial  Advocate  (quotation  in  Niles  Register  July,  1831).  Americans 
it  was  claimed  would  grow  wheat  and  manufacture  flour  cheaper  than  the  Canadians, 
and  the  York  paper  saw  how  this  American  grain  and  flour  would  now  compete  in 
the  English  and  West  Indies  markets  against  the  Canadians. 

388dBuffalo  Advertiser  (quotation  in  Niles  Register  July,  1831).  Cleveland  Ad 
vertiser  (quotation  in  Niles  Register,  Oct.  29,  1831,  p.  165.  Niles  Register  Sept.  7, 
1833,  p.  24). 

3S7C.   A.    G.   223. 

118 


can  harbors.388  In  addition  to  the  complaints  in  which  the  United 
States  were  specially  interested,  a  great  deal  of  discontent  was 
voiced  in  Upper  Canada.  Because  tobacco  could  be  grown  near 
Amherstburg  the  people  of  that  town  sent  in  their  little  petition  to 
persuade  parliament  not  to  diminish  the  import  duty  on  this  ques 
tionable  luxury.389 

Reports  from  the  Upper  Canada  Assembly,  however,  reveal  to  us 
the  fact  that  the  regulations  of  1825  to  1830  had  proven  to  be  by  no 
means  satisfactory.  The  first  report  on  trade  and  commerce  of 
Upper  Canada  by  a  select  committee  in  1835  sums  up  the  long-stand 
ing  grievances  of  the  period.  The  report  is  really  the  work  of  the 
more  radical  members,  Wilson,  MacKenzie,  Shaver,  McMicking, 
and  Durand,  but  it  is  nevertheless  significant.  It  states  the  cause 
of  distress  in  Upper  Canada  to  be  due  to  the  restrictions  laid  on  the 
trade  of  the  colony  and  compares  the  disadvantages  under  which  th0 
land  owners  and  merchants  labor  as  compared  with  the  same  classes 
on  the  opposite  frontier.  It  regrets  that  laws  for  the  regulation  of 
trade  are  dictated  or  enacted  by  the  Parliament  of  the  United 
Kingdom  and  changed  and  varied  without  consulting  the  province, 
that  some  articles  of  general  utility  were  either  prohibited  or  could 
be  imported  only  in  British  ships  or  from  a  British  port  and  all 
this  was  for  the  advantage  of  capitalists  residing  in  Europe.389a 


388c.  A.  G.  223. 

3S9Petition    Dec.    21,    1832,    C.    A.    Q.    p.    36. 

389aReport    on    Trade    and    Commerce    of    Upper    Canada,    Legislative    Assembly    of 
Upper  Canada,    1835,    Appendix  C.  A. 

The  duties  levied  on  products  of  the  U.  S.  to  date  from  Mar.  4,  1835: 

Horses    per    head    50s  By    a    later    amendment    duties    were 

Mules     40  levied    on    leather   from    Is    3d   up    to    5s 

Cattle   1   and  2  yrs 3  per    Ib.      And    the    duty   on    salt   was   re- 
Cows   2   and   4  yrs 15  duced  from  6d  to  3d  per  bu. 

Oxen      20 

Hogs    10 

Fresh   pork,   cwt 5 

Fresh    beef,    cwt 3s  9d  Journal    of    Legislative    Assembly    of 

Salt    pork,    cwt 5  Upper   Canada    for   March    14,    1833,    On- 
Salt    beef,     cwt 3s  9d        tario  Archives. 

Hams,   bacon    10 

Butter  and    cheese    10 

Lard  and  tallow    5s 

Wheat,    bu Is  3d 

Rye,    corn,    bu Is 

Sheep,  head    Is  3d 

Mutton,    cwt.     2s 

Pease,   bu Is 

Barley 9d 

Oats     6d 

Potatoes     6d 

Buckwheat      6d 

Apples,    bu 6d 

Hay,    ton     10s  388b Journal   of   House    of   Assembly   of 

Flour,    cwt 2s  6d        Upper  Canada,   1821,  Reports  No.  6,  9,  10. 

Rye     flour,     cwt 2s  Journal   for   1834,    Ontario   archives. 

BuHr  wheat    flour    2s  Journal    H.    of    A.,    U.     C.    Nov.    27, 

Indian  meal    ._ 2s  1818,    May   7,    1819;    July   12,    1819,    etc., 

Eeer,   bbl ." 5s  in    Ontario    Archives    for    earlier    discon- 

Cider,   bbl 2s  6d        tent. 

119 


The  revenue  arising  from  duty  on  goods  imported  from  the  United 
States  for  1834,  the  year  immediately  preceding  that  in  which  this 
report  was  brought,  was  ^3,236.  75.  9?4d.  amount  collected 
during  the  year  1820.  These  figures  not  only  show  the  rapid 
growth  of  the  trade  but  reveal  the  importance  of  the  matter  to  the 
legislative  assembly.389b 

With  an  ever-increasing  population  in  both  provinces  and  in  the 
neighboring  states,  with  American  settlers  continuing  to  move  from 
the  United  States,  and  with  the  better  facilities  for  trade,  new  roads, 
new  waterways,  and  reciprocity  with  regard  to  the  shipping  and 
coasting  trade,  it  was  only  natural  that  there  should  be  a  growth  in 
the  volume  and  variety  of  goods  exchanged.  The  settlers  in  Upper 
Canada,  and  it  was  here  that  the  population  grew  the  faster,  brought 
with  them  some  household  and  farm  supplies  from  their  native 
country ;  but  for  some  time  after  settling  they  could  not  supply 
themselves  from  their  own  homesteads  with  articles  that  later  that 
same  farm  would  yield  in  abundance.  When  a  bill  was  before  the 
Upper  Canadian  Legislature  in  1835  to  lay  a  comparatively  high 
duty  on  horses,  cattle,  hogs,  sheep,  mill  machinery  and  other  things, 
many  people  in  the  province  were  opposed  because  these  things 
could  not  be  produced  in  quantities  at  all  adequate  to  the  demand. 
The  supply  for  these  lay  in  the  United  States,390  and  the  opponents 
of  the  bill  wanted  to  procure  that  supply  as  cheaply  as  possible. 
It  is  rather  interesting  to  find  that  timber  which  from  the  earliest 
colonial  times  had  been  imported  from  New  York  and  New  Eng 
land  states  into  Canada  by  thousands  of  feet  en  route  to  the  British 
market,  now  by  1835  began  to  move  from  Canada  to  New  York391  in 
payment  for  American  goods  imported  into  Canada. 

While  the  legitimate  trade  since  1815  was  struggling  against 
navigation  laws,  temporary,  confusing,  and  sometimes  conflicting 
enactments,  and  uncertain  information  in  regard  to  the  interpreta 
tion  or  significance  of  imperial  or  provincial  decrees,  a  brisk  and 
flourishing  underground  traffic  had  developed  unhampered,  even 
fostered  by  legislation  on  both  sides  of  the  line.  We  must  remember 
that  the  East  India  Company  held  exclusive  privileges.  The  colonies 
had  no  legal  means  of  getting  the  produce  from  the  Orient  except 
by  way  of  Great  Britain  and  Great  Britain  itself  was  supplied  by 
this  company.  By  the  convention  of  1815  the  United  States  were 


8900.  A.  Q.  385,  p.  33,  p.  263. 
^C.  A.  Q.  155,  p.  389. 

120 


granted  privileges  of  direct  trade  with  British  dominions  in  the  East 
Indies  and  in  India  under  the  most  favored  European  nation  clause. 
This  meant  that  as  far  as  the  United  States  were  concerned  the 
East  India  Company's  monopoly  was  broken,  but  as  far  as  the 
Canada's  were  concerned,  it  still  held.  Because  this  monopoly  did 
hold  and  because  of  the  necessity  of  unloading  and  reloading  in 
England,  and  because  of  the  circuitous  voyage,  Oriental  goods  were 
much  higher  priced  in  Quebec  than  in  New  York;  consequently 
smuggling  of  Asiatic  goods  into  Canada  increased.  The  long  line  of 
poorly  protected  frontier  made  it  possible  and  easy  to  smuggle  any 
kind  of  goods,  but  the  professional  smuggler,  however,  dealt  chiefly 
in  those  commodities  which  were  easily  transported  and  would  yield 
him  great  returns  for  the  risk  taken.  One  of  the  chief  of  these 
commodities  was  tea  and  in  this  the  smuggling  trade  became  so 
systematic  and  so  injurious  to  the  revenues  of  the  Canadian  prov 
inces  that  in  1824  the  Quebec  Legislature  tried  to  take  effective 
means  to  prevent  it.392  The  council  and  assembly  sent  a  joint  ad 
dress  to  England  respecting  the  illicit  trade  in  goods  from  China 
and  India  and  suggested  methods  of  supplying  the  inhabitants  by 
arrangements  with  the  East  India  Company  or  by  direct  importa 
tion.393 

A  letter  written  by  Weltden,  who  traveled  in  America  in  1823, 
and  who  professed  neither  to  be  engaged  nor  personally  interested 
in  any  mercantile  pursuit,  is  very  illuminating  on  the  actual  state 
of  the  smuggling  trade.  During  the  first  quarter  of  the  last  century, 
he  had  noticed  the  extraordinary  progress  of  American  shipping  and 
commerce  in  Europe  and  Asia  and  when  he  came  to  St.  Johns, 
New  Brunswick,  and  traveled  up  the  St.  Croix  River,  he  discovered 
that  a  part  of  this  rapid  development  was  due  to  the  fact  that  Ameri 
cans  were  carriers  for  not  only  their  own  people  but  for  the  British 
colonists  also.  Under  cover  of  impenetrable  fogs,  they  supplied  the 
maritime  provinces  with  more  than  half  of  the  Asiatic  goods  con 
sumed.  He  passed  up  through  the  partly  constructed  Erie  Canal 
and  found  that  thousands  of  chests  of  tea  were  conveyed  by  this 
route  to  Rochester  and  the  Niagara  River.  Buffalo  had  "risen  like 
another  Phoenix  from  its  ashes"  and  its  prosperity  was  due  to  its 
advantageous  position  as  a  distributing  point.  But  Weltden  be 
lieved  that  a  great  share  of  its  wealth  came  from  its  illicit  trade  with 


•"C.   A.   Q.    170,   p.   678. 

393Dalhousie  to  Bathurst,  Feb.  27,  1824,  C.  A.  Q.  168,  p.  33. 

121 


the  Upper  Canadians  and  that  a  similar  condition  of  affairs  ex 
isted  at  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  and  on  Lake  Champlain.  He  also  estimated 
the  amount  of  tea  smuggled  to  be  twice  as  great  as  the  amount 
legitimately  imported.394  The  statistics  for  the  port  of  Quebec  cer 
tainly  seem  to  bear  out  this  statement  for,  though  population  had 
been  annually  increasing,  and  the  people  were  drinkers  of  tea 
rather  than  of  coffee,  the  importations  at  Quebec,  the  only  port 
where  tea  could  legally  enter,  had  rapidly  declined  after  1815.  The 
statistics  for  the  customs  house  at  Quebec  may  not  be  absolutely 
accurate  but  they  sufficiently  demonstrate  the  general  truth  of  Welt- 
den's  letter.  The  amount  of  coffee  imported  declined  even  more 
rapidly  than  that  of  tea  because  during  the  war  tea  could  not  be 
obtained  from  the  United  States  as  it  had  been  before,  and  so  coffee 
was  substituted  in  part.  After  the  war,  coffee  was  no  longer  pur 
chased  in  such  large  quantities.395 

When  we  know  the  profits  that  were  obtained  by  smuggling  tea, 
we  can  more  easily  credit  Weltden's  statements  as  to  the  amount 
smuggled.  Tea  imported  in  New  York  at  fifty  cents  a  pound  sold 
in  Canada  for  $1.25;  that  imported  at  twelve  cents  per  pound  re 
tailed  at  from  twenty-six  to  twenty-eight  cents.396  By  an  American 
law  the  merchant  who  imported  tea  and  exported  it  within  eighteen 
months  paid  only  two  and  one-half  per  cent  of  the  duty  regularly 
charged.  It  paid  the  American  merchant  to  foster  smuggling. 

To  check  this  loss  of  revenue,  Great  Britain  ordered  the  East 
India  Company  to  send  tea  direct  from  China  to  Quebec  and  land 
the  tea  there  at  reduced  prices.  Though  this  lessened  the  contra 
band  trade  it  by  no  means  stopped  it.397  By  a  United  States  statute, 
all  tea  imported  in  American  vessels,  direct  from  China  was  to  be 
imported  duty  free  after  March,  i823-398  This  did  not  help  to  de 
crease  the  Canadian  smuggling.  Three  years  later  Upper  Cana 
dians  were  still  petitioning  the  King  to  protect  them  against  smug 
glers,  but  the  committees  on  trade  in  the  British  council  would 


8MWeltden  to  Horten,  April   11,   1824,   C.  A.  Q.   170,  p.   677. 

3flnlmportations  at  port  of  Quebec : 

Tea-lbs.      Coffee-lbs.  396C.   A.  Q.   170,  p.   678. 

1814     487,371  168,972 

1815      314,450          269,663  397Petition     from     Chamber     of     Com- 

1816      218,969          335,441        merce,  St.  John's,  Jan.  31,   1833,  C.  A.  Q. 

1817     254,248  35,995        210,   p.   280. 

1818      348,008  50,779 

1819      280,497  43,091  398Ibid. 

1820     167,067  55,378 

1821    160,865  73,173 

1822      134,379  94,929 

April  11,  1829,  C.  A.  |Q.   170,  p.  678. 

122 


hearken  to  none  of  the  proposed  plans  of  the  colonists.399  And  so 
a  considerable  portion  of  the  tea  consumed  in  Canada  continued 
to  be  carried  by  American  merchantmen. 

Other  commodities  as  well  as  tea  were  also  smuggled  into  Canada 
in  great  quantities.  Petitions  were  sent  to  the  Legislature  pray 
ing  for  a  reduction  of  duty  on  whisky,  and  other  spirits  to  3d.  per 
gallon  in  the  hope  that  a  reduction  would  induce  the  importers 
to  enter  these  liquors  through  the  lawful  channels.  Lower  rates 
when  collected  would  yield  a  larger  revenue  than  the  higher  rates 
under  existing  conditions.  Carleton  Island  was  reported  to  be  the  ren 
dezvous  for  an  organized  band  of  smugglers.  A  great  quantity  of 
tobacco  was  confiscated  here.400  Customs  house  officers,  however 
vigilant,  were  but  inadequately  prepared  to  cope  with  the  organized 
smugglers  of  these  early  years.401 


»»C.  A.  G.  79. 

400Adams'  complaint  that  an  American  citizen  had  had  tobacco  confiscated.  C.  A.  Q. 
162,  p.  21. 

40iSee  proposals  made  by  customs  collectors,  at  Pictou,  Sydney,  Boston,  1835, 
and  letter  of  Vaughan  to  Aberdeen,  Oct.  29,  1828,  complaining  of  smuggling,  C.  A.  jQ. 
354,  p.  162.  C.  A.  Q.  p.  185,  p.  260.  0.  A.  jQ.  170,  p.  263. 


123 


XL 
TRANSPORTATION. 

The  growing  tendency  in  the  United  States  after  the  war  to 
devote  more  attention  to  all  kinds  of  internal  improvements  and 
especially  that  part  of  this  tendency  which  sought  to  develop  better 
communication  between  the  western  states  and  the  seaboard  cities 
was  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  movement  in  the  Canadian 
provinces.  The  war  of  1812  had  revealed  to  Canadians  as  well  as 
to  Americans  what  a  military  advantage  better  means  of  transporta 
tion  would  be ;  and  the  construction  and  location  of  the  early  trans 
portation  system  of  Upper  Canada  were  to  a  considerable  extent 
due  to  an  effort  to  find  better  means  for  moving  men  and  supplies 
than  had  been  offered  during  the  war.  It  is  true  that  some  short 
canals  had  already  been  built  along  the  course  of  the  St.  Lawrence. 
A  canal  at  Coteau  du  Lac  had  been  opened  in  1780,  preceding  by 
five  years  the  excavation  for  the  first  American  canal.  In  1782 
and  1783  two  other  canals,  the  Cascades  and  Split  Rock,  still  further 
removed  impediments  to  navigation  between  Montreal  and  Kingston. 
It  was  not  until  the  war  period  and  after  it,  however,  that  the  really 
significant  undertakings  were  seriously  considered. 

The  first  great  overland  route  constructed  in  Upper  Canada  was 
the  York  Road  or  Dundas  Street.  Military  exigencies  had  shown 
the  need  of  such  a  highway  to  connect  York  with  both  the  extreme 
southwest  and  the  military  stations  of  Kingston  and  farther  east. 
The  roadbed  was  cautiously  constructed  inland  from  the  exposed 
waterfront  so  that  an  enemy  might  not  so  readily  interfere  with 
traffic  upon  it.  But  the  Canadians  needed  more  than  the  York 
road  and  the  canals  already  built  along  the  St.  Lawrence  if  they 
were  to  cope  successfully  against  American  arms  in  any  future 
contest,  or  if  they  were  to  stand  any  chance  in  the  competition  for 
the  western  carrying  trade.  In  providing  facilities  for  both  war 
and  trade  the  projected  Erie  Canal  would  turn  the  scales  immeasur 
ably  in  favor  of  the  Americans.  The  immigrant  in  southern  and 
western  Upper  Canada,  when  bound  commercially  to  a  foreign  pow 
er,  might  soon  pay  complete  homage  and  allegiance  to  that  country 
instead  of  to  Britain.  Thus,  it  was  that  the  legislators  and  parlia 
ments  in  Canada  and  England  were  induced  to  vote  the  necessary 

124 


charters  and  grants  for  new  roadways  in  Canada,  and  to  place  them 
where  they  did  not  merely  offer  better  provisions  for  the  welfare 
of  the  immigrants  already  settled  and  to  induce  more  to  come,  but 
to  hold  those  they  had  true  to  their  allegiance,  and  protect  the  upper 
province  against  American  aggression. 

This  statement  holds  in  the  case  of  the  great  York  road  and  may 
be  further  verified  by  considering  each  of  the  Canadian  canals  in 
turn.  While  the  Erie  Canal  was  as  yet  a  reality  only  in  the  fertile 
fancies  of  some  New  York  promoters,  the  Lower  Canadian  Parlia 
ment  in  1817  drew  up  a  bill  for  fostering  the  St.  Lawrence  trade. 
This  bill  urged  the  consideration  of  improvements  in  the  navigation 
of  that  river  largely  because  such  improvements  would  counteract 
the  effects  of  the  projected  New  York  Canal.  The  Upper  Canada 
Legislature,  anticipating  by  a  year  the  efforts  of  the  lower  province, 
discussed  a  bill  to  make  surveys  for  the  Welland  Canal  and,  al 
though  an  act  of  incorporation  was  not  granted  until  1824  and 
navigation  was  not  opened  until  six  years  later,  a  letter  from  Cos- 
grave  in  1819  reveals  the  tone  of  the  efforts  made  to  persuade  those 
in  power  to  make  the  necessary  grants.405  After  calling  attention 
to  the  fact  that  this  canal  would  facilitate  an  export  trade  that  al 
ready  employed  5,000  seamen  and  amounted  to  1,500,000  pounds 
sterling  annually,  he  hoped  that  the  British  government  would  by 
its  zeal  and  decision  outstrip  the  United  States  government,  that 
it  would  thus  bring  to  Montreal  the  exports  and  imports  of  the 
states  bordering  on  Lakes  Erie,  Huron  and  Michigan  and  that  the 
West  Indies  might  continue  to  be  supplied  from  Canadian  ports  as 
they  then  were.  So  much  for  the  commercial  advantages  of  such 
a  waterway.  But  Cosgrave  seems  to  have  realized  that  he  must 
offer  arguments  that  would  appeal  to  those  who  wished  to  strengthen 
the  military  defenses,  and,  therefore,  he  said  that  the  Welland  Canal 
would  attract  a  population  along  the  frontier  "ready  to  oppose  any 
unjust  usurpation  of  British  rights  when  the  period  arrives  that 
these  nations  may  be  unhappily  involved  in  war/'  and  it  "would 
make  these  states  (Ohio,  Indiana,  etc.)  look  up  to  us  (British)  as 
protectors,  and  in  case  of  another  war  might  cause  them  to  separate 
from  the  Federal  Government  and  join  England."406 

Again  the  Rideau  Canal,  though  not  commenced  until  1826,  was 
advocated  a  decade  before  that  as  a  military  necessity.  Its  advo- 


405Wm.  Cosgrave  to  Goulbourn,  Jan.  18,  1819,  C.  A.  Q.  153,  p.  81. 
Sherbrooke   to  Bathurst,   May  20,    1817,   C.   A.   Q.   144,   p.   21. 
Kingford.    Kist.    of    Can.   X.    245. 
^Cosgrave  to  Goulbourn,  C.  A.  Q.  153,  p.  81. 

125 


cates  declared  that  it  would  establish  communication  between  Kings 
ton  and  Quebec  free  from  the  dangers  of  navigating  a  river  flanked 
by  American  artillery ;  it  would  make  possible  and  prosperous  a 
military  settlement  along  its  route,  and  it  was  "safer  to  get  popula 
tion  consolidated  than  scattered ;"  a  colony  of  loyal  British  soldier- 
settlers  would  "improve  the  disposition  of  the  people ;"  and  "to  ex 
pel  as  much  as  possible  the  American  manners  from  the  Canadian 
side  of  the  St.  Lawrence  (might  thereafter)  be  of  vital  importance 
to  the  provinces."407  The  government  was  urged  to  make  grants 

because  "in  the  event  of  a  war  the  sum  advanced would 

be  almost  immediately  saved."408  Bathurst  approved  of  the  scheme 
for  the  canals  and  military  settlements. 

A  few  years  later,  in  the  early  thirties,  efforts  were  made  to  open 
a  waterway  between  the  head  waters  of  the  Ottawa  and  Lake  Huron, 
and  arguments  similar  to  these  quoted  above  were  prominently  put 
forth.  The  Americans,  it  was  asserted,  were  fortunate  in  being 
able  to  combine  almost  immediate  commercial  advantages  with  ad 
ditional  facilities  for  war-like  operations  on  the  northern  frontier; 
the  Rideau  Canal  had  become  necessary  to  restore  the  equilibrium  of 
attack  and  defense,  but  it  was  also  a  stimulus  to  trade  and  settle 
ment  ;  the  proposed  canal  would  be  likewise  commercially  profitable, 
for  the  rapidly  increasing  population  of  Michigan  and  the  Northwest 
Territories  would  undoubtedly  avail  themselves  of  this  route  to  the 
Atlantic,  and  in  a  political  point  of  view  this  channel  would  increase 
the  interest  of  the  Northwestern  Americans  in  continuing  on  friendly 
footing  with  the  British  Empire ;  it  would  attract  British  settlers 
to  the  west ;  and  in  war  an  English  population  on  Lake  Huron  would 
materially  add  to  British  resources.409 

While  canals  and  highways  were  thus  promoted  in  some  sections, 
in  others  roads  were  absolutely  prohibited — and  in  pursuit  of  the 
same  policy.  In  the  eastern  townships  it  was  deemed  desirable  to 
admit  no  settlements,  a  "state  of  nature"  being  considered  a  better 
defense  than  even  a  military  settlement.  Consequently  no  system 
of  transportation  was  adopted  and  even  the  roads  which  did  exist 
were  not  repaired.  Here  was  an  effort  to  suppress  the  natural 
growth  of  one  part  of  Lower  Canada  in  order  to  protect  the  rest. 
All  attempts  to  keep  these  townships  in  a  state  of  nature  proved, 


Cockburn,  Lt.  Col.  and  Dep.  Qr.  Mast.  Gen.,  report  Nov.  26,  1818,  C.  A.  Q. 
152,  p.  9;  and  letters  C.  A.  Q.  167  B.  p.  56. 

^Reports  on  Ottawa  Canals,  C.  A.  Q.  161,  p.  318.  Also  see  Diary  of  Nicholas 
Garry,  Boy.  Soc.  of  Can.  II  Ser.  vol.  VI.  p.  95. 

W9Shirreff  to  Howick,   Sept.  29,   1832,   C.  A.  jQ.  375  p.  361. 

126 


however,  to  be  very  futile;  but  we  are  not  concerned  with  that. 
The  motive  on  the  part  of  the  British  in  prohibiting  roads  here  was 
to  strengthen  the  military  defenses  of  their  colonies  and  this  same 
motive  was  apparently  stronger  than  any  other  in  prompting  the 
legislators  to  vote  supplies  for  the  construction  of  the  other  roads 
and  canals.  Behind  all  this  was  the  prevailing  opinion  that  the 
Americans  were  simply  awaiting  their  opportunity  to  annex  the 
Canadian  colonies.  British  pride  could  not  suffer  such  a  shock  as 
the  loss  of  additional  North  American  colonies.  Moreover,  British 
capitalists,  merchants,  and  seamen  had  pecuniary  reasons  for  re 
sisting  any  further  surrender  of  provinces. 

For  altogether  too  long  a  period  the  Colonial  Office  in  London 
and  its  representatives  in  the  Canadas  suffered  from  the  infection  of 
old-world  ideas ;  a  colony  was  supposed  to  be  a  direct  and  immediate 
benefit  to  the  mother  country.  Therefore,  in  regard  to  the  Canadas. 
trade  and  revenue  laws  were  made  in  England  and  framed  to  suit 
English  interests ;  a  superabundance  of  highly  paid  officials  sent 
from  England  drew  their  coveted  salaries  from  the  Colonial  treas 
ury;410  a  privileged  clergy  was  alloted  one-seventh  of  the  crown 
lands ;  too  much  local  autonomy  was  undesirable  lest  the  colonists 
should  find  the  means  to  revolt  against  foreign  dictation  and  op 
pression  ;  contamination  from  democratic  doctrines  must  be  avoided 
and  therefore  immigration  from  democratic  states  must  be  care 
fully  supervised ;  missionaries,  teachers,  books,  and  newspapers 
emanating  from  such  a  source  were  dangerous.  The  existence  of 
a  great  Republic  as  a  near  neighbor  was  in  itself  a  source  of  danger 
and  the  more  especially  when  another  old-world  idea  still  held 
sway,  namely  that  one  of  the  functions  of  a  nation  was  to  pounce 
upon  its  unprotected  neighbor.  Would  not  the  American  eagle 
await  its  time  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  swoop  down  upon  its 
prey  in  the  northlands?  The  tardiness  in  surrendering  forts,  the 
unwillingness  to  admit  American  citizens,  the  efforts,  legitimate  and 
illegitimate  to  retain  the  good  will  of  the  Indians,  disputes  over 
strategic  points  along  the  boundary,  futile  attempts  to  prevent  the 
dissemination  of  so-called  American  principles,  the  policy  in  regard 
to  the  placing  of  internal  improvements — all  these  things  were  con 
sidered  matters  of  self-defense  against  American  aggression. 

We  have  noticed  that  immediately  after  the  close  of  the  war  in 


410Hume  in  H.  of  O.  Mar.   12,   1824,  Hansard  II  Series  Vol.   10  p.  855. 

Ibid  Mar.   15,    1825,   Hansard  II   Series  Vol.   12  p.   1035. 

Bennett  in  H.  of  C.  Mar.  12,   1824,  Hansard  II  Series  Vol.   10  p.  958. 

127 


1814  the  old  colonial  restrictive  system — the  navigation  laws — were 
enforced  more  rigidly  than  formerly.  We  have  also  noticed  that 
the  British  a  few  years  later  found  it  prudent  to  adopt  a  more  liberal 
policy ;  the  old  navigation  laws  were  so  unsatisfactory  that  they 
must  perforce  give  way  to  something  more  modern ;  nevertheless 
the  authorities  across  the  ocean  were  slow  to  introduce  any  radical 
improvements.  Even  up  to  the  coming  of  Lord  Durham  the  internal 
administration  of  the  Canadas  and  the  regulation  of  affairs  directly 
or  indirectly  pertaining  to  the  United  States  reflect  not  so  much 
ignorance  of,  or  indifference  to,  the  needs  of  the  Canadas,  as  a  more 
or  less  systematic  pursuit  of  an  antiquated  and  pernicious  colonial 
policy. 


128 


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131 


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